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Abstract
This thesis examines the national welfare consequences of trade liberalization, in the form of changes
to import tariff rates, within the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model, a 2-sector Ricardian trade
model with a novel stochastic specification of national productivity.
We first provide a thorough characterization of the general equilibria found in both the mobile labor
and immobile labor variants of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model, followed by proofs of the
existence and uniqueness of these equilibria.
Given the multiple sectors of trade specified in Eaton and Kortum (2002), it is possible for countries
to experience trade surpluses in one particular sector of trade, so long as they are balanced by deficits
in the other sectors. Welfare consequences of sector specific trade liberalization measures depends
on the sectoral trade balance. This thesis provides a characterization of the pattern of national trade
balances in the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model, and demonstrates that when some regularity
conditions are met, countries can be totally ordered by the number of other countries with which they
enjoy trade surpluses.
Having established the features of the general equilibrium of the Eaton and Kortum trade model, the
thesis next examines how the establishment of preferential trade agreements influences national wel-
fare within the context of the model. We do so by consider the elemental case of a country unilaterally
changing the tariff rate imposed on imports from some other country, and mathematically describe the
amplification process that propogates, via trade in intermediate goods, the initial price shock resulting
from the unilateral tariff change to the rest of the world.
It was found that in the mobile labor variant of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, any country
increasing import tariff rates would increase prices in every country, causing all countries to substi-
tute away from imports towards domestic suppliers. Furthermore, global free trade agreements would
not be stable within this context, as every country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from such
arrangements by imposing import tariffs. It was also found that rules punishing such unilateral de-
viations by allowing punitive import tariffs to be imposed against the offending country would be
ineffective in removing the incentives for deviation.
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Part I
Introduction
What are the welfare consequences of preferential trade liberalization, not only for the countries in-
volved, but also for those countries excluded? Further, if trade liberalization affects the welfare of
both groups, then through what channels? With the surge in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in
the past two decades, these questions are frequently posed by trade economists and policymakers, and
generate considerable public interest.
This thesis aims to examine this issue, through the prism of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model.
We do so by first characterizing the general equilibrium of the Eaton and Korum (2002) trade model,
and subsequently by performing a comparative statics analysis of tariff barriers.
With respect to the characterization of the general equilibrium in Eaton and Kortum (2002), we first
prove that the general equilibrium in both mobile and immobile labor scenarios of the Eaton and
Kortum (2002) always exists, and that the mobile labor general equilibrium is always unique. The
sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the general equilibrium in the immobile labor equilibrium
is also provided.1
One implication of having 2 sectors in the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model is that countries can
experience sectoral trade surpluses or deficits, and that welfare changes due to terms-of-trade effects
depends crucially on sectoral trade balance. We provide a result that shows that countries can be
totally ordered by the number of other countries with which they run trade surpluses, provided that
some regularity conditions on bilateral trade costs are met. This provides a characterization of the
structure of trade surpluses and deficits in the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model, which might be
useful in analyzing the welfare effects of trade liberalization measures.
The general equilibrium characterization portion of the thesis is largely technical in nature. In the
comparative statics portion of the thesis, we consider the implications of preferential trade agreements
in trade models utilizing the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade framework.
In his pioneering study, Viner (1950) suggests that if trade liberalization is preferential (for example,
through the formation of free trade blocs), it could be either welfare improving or welfare deteriorat-
ing for member countries; however, preferential trade agreements would unambiguously harm non-
member countries because of trade diversion. Since Viner, the ambiguity of the direction of welfare
changes for member countries has lead to an extensive literature on theoretical and empirical studies
on member country welfare (e.g Richardson (1993); Krishna (1998); Trefler (2004)). However, the
literature has paid relatively less attention to welfare implications for nonmember countries, instead
largely focusing on the magnitude of the trade diversion effects in empirical studies (e.g. Clausing
(2001); Ghosh and Yamarik (2004); Magee (2008)).
1While Eaton and Kortum (2002) was noted for introducing a novel trade model, the paper was primarily focused on
providing numerical estimates of welfare implications of preferential trade agreements, as opposed to characterizing the
features of the new trade model. Hence, proofs of existence and uniqueness of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model
were not provided in the original paper.
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There are some exceptions which examined welfare implications of preferential trade agreements on
nonmember countries. Using a three-country three-good model, Mundell (1964) shows that when two
countries implement a preferential trade agreement by lowering tariffs on imports from each other,
the excluded country reduces its price to offset trade diversion, thus worsening its terms-of-trade.
Chang and Winters (2002) also use a simple strategic pricing model with differentiated products to
show that a PTA may induce a significant reduction in the export prices of nonmember countries
to member countries, again worsening the terms-of-trade of non-member countries. Unlike these
studies, which investigated the endogenous terms-of-trade changes induced by the PTA as proxies for
changes in national welfare,2 in this thesis we directly study the welfare effects of a PTA, conducting
a comparative static analysis of equilibrium welfare with respect to the tariff changes.
Further, Kemp and Wan (1976) studied the implications of customs unions, and showed that when
there are tariff concessions by or transfers from member countries, each country whether a member
or not would not be made worse off by the formation of the union. Endoh, Hamada and Shimomura
(2013) also show that in a two-good three-country world, tariff concessions or transfers are necessary
for a Pareto-improving PTA unless one of the member countries of the PTA is an entrepot.
In contrast to these studies, this thesis would show that in the Eaton and Kortum general equilibrium
model, nonmember countries can also passively gain from a PTA, even in the absence of tariff con-
cessions or transfers from member countries. Nonmember countries potentially gain through trade
of intermediate goods. When one country decreases import tariffs, the prices of imported intermedi-
ate goods in that country decreases, bringing down manufacturing costs of all final and intermediate
goods in the same country. Much of the lower cost intermediate goods is exported, resulting in lower
costs of production everywhere else.3 Our theoretical analysis demonstrates how trade in intermediate
goods amplifies and propagates the effects of local tariff changes. We show then that when even just
one country reduces tariffs on imports from another country, every country would find domestically
sourced products becomes more relatively more costly than imports, causing every country to substi-
tute towards imports, indicating that PTAs leads surely to trade creation in every country, within the
context of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model.
This thesis contributes to two strands of the international trade literature. The first strand follows Eaton
and Kortum (2012), and could be described as a well-developed literature that uses the Eaton-Kortum
trade framework to analyze the welfare and trade effects of trade liberalization.4 Recently, Arko-
2Another strand of trade literature examines the tariff changes in member countries as being endogenously determined,
providing further implications for the terms-of-trade of nonmember countries. For instance, Bond, Syropoulos and Win-
ters (1996) argue that the optimum tariffs for PTA members against the excluded countries increase when trade barriers
between the PTA members fall, while Ornelas (2005) shows that a PTA reduces the incentive to lobby for higher exter-
nal tariffs because of rent destruction in import-competing sectors. Conversely, Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2015)
generalized Grossman and Helpman (1994), empirically evaluating the relative importance of three different factors that
motivate redistributive government policy, namely, tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. They show
that developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue more heavily, whereas more developed coun-
tries weigh producer interests most heavily, but still assign significance to tariff revenues.
3The importance of intermediate goods has been increasing in international trade. For example, Feenstra and Hanson
(1996) showed that the share of imported intermediate inputs in the US increased from 5:3% to 11:6% between 1972 and
1990. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) found that vertical specialization accounts for some 21% of trade in some OECD
countries and emerging markets, and that it increased by about 30% between 1970 and 1990.
4For a comprehensive survey, see Eaton and Kortum (2012). Some examples of extensions of the basic Eaton and
Kortum model would be Caliendo and Parro (2015), Parro (2013) and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2013).
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lakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) show that for a range of Ricardian trade models, changes
in welfare resulting from changes in trade patterns can be computed using only the two aggregate
statistics, own-trade share and trade elasticity; and demonstrate that these results can be extended to
models applying the Eaton and Kortum framework. Alvarez and Lucas (2007) examined a version of
the Eaton and Kortum model in which intermediate goods are tradable but final goods are not; and in
which every country experiences balanced trade by assumption. Within this framework, they show the
sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium. Caliendo and Parro (2015) extend the
Eaton and Kortum model by introducing inter-sectoral linkages through trade in intermediate goods,
and evaluate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
In this thesis, we also use the Eaton and Kortum trade framework to examine welfare consequences
of a PTA. This thesis differs from the papers discussed above in several aspects. First, Arkolakis,
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012)’s welfare analysis considered the impacts of external shocks
in a world without import tariffs, while our analysis specifically allows for tariffs and studies the
motivations of countries with respect to the implementation of import tariffs. We show that while the
main result in ibid. still holds in our analysis of a no-tariff revenue world, the introduction of tariff
revenues may alter the welfare consequences of a PTA such that own-trade shares and trade elasticity
would no longer be sufficient statistics for computing welfare changes triggered by external shocks.
Furthermore, our analysis aims to disentangle the underlying mechanisms of welfare changes in trade
liberalization within the Eaton and Kortum-framework, while the focus in ibid. was to find common
features of welfare predictions across various trade models.
Another important difference is sectoral trade imbalances. Alvarez and Lucas (2007) studied the Eaton
and Kortum trade framework with one tradable sector under the assumption of balanced trade. In a
single period model, national income must be equal to expenditure. When there is only one tradeable
sector in the model, trade must necessarily balance within this sector for each country. However
as pointed out by Caliendo and Parro (2015), in general within the Eaton and Kortum-framework
with multiple sectors, a country’s imports in any particular sector do not necessarily equal exports
in the same sector. The two-sector Eaton and Kortum-model provides a simple analytically tractable
framework to consider how sectoral trade-imbalances influence the welfare consequences of a PTA,
and we showed that trade surpluses and deficits have significant impact on changes to national welfare.
The second strand of the literature that we contribute to is the one of PTAs and network formation
games. In the literature of trade theory, PTAs are sometimes modelled as networks, with countries
considered as nodes, and reciprocal free trade arrangements forming links between countries. Network
formation games are then used to study the stability of PTAs. Recently Furusawa and Konishi (2007)
showed that global free trade is potentially a stable network following the definition of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996): a network in which (i) no country has an incentive to cut a link with another; and
(ii) for any unlinked pair of countries, at least one of them has no incentive to form a link with the
other. Goyal and Joshi (2006) also prove a similar result, such that if countries are symmetric, a
complete network in which every pair of countries has a PTA, i.e., global free trade, is consistent with
the incentives of individual countries.
The literature considering PTAs as network formation games typically constructs a simple partial
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equilibrium setting to analyze the stability of PTAs. Departing from this literature, we employ the
Eaton and Kortum’s general equilibrium framework, and show that a global free trade network is not
stable. Starting with the scenario of global free trade, we show that increasing tariffs on imports is
welfare improving for any country. In our analysis, changes to national welfare induced by a country
increasing import tariff rates originate from three sources: changes in tariff revenues, changes in
the patterns of trade, and the terms-of-trade effect. Taking each effect independently, an increase
in national tariff revenues increases the country’s purchasing power and hence national welfare. A
diversion of purchases away from more efficient foreign producers towards domestic producers is
welfare decreasing, and an increase in the price of the country’s exports relative to its imports is welfare
increasing. By imposing tariff barriers on imports, which include intermediate goods, the country
forces up production costs and hence, given competitive product markets, the prices of its exports,
resulting in an improvement in the terms of trade. We show that in the Eaton and Kortom model,
this improvement in the terms-of-trade, combined with the increase in tariff revenues, is sufficient to
overcome the negative consequences of reduced trade. This results in a net national welfare gain.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Part II through IV concerns the characterization of
the general equilibrium of the Eaton and Kortum trade model. Part II describes the Eaton and Kortum
(2002)model, explains the foundations of themodel of stochastic production efficiencies underpinning
it, and defines the general equilibria in mobile and immobile variants of the model. Part III provides
the proofs of existence and uniqueness of the equilibria. In Part IV, the potential for sectoral trade
imbalance is discussed and a characterization of the international structure of national trade balance
is provided. Part V provides comparative statics analysis of trade liberalization policies in the mobile
labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum model. Part VI concludes.5
5For interested readers, the Appendix contained in Part VII contains analysis of welfare implications of trade liberaliza-
tion in the immobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum trade model. Given the mathematical complexity (brought on
by endogenously determined wages) and a paucity of general results for the immobile labor scenario that are substantially
different from that of the mobile labor scenario, this analysis was omitted from the main body of the thesis.
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Part II
The Eaton and Kortum (2002) Model of
Trade
In Ricardian trade models, different countries are assumed to have different levels of efficiency in
the production of different goods. Trade between countries is generated by differences in productiv-
ity across countries and goods. If all countries are equally productive in every good, incentives for
international trade would not exist.
Ricardian trade models typically rely on the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets, constant
returns to scale (CRS) production technologies and a single primary (non-produced) factor of produc-
tion, labor. The Eaton-Kortum trade model as a model in the Ricardian framework exhibits all these
features.
At its core, the Eaton and Kortum trade model is a variant of the Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson
(1977) trademodel. The key innovative feature of the Eaton andKortum trademodel is a set of country
specific stochastic functions determining how productivity differs across goods in each country. This
alongwith a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation function combining the continuum of
tradeable goods into a composite final good allows the extension of the 2 country Dornbusch, Fischer
and Samuelson (DFS) trade model to accommodate an arbitrary number of countries.6
The overall general equilibrium model used in the Eaton and Kortum (2002) needs to be carefully dis-
tinguished from the key idea in the paper, which is a partial equilibriummodel of trade with the above-
mentioned stochastic production functions and CES aggregation function, specifying how prices and
patterns of trade are determined in the presence of international trade costs, and heterogeneity of pro-
ductivity across goods and countries. We shall use the term ‘Eaton and Kortum trade framework’ to
denote price and trade flow determining process.
We begin examining the Eaton and Kortum trade framework by first describing the theoretical founda-
tions of Eaton and Kortum’s specification of stochastic production technology in Section 1. In Section
2, the Eaton and Kortum trade framework would be described and characterized, after which in Sec-
tion 3 the Eaton and Kortum trade framework would be augmented with additional assumptions on
6The basic Ricardian model starts with 2 tradeable goods and 2 trading countries. From a historical perspective,
extending the basic model to accommodate an arbitrary set of tradeable goods and an arbitrary number of trading countries
hadn’t been a trivial problem.
Some of the issues complicating the extension of Ricardian trade models to many goods and countries can be found
in Chipman (1965). The theoretical issues stems primarily in the complexity of obtaining general results for patterns of
specialization of national production when there are a large number of distinct goods.
TheDornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) trademodel overcame some of these problems by specifying a continuum

 = [0; 1] of uncountably infinite tradeable goods, simplying the problem of ‘comparing’ comparative advantage across
goods and countries, by describing relative national productive efficiencies as a continuous function of goods in the domain
[0; 1]. However, it had been difficult to extend the DFS model of trade to analysis beyond 2 countries.
Wilson (1980) provides a good overview of the difficulties encountered, and sufficient conditions on measures of cross-
country relative efficiencies of production allowing the extension of the DFS trade model to an arbitary number of coun-
tries.
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the determinants of national income and costs of production to obtain the ‘mobile’ and ‘immobile’
labor variants of Eaton and Kortum (2002) general equilibrium model.
This part of the thesis introduces no new features to the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, seeking only
to provide a comprehensive introduction to the model.
As previously noted, the Eaton and Kortum (2002) paper was largely focused on application: es-
timating the effects of historical preferential trade agreements based on empirical data. Given this
emphasis, formal development and analysis of the model introduced in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
were not presented in the original paper.
The following sections provide a formal development of the model starting from the fundamental
model assumptions stated or implied in Eaton and Kortum (2002), deriving the functions describing
model variables such as prices, patterns of trade and national welfare. We also provide formal defini-
tions of the general equilibria in the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, which would be key to the proofs
of existence and uniqueness of equilibria found in Part III. As a aide to comparative statics analysis
found in Part V, we deviate from the common presentation of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model by
restating the model in linear algebraic form. As noted in the text, for some key model propositions, we
provide proofs which we believe to be more concise and intuitive than what is found in the literature.
1 Research, Blueprints and Stochastic Productivity
In the context of the Eaton and Kortum trade framework, a blueprint or an idea, b; is a production
technique for some good ! to be employed in some country n. The key feature of a blueprint b is the
efficiency zn(!; b) with which one unit of inputs could be converted into output when following the
production technique specified in the blueprint.
Under the assumption of constant returns-to-scale production, using some blueprint b for the produc-
tion of good ! in country n yields output yn(!) as a linear function of the quantity of inputs used
kn(!) such that
yn(!) = zn(!; b)  kn(!):
The efficiency of the blueprint zn(!; b) is simply the quantity of output that 1 unit of input yields.
Let Bn(!; t) denote the set of blueprints for producing good ! possessed by country n at some time t.
The blueprint b(t) 2 Bn(!; t) actually deployed by country n in production of good ! is the blueprint
with greatest efficiency, i.e. b(t) = argmaxb2Bn(!;t) fzn(!; b)g.
Eaton and Kortum (2001) introduced the key defining feature of the Eaton and Kortum trade frame-
work: that the efficiency zn(!) := zn(!; b(t))withwhich each countryn actually produces each good
! is specified as a random variable independently drawn from a Frechet distribution with a country
specific scale parameter7 Tn, interpreted as the level of accumulated production technology in the
7A Frechet distributed random variable X with scale parameter s and shape parameter  would have a cumulative
distribution function, P(X  x) = exp( sx ). Hence strictly speaking, T 1n is the scale parameter for the distribution
of efficiency zn(!). However, we refer to Tn as the scale parameter for convenience.
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country, and a global shape parameter  which describes that degree of heterogeneity of production
efficiencies between various goods.
Even though Ricardian trade models are single period models, for the purpose of modeling the accu-
mulation of blueprints and the quality of the blueprint actually employed - zn(!; b()), it is assumed
that time is continuous, indexed as t 2 ( 1; ) where  is the final period in which the trade analysis
takes place.
Let Rn(t)  0 denote the research intensity in country n in period t, and a the productivity of re-
search. The time between the arrival of new blueprints for any good ! in country n is an exponentially
distributed random variable with arrival rate aRn(t), and each new blueprint is added to the library
Bn(!; t)with no possibility of being forgotten. The beneficial effects of research intensity is not good
specific, in the sense that increases in research efforts in country n increases the rate with which new
blueprints are generated for every good.
By the final period  , the number of ideas accumulated inBn(!; ) is the result of a non-homogeneous
Poisson process, with expected number of accumulated ideas being aTn(), whereTn() :=
R 
 1Rn(t)dt
summarizes the history of research intensity in countryn.8 The total number of blueprints accumulated
by final time  , is thus Poisson distributed with parameter aTn().
The efficiency of each new blueprint is independently drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape
parameter  and minimum value z; the probability a blueprint b has efficiency zn(!; n) exceeding
some level z is given as P(zn(!; b) > z) = (z/z)  for z > z and 1 otherwise. Of all blueprints
accumulated, the expected proportion with efficiency greater than z would be (z/z) . A higher level
of  means that the expected efficiency of new blueprints is low.
Let Cn(z) := jfb 2 Bn(!) j zn(!; b) > zgj denote the number of blueprints accumulated for good ! in
country nwith efficiency exceeding z 2 (z;1), and notice that Cn(z) is the total number of blueprints,
regardless of efficiency. It can be easily shown9 that the number of blueprints accumulated by time 
with efficiency of at least z 2 (z;1) is Poisson distributed with parameter aTn() (z/z) .
8As an aside, to ensure that Tn() is bounded, assume that limt! 1Rn(t) = 0: Intuitively, this means that there is
no research at the start of history, and every country started with a tabula rasa.
9Since the efficiency of each blueprint is independently and identically distributed, the distribution of Cn(z) conditioned
on the total number of blueprints Cn(z) is binomial if Cn(z) < Cn(z).
P

Cn(z) = k j Cn(z) = i

=
(
0 k > Cn(z)
i!
k!(i k)!p
k (1  p)i k k  Cn(z);
where here p := P
 
zn(!; b) > z

is the probability that a blueprint b 2 Bn(!) has greater efficiency than z.
With Cn(z)  Pois() where  = aTn(), the unconditional probability mass function of Cn(z) is therefore
P

Cn(z) = k

=
1X
i=k
P

Cn(z) = i

P

Cn(z) = k j Cn(z) = i

=
1X
i=k

ie 
i!

i!
k! (i  k)!

pk (1  p)i k
=
(p)
k
e 
k!
1X
i=k
( (1  p))i k e (1 p)
(i  k)!
=
(p)
k
e 
k!
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In order to consider blueprints with all possible efficiencies in (0;1), Eaton and Kortum (2010)
normalized az = 1 and considered the limiting case as the minimum possible efficiency z tends
towards 0. With these conditions in place, we have Cn(z)  Pois
 
Tn()z
  ; with
P
 
Cn(z) = k

= exp
 
Tn()z
  Tn()z k
k!
: (1)
For any country n and good  , we can rank the blueprints accumulated in the library Bn(!; ) in
terms of efficiency, such that b(k) denotes the blueprint with the kth highest efficiency, i.e. b(1) =
argmaxb2Bn(!) fzn(!; b)g and zn(!; b(1))  zn(!; b(2))  :::. Denote by z(k)n := zn(!; b(k)) the kth
highest level of efficiency which could be found. It might be fruitful for future research to derive
the probability distribution of z(k)n . Eaton and Kortum (2010) provides a similar derivation focused
on production costs rather than production efficiency spanning several pages. The argument below
provides amore concise, and hopefully amore intuitive, presentation focused on production efficiency.
For an arbitrary level of efficiency z, the event Cn(z) = 0 implies that no blueprint has an efficiency
level greater than z, hence it must be the case that z(1)  z. On the other hand, should the event
Cn(z) = 1 occur, then there must exist some blueprint b(1) with efficiency level z(1) > z, while every
other blueprint, including the second most efficient blueprint, must have efficiency level less than z.
Hence Cn(z) = 1 implies that z(1) > z  z(2). By similar reasoning, for any natural number k and
positive real number z, the event Cn(z) = k is equivalent to the event z(k) > z > z(k+1); which in
probability terms can be written as P
 Cn(z) = k = P z(k) > z > z(k+1).
Lemma 1. Let blueprints in Bn(!; ) be indexed by descending order of efficiency, such that z(k)n :=
zn(!; b
(k)) is the efficiency level of the kth most efficient blueprint in producing good ! available at
time  in country n. Then, the distribution of z(k)n is given as
P
 
z(k)n  z

= exp
 
Tn()z
 )
k 1X
i=0
 
Tn()z
 i
i!
(2)
Proof. We shall argue that P(z(k)  z) =Pk 1i=0 P(Cn(z) = i).
For any arbitrary eventA, let fAg denote the set all of possible outcomes in which the eventA occurs.
Consider the set of outcomes in which the kth ranked efficiency level is less than z, i.e.

z(k)  z	.
It must always be the case for the next higher ranked efficiency level z(k 1), that either z(k 1)  z
or z(k 1) > z but not both. Hence we can partition the set of events where z(k)  z into the a set of
events in which z(k)  z and z(k 1)  z, and another set in which z(k)  z < z(k 1), such that

z(k)  z	 = z(k)  z < z(k 1)	[z(k)  z	\z(k 1)  z	 :
By definition, z(k)  z(k 1), hence z(k)  zwhenever z(k 1)  z, such thatz(k)  z	  z(k 1)  z	.
with the last equality since
P1
i=k
((1 p))i ke (1 p)
(i k)! = P(X  0) = 1 for some random variable X  Pois ( (1  p)).
It follows immediately that the number of blueprints with efficiency greater than z 2 (z;1) is also Poisson distributed
with parameter aTn()

z
z
 
.
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This immediately implies that

z(k)  z	Tz(k 1)  z	 = z(k 1)  z	.
We can therefore write the probability that z(k)  z as
P
 
z(k)  z = P z(k)  z < z(k 1)+ P z(k 1) < z
= P (Cn(z) = k   1) + P
 
z(k 1) < z

=
k 1X
i=0
P (Cn(z) = i  1) : ()
We complete the proof by substituting the probability mass function for Cn(z) provided by equation
1 into equation () above.
The distribution of higher indexed (lower efficiency) blueprints might be useful, depending on the
structure of the market for good ! and how blueprints are distributed between different firms. For
example, if Bertrand competition characterizes the market for good ! and each firm is exogeneously
endowed with only one unique blueprint, the production costs and hence the efficiency level of higher
indexed blueprints would be relevant in the determination of the resulting market outcome.
However, in the Eaton and Kortum trade framework, it is implicitly assumed that in country n at
time  , every firm has access to all blueprints available in the library Bn(!; ). Perfect competition
in product markets ensures that every firm would chose to employ the most efficient blueprint b(1)n
hence the efficiency level of the method actually used to produce good ! at time  in country n is
zn(!; ) = z
(1)
n .
Using Lemma 1, we obtain the result that production efficiency zn(!; ) for any individual good !
is a Frechet distributed random variable with a country specific scale parameter Tn() capturing the
history of research in country n, and a global shape parameter  which captures the variability of
efficiency of blueprints.
We now turn to stating the Eaton-Kortum trade framework in full.
2 The Eaton and Kortum Trade Framework
Let N := f1; 2; :::; Ng denote the set of N trading countries in the global economy. As with DFS
trade models, there is the continuum of uncountably infinite tradeable goods indexed ! 2 
 := [0; 1].
In addition, the Eaton-Kortum trade model makes the following assumptions common to Ricardian
trade models:
1. Labor is the only primary (non-produced) input into production. Labor is immobile between
countries but are perfectlymobile between production of different goodswithin countries. Every
country is endowed with a fixed pool of labor force Ln. Each household supplies 1 unit of labor
and a country’s labor force Ln could also be interpreted as the country’s population.
2. Perfectly competitive product and labor markets.
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3. Every country has the ability to produce any tradeable good in 
 with constant returns-to-scale
production technologies, such that for kn(!) units of a bundle of inputs into the production of
good !, producers in country n would be able to produce
yn(!) = zn(!)  kn(!) (3)
units of good !, where zn(!) is a exogeneously determined level of productive efficiency. Let
cn refer to the cost of one unit of production inputs in country n.10 Perfect competition in product
markets ensures that the factory-gate price pnn(!) of good ! equal marginal costs of production,
with
pnn(!) =
cn
zn(!)
:
4. Costs of trading between countries follows the Samuelson Iceberg assumption: delivering 1 unit
of some good ! from country i to country n requires the production of dni  1 units in country
i, with the excess dni   1 dissipated in the act of transportation from i to n. The unit price of
good ! produced in country i and delivered to country n unencumbered by import tariffs would
hence be
pni(!) = dnipii(!): (4)
If an ad-valorem tariff rate tni were imposed by country n on imports from country i, the final
country n price inclusive of import tariffs would be
pni(!) = dnipii(!) =
dnici
zi(!)
; (5)
where dni = (1 + tni) dni could be interpreted as the total costs of trade from country i to country
n or the ‘economic’ distance from country i and n, with dni interpreted as the ‘geographical’
distance associated with factors like physical distance, cultural affinity etc, and (1 + tni) being
the tariff barrier to trade.
It is assumed that the triangular inequality holds for trade costs, such that for all n; i; j 2 N , it
is always the case that dnidij  dnj . This assumption ensures that it is never cheaper to route
trade through a third country.
In the Eaton and Kortum trade model, tradeable goods in 
 are valued only in the form of a final
composite good, aggregated with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function
Gn =
Z
!2

qn(!)
 1
 d!
 
1 
; (6)
where qn(!) is quantity of an individual tradeable good ! 2 
 used in the production of Gn units of
10The assumption here is that the production of every manufacturing good
 requires the same input bundle.. As would
be later discussed, with the specification of the Eaton and Kortum trade model examined in this thesis, the production func-
tion for each good ! 2 
 is Cobb-Douglas, with Total Factor Productivity zn(!), taking as inputs labor and intermediate
goods with  and (1  ) being the labor and intermediate good output elasticities (equivalently cost shares). For a given
wage rate and intermediate good price in each country, the production of every good would require labor and intermediate
goods in the same proportions, hence the assumption of a uniform production input bundle and national input cost cn.
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the final composite good.
Buyers in each country wish to minimize the cost of the final composite good. For each good ! 2 
;
buyers in country n are faced with potential suppliers from every country i 2 N each offering a price
pni(!). Cost minimizing buyers would choose the lowest priced supplier, and the realized price of
good11 ! in country n would be
pn(!) := min
i2N
pni(!):
Taking as given fpn(!)g!2
, the set of country n realized prices, solving the optimal demand problem
for the composite good given expenditure Xn yields
Gn(q
) =
Xn
pn
where q := fqn (!)g!2[0;1] is the optimum basket of tradeable goods; qn(!0) the optimal demand for
for each good !0 2 
 given by
qn(!0) =
pn(!0)
 
p1 n
Xn; (7)
and
pn :=
Z 1
0
pn(!)
1 d!
 1
1 
(8)
is the CES price index which is interpreted as the unit cost of the composite good.
The discussion up to this point has been of a conventional Ricardian trade model with a CES demand
function. The main contribution of Eaton and Kortum in the extending the DFS trade model is the par-
simonious specification of heterogeneous production efficiencies zn (!) across countries and goods.
Two parameters, a country specific measure of technological prowess Tn, and a global measure of
variability of manufacturing efficiencies , fully specifies the differences in national productivities
that gives rise to international trade.
For each country n 2 N and each good ! 2 
, the level of efficiency zn(!) with which country n
produces good !, is an independently distributed random variable with a Frechet distribution. The
probability distribution of zn(!), is given by the cumulative distribution function
P(zn(!)  z) = exp
  Tnz  : (9)
As earlier discussed in Section 1, the parameter Tn could be interpreted as the level of accumulated
technology in country n. A higher level of national technology Tn would result in higher expected
level of efficiency with which goods could be produced in country n.
The parameter  is defined as a global parameter that measures the effectiveness of research effort.
High values of  implies that research is ineffective, in the sense that high efficiency blueprints arrive
at a low rate and are relatively uncommon. Hence,  could be interpreted as ameasure of the dispersion
of productive efficiency with greater values of  associated lower likelihood of goods being produced
11With the stochastic nature of prices pni (as discussed further on in the text), the term ‘realized price’ might be mis-
takenly taken to mean the observed value of a randomly distributed price. In the context of this section, ‘realized price’ of
good !, pn(!) should instead be simply understood as the price that buyers in country n actually pay for good !:
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with very high efficiency. High values of  is associated with less weight in the upper tail of the
probability distribution of zn(!) for all countries and goods. Some authors interpret Tn as the level
of absolute advantage for country n and  as the level to which the effects of comparative advantage
operates in the global market place.
From an analytical perspective, it is more intuitive to consider the random variable zn(!) in terms of
an exponentially distributed random variable zn(!)   Exp(Tn).12 Since production efficiencies (or
equivalently total factor productivity) can be expressed as exponentially distributed random variables,
and production functions are constant returns to scale, it is unsurprising that tradeable goods prices
can also be expressed as exponentially distributed random variables.
Proposition 1. Taking exporting country i’s national production inputs costs ci as given,
1. pni(!) the price of a good ! produced in country i when sold in country n, can be expressed
as an exponentially distributed random variable, such that pni(!)  Exp(ni) where ni :=
Tic
 
i d
 
ni .
2. pn(!) := mini2N pni(!) the realized price of good ! in country n, can also be expressed as
an exponentially distributed random variable, such that pn(!)  Exp(n) where n :=P
i2N ni.
Proof. (Item 1) From equation 5 and zn(!)   Exp(Tn), we have
P(pni  p) = P
 cidni
zi(!)

 p

= P

zi(!)
   p (cidni) 

= 1  exp

  Ti (cidni)  p

:
(Item 2) By the definition of pn(!) = mini2N pni(!), it is the case that pn(!) > p for some p > 0
only if pni(!) > p for all i 2 N , so we can write
P

pn(!)
  p

= 1  P

pn(!)
 > p

= 1  P
 \
i2N
pni(!)
 > p

: ()
Since fzi(!)gi2N are independently distributed random variables, the set of prices

pni(!)

	
i2N is
12To see this, simple note that
P(zn(!)   z) = P(zn(!) > z  1 )
= 1  P(zn(!)  z  1 )
= 1  exp( Tnz):
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also a set of independent random variables, in which case we must have
P
 \
i2N
pni(!)
 > p

=
Y
i2N
P(pni(!) > p)
=
Y
i2N
exp

  ni

= exp

 
X
i2N
ni

; ()
with the second equality from Item 1 of the Proposition. Substituting () into () gives the required
result.
For every pair of countries n; i 2 N , let 
ni  
 denote the set of goods country n sources from
country i, and ni := j
nijj
j denote the proportion of tradeable goods in 
 for which country i is the
lowest cost provider to country n. Equivalently, ni denotes the proportion of tradeable goods that
country n purchases from country i.
Given stochastic national productive efficiencies and tradeable good prices pni(!), it is not possible
to exactly identify which particular goods would be in 
ni. However the stochastic nature of prices
in the Eaton and Kortum trade model is not a drawback, but in fact provides the model with desirable
mathematical qualities.
For one, it is easy to provide a measure of the range of goods that one country sources from another.
As there is an infinite number of goods in the continuum 
 = [0; 1], Borel’s Law of Large Numbers
implies that the probability that country i is the lowest cost provider of a specific good to country n,
is also ni, the proportion of goods for which country i is the lowest cost provider to country n.
Proposition 2. The fraction of tradeable goods in 
 that country n sources from country i is given as
ni =
ni
n
:
Proof. It is a well known result that for two exponentially distributed random variables, a  Exp(A)
and b  Exp(B), we have P(a = min fa; bg) = A
A+B
.
Fix some arbitrary ! 2 
. In the context of this proof, let a = pni(!)  Exp(ni) and b =
minj2Nni pnj(!) where Nni refers to set of countries in N excluding country i. From Item 2 of
Proposition 1, we have b  Exp(n   ni). The probability that country i is the lowest priced
supplier to country n is then
P
 
pni(!) = min
j2N
pnj(!)

= P
 
pni(!)
 = min
j2N
pnj(!)


= P

pni(!)
 =

pni(!); min
j2Nni
pnj(!)


= P(a = min fa; bg)
=
ni
n
:
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Pick some arbitrary positive integer M . Let X1; :::; XM be a number of Bernoulli trials in which
goods !1; :::; !M are randomly picked without replacement from 
, and tested to see if !m 2 
ni, for
m = 1; :::;M . Let Xm = 1 if !m 2 
ni and 0 otherwise, and CM(
ni) =
PM
m=1Xm be the count of
successes afterM attempts, such that CM (
ni)
M
is the proportion of !1; :::; !M found to be in 
ni.
The Borel’s law of large numbers states that limM!1 CM (
ni)M = P(!m 2 
ni). Suppose every good
! 2 
 were so tested, then M ! 1 as there are an infinite number of goods in 
, and CM (
ni)
M
must thus be the proportion of ! 2 
 that are in 
ni such that CM (
ni)M = j
nijj
j = ni. Then since
P(! 2 
ni) = P
 
pni(!) = minj2N pnj(!)

, we have the desired result, ni = nin :
Another mathematically convenient feature of the Eaton and Kortum framework is that the definition
of the realized prices as the minimum of independent exponentially distributed random variables also
implies that the distribution of good prices pn(!) in a country does not depend on where the goods are
sourced from.
Proposition 3. The distribution of the realized price of good ! in country n, pn(!), does not depend
on the source of !, such that for all n; i 2 N and ! 2 
,
P
 
pn(!)  p j! 2 
ni

= P
 
pn(!)  p

:
Proof. Since minj 6=i

pnj(!)

	  Exp(n   ni) and pni(!)  Exp(ni) are independent random
variables, and pn(!) = pni(!) if and only if pni(!)  minNj 6=i

pnj(!)

	
, we can write the joint
probability of the events pn  p and pn(!) = pni(!) (which is equivalent to ! 2 
ni) as
P
 
pn  p

&

pni(!)
 = pn
 
= P
 
pni  p

&

pni(!)
  min
j 6=i

pnj
	
=
Z p
0
P

min
j 6=i

pnj
	
> z

dP(pni  z)
=
Z p
0
exp

  (n   ni) z

 ni exp( niz)dz
=
ni
n
Z p
0
n exp ( nz) dz
= niP
 
pn  p

:
Recalling that ni = P(pn = pni), we immediately notice that
P(pn  p j pn = pni) =
P
 
pn  p

&

pni(!)
 = pn
 
P(pn = pni)
= P(pn  p);
as required.
Finally, the specification of realized prices as continuously distributed random variables implies that
it is always possible to sort goods in 
 such that prices of tradeable goods could be expressed as a
continuous function of goods in 
 = [0; 1] : As shall be shown, this gives a tractable specification
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of both the national CES price index, as well as how a country allocates import expenditures among
different suppliers.
We first turn our attention to specifying realized prices pn(!) as a continuous function of goods ! 2 

and solving for the CES price index pn.
Proposition 4. It is possible to sort goods ! 2 
 = [0; 1] such that realized prices in each country
n 2 N is written as
pn(!) =

  ln(1  !)
n
 1

; (10)
a continuous and strictly increasing function of !:
Then the country n price of the composite good is given as
pn = 
  1

n ; (11)
where  :=

 (1 + 1 

)
 1
1  and   is the gamma function.
Proof. For any realization of prices fpn(!)gn2N , sort the set of goods ! 2 
 = [0; 1] in ascending
order of pn(!). Fix some arbitrary good !0 2 [0; 1]. Since goods in 
 have been sorted by prices, we
would have pn(!)  pn(!0) for all ! 2 [0; !0]. The proportion of goods with lower prices than !0 is
j[0;!0]j
j
j = !0 as 
 = [0; 1] implies that j
j = 1.
Let F : R+ ! [0; 1] denote the cumulative distribution function of pn(!), such that F
 
pn(!0)

:=
P(pn(!)  pn(!0)). By Proposition 1, it is the case that pn(!)  Exp(n), and bearing in mind that
 > 0, we have
F
 
p(!0)

= P
 
pn(!)  pn(!0)

= P
 
pn(!)
  pn(!0)

= 1  exp( p(!0)):
By Borel’s law of large numbers, the proportion of goods ! with pn(!)  pn (!0) equals the proba-
bility F (pn(!0). We can therefore write
F
 
pn(!0)

= !0:
By the definition of function F as a cumulative probability distribution function, F is a continuous
one-to-one function mapping from the set of realized prices to the set of goods [0; 1]. The inverse
function F 1 : [0; 1] ! R+ therefore exists. Hence, for any good !0 2 [0; 1], the function mapping
from the set of goods into prices could be written as
pn(!0) = F
 1(!0) =

  ln(1  !0)
n
 1

: (12)
This gives the first part of the proposition.
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To show the second part, substitute equation 10 into the CES price index in equation 8 giving
pn =
Z 1
0
pn(!)
1 d!
 1
1 
= 
  1

n
Z 1
0
(  ln(1  !)) 1  d!
 1
1 
(13)
= 
  1

n
Z 1
0
y
1 
 e ydy
 1
1 
= 
  1

n ;
with the third equality due to a change of variable y =   ln(1 !), and  :=  (1 + 1 

)
 1
1  where
  is the gamma function.
Having established national prices of tradeable goods, we shall now focus on patterns of trade: how
a country allocates its expenditure on goods across imports from other countries. Proposition 2 es-
tablished the range of goods a country n might optimally choose to source from some country i. The
next proposition tells us that ni is not only the proportion of the types of goods that country n sources
from country i, but is also the fraction of country n’s expenditure on tradeable goods spent on goods
produced in country i.
Proposition 5. Let Xni =
R
!2
ni pn(!)q

n(!) d! denote the country n’s expenditure on goods pro-
duced in country i, and recall that Xn is country n’s total expenditure on tradeable goods, such that
Xni
Xn
is interpreted as the proportion of country n’s expenditure on tradeable goods spent on goods
produced in country i. It is the case that
Xni
Xn
= ni
where ni = nin as defined in Proposition 2.
Proof. Fix some arbitrary country n 2 N . The optimal expenditure by country n on goods sourced
from any country i 2 N is found by summing up on optimal expenditures pn(!)qn(!) for all goods
! 2 
ni. We write this as
Xni =
Z
!2
ni
pn(!)q

n(!) d!: ()
Given national prices pn(!) for all goods ! 2 
 and nominal national expenditure Xn, equation
7 gives the optimal quantity demanded qn(!0) for any good !0 2 
. Substituting equation 7 into
equation () and dividing throughout byXn gives the proportion of country n’s expenditures spent on
imports from country i as
Xni
Xn
=
R
!02
ni pn(!0)
1 d!0
p1 n
: ()
We now wish to solve the integral
R
!02
ni pn(!0)
1 d!0. In order to do so, we shall derive pn(!0) as
a continuous function of !0 2 
ni.
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Sort the set of goods ! 2 
 = [0; 1] by countries of origin such that [0; ni] = 
ni is the set of goods
country n sources from country i. (Recall that ni = j
nijj
j is the proportion of goods in 
 = [0; 1] that
are in 
ni:)
Fix some arbitrary good !0 2 
ni = [0; ni] : Sorting the set 
ni = [0; ni] in ascending order by
price, such that we have [0; !0]  [0; ni] as the set of goods imported by n from i with prices less or
equal to that pn(!0). The proportion of goods in [0; ni] with prices less than pn(!0) would obviously
be !0
ni
.
By Proposition 3, the distribution of the price pn(!) of any good is independent of its source, hence
for any ! 2 
ni = [0; ni], we have pn(!)  Exp(n) and it immediately follows that
P(pn (!)  pn(!0)) = 1  exp( npn(!0)):
Since there are an infinite number of goods in 
ni = [0; ni], the Borel’s law of large number13 shows
that the probability that some good in
ni has a lower price than pn(!0) is also the proportion of goods
in [0; ni] that has prices lower than !0 2 [0; ni] : This gives the equality
1  exp( npn(!0)) = !0
ni
:
By similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, we then can write the prices of any good !0 2

ni = [0; ni] as a continuous function of !0, such that
pin(!0) =
 
  ln(1 
!0
ni
)
n
! 1

: (  )
Notice the use of the superscript i to distinguish pin(!), the function giving prices of goods conditioned
on the goods being sourced from country i, from pn(!) which is the ‘general’ unconditional price
function of tradeable goods in 
.
Having sorted 
 such that 
ni = [0; ni], substituting (  ) into () gives
Z
!2
ni
pn(!0)
1 d!0 =
Z ni
0
 
  ln(1 
!0
ni
)
n
! 1 

d!0
= ni
Z 1
0

  ln(1  !)
n
 1 

d!; (14)
with the second equality due to a change of variable ! = !0
ni
. In the proof of Proposition 4, equation
13The argument here in employing Borel’s law of large numbers, that the probability P(pn (!)  pn(!0)) also gives
the proportion of goods ! with prices lower than that of !0, that is identical to the argument employed in the second part
of Proposition 2.
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13 showed that
R 1
0

  ln(1 !)
n
 1 

d! = p1 n :Hence we obtain the desired result
Xni
Xn
= ni
R 1
0

  ln(1 !)
n
 1

d!
p1 n
= ni
and ni is not only the proportion of goods in 
 that are in 
ni, but also the proportion of country n’s
expenditures on tradeable goods is spent on country i sourced goods.14
Wewould conclude this section with a final proposition, that if the triangular inequality for trade costs
holds, a country exports a good only if the country produces the good for domestic use. Intuitively, a
country is sufficiently efficient in producing a good ! to be competitive in foreign markets, only if it
is competitive in its own domestic market for the good.
Proposition 6. For any good ! 2 
, and country n 2 N ,

in  
nn;
for all i 2 N . Then it immediately follows that
in  nn;
and that the no-trade-arbitrage condition holds such that
pi < pndin
for all i; n 2 N .
Proof. Take some good! 2 
in for some countries i; n 2 N . Then it must be the case that pin(!) 
pij(!
) for all j 2 N , in turn implying that
zn(!
)
cn /
zj(!
)
cj
 din
dij
; ()
which can be economically interpreted as meaning that country n is most competitive in supplying
good ! to country i only if country n’s comparative advantage in the production of good ! relative to
any other country is sufficiently great as to overcome the relative trade costs of supplying into country
i’s product market.
The triangular inequality assumption in trade costs ensures that dindnj  dij or equivalently, dindij 
dnj . Combining this with equation () gives
zn(!)
cn /
zj(!)
cj
 dnj; 8j 2 N ;
14The basic idea for the proof is that the independence of distribution of prices of a good from the source of the good
implies that as a function, pin is identical to pn, just compressed from the domain [0; 1] into the subset [0; ni]. The area
under the curve for
 
pin
1  in the domain [0; ni] then is simply the area under the curve for p1 n over [0; 1] scaled down
by ni.
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or equivalently, pnn(!)  pnj(!) for all j 2 N and ! 2 
nn.
Since we have shown that 
in  
nn, it must be the case that in = j
inj  j
nnj = nn.
To show that the no-trade-arbitrage condition holds, simply note that since jn  nn, jn = jnj ,
jn = Tjc
 
j d
 
jn , and j =  p j for all j 2 N , we have
in
nn
=

dinpn
pi
 
 1
or equivalently dinpn  pi.
The no-trade-arbitrage statement of Proposition 6, that pndin  pi for all n; i 2 N , simply means that
no trader could earn a positive profit by buying the final composite good in country n and ship it to
country i at cost pndin for resale at price pi. The proof of Proposition 6 also highlights the critical
importance of the triangular inequality in trade costs in Ricardian trade models.
Recall that for each good ! 2 
; cost-minimizing buyers in country n chose from a menu of prices
fpii(!)dnigi2N and picks the supplier offering the lowest ‘direct’ price15 pjj(!)dnj = mini2N fpii(!)dnig,
resulting in the realized price of good ! in country n as being pn(!) = pjj(!)dnj . The results from
analysis above all follow from this characterization of national prices of tradeable goods.
The triangular inequality assumption in trade costs ensures that there is no possibility of obtaining
good ! at an even lower price by routing the purchase of the good through a third country. Suppose
a buyer in country n instead decides to route a purchase of 1 unit of good ! from country j through
some third country k. She would have to pay dkjpjj(!) for the good to be delivered to country k, and
an additional (dnk   1) dkjpjj(!) for transporting the good from country k to country n. The total cost
of purchasing good ! from j through third party k would be dnkdkjpjj(!). If the triangular inequality
holds, than dnkdkj  dnj and it would never be cheaper for the country n buyer to route the purchase
through a third country.
On other hand, suppose the triangular inequality does not hold, and dnkdkj < dnj . If this were the case,
then pjj(!)dnkdkj < pjj(!)dnj and the country n buyer should not purchase the good directly from
the manufacturer in country j, and the realized price of good ! in country n need not correspond to
mini2N fpii(!)dnig. In fact, buyers in every country would need to consider the possibility of routing
the trade not only through third countries, but other possibilities involving any number of intermediate
countries. The immediate implication of course is that Proposition 1 would not hold, and neither any
of the other propositions as they depend in part on the condition that pn(!) = mini2N fpii(!)dnig.
Yet in reality it is often cheaper to route goods through trade hubs or entrepots like Singapore, in the
process of transporting a good from the supplier to its final customer, so it would be interesting, at
least in future work, to see how a relaxation of the triangular inequality might be accommodated in
the Eaton and Kortum framework.
The Eaton andKortum trademodel as it has been so far developed in this section is a partial equilibrium
15The use of the term ‘direct’ price might require some explanation. From the perspective of the buyer in country n,
pjj(!)dnj represents the cost of acquiring good ! directly from the supplier in country j at factory gate price pjj(!) and
paying pjj(!)(dnj   1) in transportation costs, hence the use of the term ‘direct’ price pjj(!)dnj :
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model as determinants of production input costs cn and national expenditures on tradeable goods
Xn has yet to be defined. We have only explored the general features of Ricardian models of trade
employing the Eaton and Kortum specification of stochastic technology, and shown that Propositions
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 describe the key features of prices of tradeable goods and patterns of trade that
must necessarily hold in any such models. The next section develops the general equilibrium model
employed in Eaton and Kortum (2002) by specifying how costs and expenditures are determined.
3 General Equilibrium Model in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
A key goal in trade analysis is to examine how national welfare changes in response to changes in
trade flows. As the term implies trade flows both captures the direction of trade or trade patterns
- who produces what for sale to whom, and trade volumes - of each good traded, how much in ei-
ther monetary or quantitative terms is transacted. Explaining how trade flows might be affected by
changes in variables such as barriers to trade and changes in technologies employed in production and
transportation would provide insight into the consequent effects on national welfare.
In order to conduct a general equilibrium analysis of trade flows and national welfare employing the
Eaton and Kortum trade framework, the model needs to be closed by specifying the determinants of
production costs, national income and expenditures on tradeable goods.
In this section, we describe how the Eaton and Kortum trade framework was augmented to obtain the
general equilibrium model employed in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
In the Eaton and Kortum (2002) general equilibriummodel, as with Ricardian trade models in general,
labor is immobile between countries. There are 2 sectors of tradeable goods, ‘manufacturing’ and
‘non-manufacturing’. Each country n 2 N is exogeneously endowed with a labor force Ln. The labor
force is distributed between employment in the manufacturing sector LMn and the non-manufacturing
sector LOn . Perfectly competitive labor markets ensure full employment such that Ln = LMN + LOn .
International trade in the non-manufacturing good is costless and tariff barriers do not exist. Hence
the law of one price applies in the non-manufacturing sector and the price of the non-manufacturing
good is the same in every country. It is natural therefore to designate the non-manufacturing good
as the numeraire good. The only factor of production for non-manufacturing goods is labor. Let
wOn denote the national non-manufacturing wage rate, such that Y On = wOnLOn denotes the national
non-manufacturing income.
Production and trade in the manufacturing sector is governed by the Eaton and Kortum trade frame-
work as described in Section 2. That is to say, there are infinitely many manufacturing goods ! 2 
,
aggregated into a final composite manufacturing good by the CES function specified in equation 6.
Assumptions 1 through 4 stated at the start of Section 2 applies to the manufacturing sector, as would
Propositions 1 through 6.
Alongside labor, production of manufacturing goods takes the composite manufacturing good as in-
termediate inputs. The manufacturing production function has a Cobb-Douglas specification, with 
being the share of labor income and the remainder (1  ) being the cost share of intermediate goods.
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The basket of production inputs going into the manufacturing production (as stated in equation 3)
is thus given as kn(!) = LMn (!)GMn (!)1  where LMn (!)16 is the manufacturing labor force, and
GMn (!) is the units of the composite manufacturing good employed in country n on the production of
good ! respectively.
Given cost minimization by producers of manufacturing goods, the optimized cost of each input basket
in country n is
cn = (wn)
 (pn)
1  (15)
where wn is the national manufacturing wage rate and pn is the national price of the composite good
as given in equation 11 in Proposition 4.
Given national manufacturing revenue Qn, national manufacturing labor income is
Y Mn = wnL
M
n = Qn (16)
and the national expenditure on manufacturing goods as intermediate inouts is (1  )Qn.
Substituting the equation 15 into the findings of Section 2 we obtain the following results for prices
and trade patterns in the manufacturing sector:
ni(p;w) = Ti

wi p
1 
i dni
 
(17)
n(p;w) =
X
i2N
ni(p;w) (18)
pn(p;w) = n(p;w) 
1
 (19)
ni(p;w) =
ni(p;w)
n(p;w)
(20)
where p = (p1; :::; pN) and w = (w1; :::; wN) denote the vectors of national manufacturing prices (or
more specifically, national prices of the manufacturing composite good) and national manufacturing
wages respectively. Notice that a consequence of the role of manufacturing goods as intermediate
goods is the inter-dependency of national manufacturing prices.
National welfare is determined by the level of real consumption of both non-manufacturing goods COn
and of the manufacturing composite good17 C
M
n
pn
. The national aggregate welfare function for each
country is Cobb-Douglas, stated as
Wn =

CMn
pn
  
COn
1 
:
where  is the share of national consumption expenditure spent on consumption of the final manufac-
turing good.
Given the static nature of Ricardian trade models in general, it is necessarily the case that nominal
16Total manufacturing labor employment is LMn =
R
!2
 L
M
n (!)d!.
17CMn and COn are the nominal expenditures on the consumption of the composite manufacturing good and the non-
manufacturing goods respectively. Hence C
M
n
pn
is real consumption of themanufacturing good. COn is also real consumption
of the non-manufacturing good as the non-manufacturing good, as the numeraire good, has the price of 1 in every country.
30
national income Yn equals nominal expenditures on consumption CMn + COn . Then optimal national
demand for consumption goods, subject to the national budget constraint, gives optimized national
aggregate welfare18 as
Wn =
Yn
pn
: (21)
The national expenditure on non-manufacturing goods is COn = (1  )Yn, and the national expen-
diture on manufacturing good consumption is CMn = Yn.
Total national expenditure on manufacturing goods Xn includes both expenditure on manufacturing
goods as consumption goods and as intermediate goods into manufacturing production, hence
Xn = (1  )Qn + Yn: (22)
From Proposition 5, country n’s expenditure on goods sourced from country i is Xni = niXn. If
country n imposes an ad-valorem tariff tni on imports from country i, this expenditure Xni would
consist of 2 parts: Qin the before-tariffs manufacturing revenue earned by country i, and TRni =
tniQin the tariff revenue collected by country n (and subsequently rebated in full to households in
country n). Since Xni = TRni +Qin = (1 + tni)Qin, we have
Qin =
1
1 + tni
niXn
TRni =
tni
1 + tni
niXn:
Total national manufacturing revenue Qn =
P
i2N Qni is
Qn =
X
i2N
in
1 + tin
Xi: (23)
Total national tariff revenue TRn =
P
i2N TRni is
TRn = Xn
X
i2N
tnini
1 + tni
: (24)
Since the national tariff revenue is rebated in full to households in the same country, total national
income is the sum of manufacturing and non-manufacturing incomes and tariff revenues on imports
of manufacturing goods, such that
Yn = Y
O
n + Y
M
n + TRn:
Equations 19 and 20 show that manufacturing wage rates wn affects manufacturing prices and pat-
terns of trade. Eaton and Kortum (2002) provided 2 specifications of intra-sectoral labor mobility,
18Optimized level of national aggregate welfare should be Wn = 1A
Yn
pn(p
O
n )
1  where A =  (1  )1  and pOn is
national price of non-manufacturing goods. Since we are primarily interested in relative changes in national welfare, we
can safely ignore the constant term A by setting it to 1. Since the non-manufacturing good is designated the numeraire
good, we have pOn = 1 for all countries n:
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termed the ‘mobile’ and ‘immobile’ labor scenarios respectively, with different implications for the
determination of national manufacturing wages and the resulting equilibria.
3.1 Mobile Labor Scenario
In the mobile labor scenario, labor is fully mobile between the manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sectors, and perfectly competitive national labor markets ensure the equality of wages between the
two sectors within each country. National wages wn are completely determined by exogeneously
given productivity in the non-manufacturing sector,19 which when combined with fixed national labor
supply Ln results in total national labor income being fixed at
Y On + Y
M
n = wn Ln:
National income in the mobile labor scenario is then
Yn = wn Ln + TRn: (25)
Given exogeneously given national wages and labor supply, national income only varies with tariff
revenues in the mobile labor scenario.
National expenditure on manufacturing goods in the mobile labor scenario is then
Xn = (1  )Qn + TRn + wn Ln: (26)
In the Eaton and Kortum (2002) general equilibrium model, only two markets matter, the manufactur-
ing product market and the national labor market. The national budget constraint ensures that if these
two markets clear, the non-manufacturing market must clear as well.
In the mobile labor equilibrium, the national labor market outcome is exogeneously determined by the
externally given national wages and labor supply. The only market that is not completely determined
by external parameters is the manufacturing product market. Consequently, analysis of the mobile
labor case need only consider developments in the manufacturing sector.
The discussion of the Eaton and Kortum trade model necessarily involves vectors of variables such
as manufacturing prices and wages, and matrices of variables such as expenditure shares, but also
vectors and matrices of functions of such variables. To render such notations intelligible, and to avoid
too many standalone symbols, we here offer the following definitions:
• Let M (zni) denote a square N  N matrix with zni being the element on the nth row and ith
column, i.e. the first subscript refers to the row index while the latter denotes the column index.
It follows immediately from this definition that M(zin) = M(zni)>, where M(zni)> refers to
the transpose of the matrixM(zni).
19To ensure that that non-manufacturing productivity determines national labor wages in each country, it is assumed
that labor supply in each country is sufficiently large such that non-manufacturing production occurs in each country.
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• Let L (zn) = (z1; :::; zN)T denote a N  1 column vector with the kth element being zk, and
• D (zn) denote a N  N diagonal matrix, with all off-diagonal elements being 0, and the kth
diagonal element being the kth element from the vector L (zn).
For example,
M (zni) =
266664
z11 z12 ::: z1N
z21 z22 ::: z2N
... ... . . . ...
zN1 zN2 ::: zNN
377775 ; D (zn) =
266664
z1 0 ::: 0
0 z2 ::: 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 ::: zN
377775 :
• Let 1N := (1; 1; :::; 1)> and 0N := (0; 0; :::; 0)> refer to N dimensional vectors entirely com-
posed of 1’s and 0’s respectively.
• Finally, let k := (0; ::; 0; 1; 0; :::; 0)> denote a N dimensional kth unit vector, i.e. a vector with
1 in the kth position and 0’s everywhere else.
Cost minimization by buyers of the composite manufacturing good in each country n 2 N requires
that national manufacturing prices pn satisfy equation 19, and import expenditure shares on man-
ufacturing goods ni satisfy equation 20. Equivalently, the vectorof national manufacturing prices
p = (p1; :::; pN) must satisfy
p = L
 
n(p) 
1


; (27)
where n(p) is given by equation 18.
The matrix of expenditure shares must satisfy
(p) = M
Ti dniwi p1 i  
p n

; (28)
where (p) := M
 
ni(p)

.
Notice that we have removed the reference to manufacturing wages in the arguments to the prices,
expenditure shares and n; because in the mobile labor scenario, manufacturing wages are exogenous
parameters.
In linear algebraic form, the vector of national tariff revenue L(TRn) can be written as a function of
expenditure shares in  := M(ni), tariff rates in M(tni) and the vector of national manufacturing
expenditures L(Xn)
L
 
TRn(p)

= Dt(p)  L Xn(p); (29)
where Dt(p) := D
 P
i2N ni(p)
tni
1+tni

.
The vector of national manufacturing revenues (or equivalently nominal output) can be written
L
 
Qn(p)

= t(p)>  L Xn(p); (30)
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where t(p)> := M
 
1
1+tni
ni(p)
>
:
Substituting equations 29 and 30 into the the vector form of equation 26, L(Xn) = (1  )L(Qn) +
L(TRn) +L(wn Ln), shows that the vector of national expenditures on manufacturing goods must
satisfy 
I  (1  )t(p)>   Dt(p)L Xn(p) = L(wn Ln): (31)
The equilibrium conditions for the mobile labor scenario is summarized in the following definition.
Definition 1. Given model parameters , , , L(Tn), L(wn), L(Ln), M(dni) andM(tni), an equilib-
rium in the mobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model consists of
1. A price vector p 2 RN++; satisfying equation 27. (Prices)
2. A matrix of expenditure shares (p) satisfying equation 28. (Pattern of Trade)
3. A vector of national manufacturing expenditures L
 
Xn(p)

satisfying equation 31. (Scale of
Trade)
Since expenditure shares (p) is a function of prices p, there must be a unique matrix of equilibrium
expenditure shares if the vector of equilibrium prices p is unique.
By an argument almost identical to the proof of Lemma 3 below, it can be easily shown that the matrix
I  (1  )t(p)>   Dt(p) is invertible in which case equation 31 has a unique solution for any
vector of prices p, and consequently the vector of manufacturing expenditures L
 
Xn(p)

is a function
of the vector of prices p as well.
Since manufacturing expenditure shares(p) and national manufacturing expendituresL
 
Xn(p)

are
completely determined by manufacturing prices p, it follows that the mobile labor equilibrium, if it
exists, is completely characterized by the equilibrium vector of manufacturing prices.
3.2 Immobile Labor Scenario
In the immobile labor scenario, labor is perfectly immobile between the non-manufacturing and man-
ufacturing sectors within each country.
In this scenario, non-manufacturing output (or equivalently income) is an exogeneously given param-
eter Y On , and manufacturing labor supply LMn is also exogeneously determined.
Manufacturing wages wn is endogenously determined by manufacturing revenuesQn. From equation
16, we have wn =  QnLMn .
National income then would be
Yn = Qn + Y
O
n + TRn: (32)
Unlike in the mobile labor scenario, national income varies not only with tariff revenues, but also with
manufacturing revenues as well.
Manufacturing labor and product market outcomes are determined simultaneously, as manufacturing
prices and wages are mutually determined endogenous variables in the immobile labor scenario.
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As in the mobile labor scenario, cost minimizing buyers of manufacturing goods require that manu-
facturing prices satisfy
p = L

n(p;w) 
1


; (33)
where n(p;w) is defined by equation 18, p = (p1; :::; pN) is the vector of national manufacturing
prices and w = (w1; :::; wN) is the vector of national manufacturing wages.
Manufacturing expenditure shares must satisfy
(p;w) = M
Ti dniwi p1 i  
p n

: (34)
Tariff and manufacturing revenues are given as
L
 
TRn(p;w)

= Dt(p;w)  L Xn(p;w); (35)
L
 
Qn(p;w)

= t(p;w)>  L Xn(p;w) (36)
where Dt(p;w) := D
 P
i2N ni(p;w)
tni
1+tni

and t(p;w) := M

1
1+tni
ni(p;w)

.
Given national income equation 32 and national manufacturing expenditures in equation 22, the vector
of national manufacturing expenditures is
L

Xn(p;w)

= L

Qn(p;w)

+ L

TRn(p;w)

+ L

Y On

;
where  := 1   + .
Substituting equations 35 and 36 into the above shows that national manufacturing expenditure must
satisfy 
I  Z(p;w)>LXn(p;w) = L Y On ; (37)
where Z(p;w) := t(p;w)  

Dt(p;w) for notational convenience.
If the inverse of the matrix [I  Z(p;w)] exists, the vector of national manufacturing revenues is
given by
L

Qn(p;w)

= t(p;w)>

I  Z(p;w)> 1 L Y On : (38)
Finally since the vector of manufacturing wages is L(wn) = D

LMn
 1
L
 
Qn

, the vector of manu-
facturing wages must satisfy
w = D(LMn ) 1t(p;w)>

I  Z(p;w)> 1 L Y On : (39)
The equilibrium conditions for the immobile labor scenario are summarized below.
Definition 2. Given model parameters , , , L(Tn), L(LMn ), L( Y On ), M(dni) andM(tni), an equi-
librium in the immobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model consists of
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1. A manufacturing price vector p 2 RN++; satisfying equation 33. (Manufacturing Prices)
2. A manufacturing wage vector w 2 RN++; satisfying equation 39. (Manufacturing Wages)
3. A matrix of expenditure shares (p;w) satisfying equation 34. (Pattern of Trade)
4. A vector of national manufacturing expenditures L

Xn(p;w)

satisfying equation 37. (Scale
of Trade)
We have fully characterized the general equilibria described in Eaton and Kortum (2002). The next
part of the thesis establishes the existence and uniqueness of the general equilibria in both scenarios
of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model.
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Part III
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Given the empirical focus of Eaton and Kortum’s 2002 paper, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence or the uniqueness of general equilibria described in their paper were not discussed.
While Alvarez and Lucas (2007) provided existence and uniqueness proofs of equilibrium in their
variant of the Eaton and Kortum model, their model differs in some significant ways from the original
proposed in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
For example, while all manufacturing goods are traded in the Eaton and Kortummodel, in the Alvarez
and Lucas variant, only manufacturing intermediate inputs are traded while consumption goods can
only be produced domestically. Furthermore, in the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, there are 2
sectors of traded goods, manufacturing and non-manufacturing. In the Lucas and Alvarez (2007),
there is only one. Finally, while in the mobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum model it is
possible for labor to move freely between the 2 different sectors of production in response to changes
in foreign and domestic demand, this is not the case in the Alvarez and Lucas model since there is
only one single sector of traded output with a fixed labor endowment.
In short, the Alvarez and Lucas (2007) model differs substantially from the original model specified
in Eaton and Kortum (2002), such that proofs of existence and uniqueness provided by Lucas and
Alvarez cannot be directly applied to the general equilibria in the Eaton and Kortum model.
This part of the thesis aims to address the gap by providing rigorous proofs of existence and unique-
ness of the general equilibria described in the original Eaton and Kortum (2002) paper. However,
it should be noted here that since the immobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum model and
the Alvarez and Lucas model share the feature of fixed labor endownment in the sector that relies
on intermediate inputs (i.e. the manufacturing sector in the Eaton and Kortum model), the proof of
uniqueness of equilibrium in the immobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum model presented
here is an adaptation of Alvarez and Lucas’s proof of uniqueness of equilibrium along with the asso-
ciated sufficient conditions, from their single sector model to the multi-sectoral model of Eaton and
Kortum.
However, it should be noted that our proof that the Eaton and Kortum immobile labor equilibrium
exists unconditionally is unrelated to the work presented in Alvarez and Lucas.
To our best knowledge as well, there are no close parallels in Alvarez and Lucas to our existence and
uniqueness results for the mobile labor equilibrium - the topic of the next section.
4 Existence and Uniqueness of Mobile Labor Equilibrium
In this section, we prove the existence and the uniqueness of the mobile labor equilibrium by showing
that - taking as given any vector of national manufacturing wages w = (w1; :::; wN), and model
parameters ; ; , L(Tn), M(tni) and M(dni) - there exists one and only one possible equilibrium
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vector of prices, p = (p1; :::; pN) 2 RN++ satisfying
p = L

n(p) 
1


(40)
where n(p) :=
P
i2N Ti

wi p
1 
i dni
 
.
In the discussion directly following Definition 1, it was noted that since manufacturing expenditure
shares and national manufacturing expenditures are completely determined by manufacturing prices,
the vector of manufacturing prices p completely characterizes the mobile labor equilibrium, and that
the existence and uniqueness of a price vector p that satisfies equation 40 (which is identical to equation
27) automatically implies the existence and uniqueness of the mobile labor equilibrium.
For ease of notation, let ~p := (ln p1; :::; ln pN), gn(~p) :=  1 lnn(p) and G(~p) = (g1(~p); :::; gN(~p)).
The strategy towards the proof is to first demonstrate that the function G is a contraction in RN , in
which case there must exist a unique fixed point ~p 2 RN which satisfy ~p = G(~p). Then since the
natural logarithm is a one-to-one function, there must exist a unique p 2 RN++ satisfying equation 40.
We first derive the Jacobian matrix of G(~p) in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For any n; i 2 N ; the partial derivative of n with respect to pi is given as
@ ln gn(~p)
@~pi
= (1  )ni(p) (41)
where ni(p) =
Ti(wi p
1 
i dni)
 
n(p) is the share of country n’s expenditures on manufacturing goods spent
on imports from country i.
Organized in matrix form, the Jacobian matrix of G(~p) is given as
M
@gn(~p)
@~pi

= (1  )(p);
noting that the matrix of expenditure shares (p) = M

ni(p)

is a right-stochastic matrix.
Proof. Taking manufacturing wages and model parameters as given, the matrix of manufacturing
expenditures shares is a function of national manufacturing prices, written as (p). The sum of each
row of (p), as a sum of shares, must be unity; and (p) is a right stochastic matrix. This could be
confirmed by noting that the sum of the nth row of (p) is
P
j2N nj(p) =
P
i2N Tj(w

j p
1 
j dnj)
 
n
= 1
by the definition of n(p) given in equation 40.
Taking the natural logarithm of each expenditure share term, we have lnnj(p) = lnTj

w j dnj
 
 
 (1  ) ln pj   lnn. Since lnTj

w j dnj
 
is a function of constant terms, we have for each
i 2 N ,
@ lnnj
@ ln pi
=   (1  ) @ ln pj
@ ln pi
  @ lnn
@ ln pi
: ()
38
Since
P
j2N nj(p) = 1, and using equation (), it must be the case that
0 =
@
@ ln pi
 X
j2N
nj(p)
!
=
X
j2N
nj
@ lnnj(p)
@ ln pi
=   (1  ) ni + @ lnn(p)
@ ln pi
()
Rearranging (), we obtain the required result that
@gn(~p)
@~pi
=  1

@ lnn(p)
@ ln pi
= (1  )ni(p):
The following proof that G is a contraction closely follows the proof of Theorem 1 in Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). In the spirit that simplicity is next to godliness, it is hoped that the proof presented
here is a slight improvement on Alvarez and Lucas in the sense that it does not require the use of the
Blackwell sufficient conditions for a contraction.20
Theorem 1. For any combination of manufacturing wages and model parameters, the function G :
RN ! RN is a contraction, since for all ~p0 ; ~p00 2 RN , it is always the case that
kG(~p0) G(~p00)k1  (1  ) k~p0   ~p00k1;
where k  k1 is the supremum norm, and (1  ) < 1 .
Then by the Banach fixed point theorem, there must exist a unique ~p 2 RN that is a fixed point of
G, in which case p = (exp ~p1; :::; exp ~pN) is the unique vector of manufacturing prices satisfying
equation 40.
It follows immediately that:
1. The mobile labor equilibrium vector of manufacturing prices is uniquely determined by manu-
facturing wages and model parameters, and the mobile labor equilibrium is unique.
2. In the immobile labor scenario, holding model parameters constant,
(a) the vector of national manufacturing prices p(w)
(b) the matrix of expenditure shares (p(w);w)
are both completely determined by manufacturing wages, and are continuous functions of the
vector of manufacturing wages w.
20This proof also corrects a slight mathematical error in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) in which it seemed to be implied that
for a pair of vectors ~p0 ; ~p00 2 RN , the difference a = ~p0   ~p00 is a scalar.
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Proof. For each n; i 2 N , the expenditure share ni (p) is obviously continuous for all p 2 RN++ and
p = L(exp ~pn) is obviously continuous in ~p 2 RN , in which case @ ln gn(~p)@~pi = (1  )ni(p)must be a
continuous function for all ~p 2 RN :We have thus shown that for each n 2 N , gn(~p) is continuously
differentiable in RN++.
Since gn(~p) is continuously differentiable, for each ~p 2 RN and a = (a1; :::; aN) 2 RN , there must
exist some v 2 [0; 1], such that
gn(~p+ a)  gn(~p) =
NX
i=1
@gn(~p+ va)
@~pi
ai
= (1  )
NX
i=1
ni(~p+ va)  ai:
 (1  )max
i2N
ai:
This is true for gn(~p) for all n 2 N , including maxn2N gn(~p), in which case
kG(~p+ a) G(~p)k1 = max
n2N
gn(~p)  (1  )max
i2N
ai = (1  )kak1;
and we obtain the desired result that G is a contraction in RN .
Item 2 (a) and (b) of the theorem might require further elaboration.
Given that the price vector in the immobile labor scenario must also satisfy equation 40,21 it is clear
that the immobile labor price vector must uniquely determined by, and hence an implicit function of
manufacturing wages, written as p(w). This results in Item 2 (a).
Taking model parameters as given, each element ni(p;w) =
Ti(dniwi p
1 
i )
p n
of the expenditure share
matrix is a function of both the vector of manufacturing prices p = (p1; :::; pN) and manufacturing
wages w = (w1; :::; wN). But since the price vector is entirely determined by manufacturing wages,
the same must also be true of expenditure shares, and we write ni(w) := ni(p(w);w) to show that
expenditure share ni is an implicit function of the vector of manufacturing wages.
In the proof of Proposition 48, it would be shown that the Jacobian of manufacturing prices with
respect to wages, if it exists, is given as
M
@ ln pn
@ lnwi

=  [I  (1  )(w)] 1(w):
As it would be demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 48, the inverse matrix [I  (1  )(w)] 1
exists for all w 2 RN+ , and hence manufacturing prices are differentiable everywhere with respect to
manufacturing wages. It follows immediately that p(w) is a continuous function of manufacturing
wages, in which case (w) = M

Ti(dniwipi(w)) 
pn(w) 

is also a continuous function of wages.
Having established that a unique general equilibrium of the mobile labor scenario must always exist,
we turn our attention to the immobile labor equilibrium in the next section.
21Notice that equations 27 and 33 are have identical definitions.
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5 Existence of the Immobile Labor Equilibrium
In this section, we shall show that that an equilibrium vector of manufacturing labor wages must
always exist in the immobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum trade model.
Theorem 1 showed that manufacturing prices p(w) and expenditure shares(w) are completely deter-
mined by manufacturing wages in the immobile labor scenario. As Lemma 3 would show, the inverse
matrix

I  Z(p(w);w)> 1 exists for all w 2 RN+ , in which case the vector of manufacturing ex-
penditures would also be completely determined by manufacturing wages.
If an equilibrium vector of manufacturing exists, then equilibrium manufacturing prices, expenditure
shares and expenditures satisfying conditions 1, 3 and 4 of Definition must exist as well. Just as the
equilibrium vector of manufacturing prices completely characterizes the mobile labor equilibrium,
an equilibrium in the immobile labor scenario would be completely characterized by the equilibrium
vector of manufacturing wages.
Hence demonstrating that there exists a equilibrium vector of wages satisfying equation 39 is sufficient
in proving the existence of the immobile labor equilibrium.
An equilibrium vector of wages w := L(wn) in the immobile labor equilibrium must satisfy22
w = D(LMn ) 1t(w)>

I  Z(w)> 1 L Y On : (42)
The existence of an equilibrium in the immobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum trade model
relies on the existence of a fixed point for equation 42. We shall proceed with the proof of existence
of the immobile labor equilibrium in the following manner:
• We shall first show that there exists a continuous function g : RNN ! RN+ mapping from the set
of all possible trade share matrices to wage vectors, and a continuous function f : RN+ ! RNN
mapping from the set of all possible wage vectors to trade sharematrices, such that the composite
f  g : RN+ ! RN+ is the function of wages on the right hand side of equation 42.
• We shall then show that the composite function g fwith a suitable convex and compact domain
is a continuous self-map in which case the application of the Brouwer fixed point theoremwould
show that there must exist a trade share matrix  which is a fixed point of g  f. It would then
follow that w = g() is a fixed point of g  f and hence an equilibrium wage vector in the
immobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum trade model.
We start by discussing the appropriate space of trade share matrices. Every row of any arbitraryNN
right stochastic matrix is anN -dimensional probability vector. EveryN dimensional probability vec-
tor n := (n1; :::; nN) can be represented as a point in a N   1 dimensional simplex SN :=
(n1; :::; nN) 2 RN+ :
P
i ni = 1
	
, which is obviously a convex, closed and bounded subset ofRN .
Hence every right stochastic stochasticmatrixmust exist inSNN :=
QN
n=1

(n1; :::; nN) 2 RN+ :
P
i ni = 1
	
,
which as the product of convex and compact sets, is also a convex and compact subset ofRNN . Since
22Since expenditure shares are completely determined by manufacturing wages, we drop the vector of manufacturing
prices p from the arguments to functions in the discussion below.
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every trade share matrix  is also by definition a right stochastic matrix, we have (w) 2 SNN for any
possible wage vector w 2 RN++.
Taking model parameters such as ; ; L(LMn ) and L(Y On ) as given, let g : SNN ! RN++ be the
continuous mapping from the set of all possible trade share matrices to wage vectors, such that for any
 = M(ni) 2 SNN the function g must satisfy
g() := D(LMn ) 1t>

I  ~Z()> 1 L Y On  (43)
where for notational convenience, we define ~Z() := M

ni
1+tni

+ 

D
P
i2N
tnini
1+tni

. It would be
trivial to show that Z(w) = ~Z
 
(w)

.23
The nth element of g() could be interpreted as the manufacturing wages generated in country n
given trade share matrix . The basic idea here is that given any trade share matrix , the term
D(LMn )g() = L(gn()  LMn ) could be interpreted as the vector of national manufacturing revenues
generated by the pattern of trade described in  and global non-manufacturing income.
The term Z()>D(LMn )g() represents the demand for manufacturing output recursively gener-
ated within the manufacturing sector, driven by the demand for manufacturing output both as inter-
mediate goods and as consumption goods for manufacturing labor. The vector M

ni
1+tni
>
L(Y On )
represents the demand for each country’s manufacturing output generated by exogenous global non-
manufacturing income, which is simply calculated as total manufacturing output net of demand for
manufacturing goods generated from within the manufacturing sector itself.
The relationship above only indicates a correspondence between trade share matrices and national
manufacturing wages, which is insufficient for our purpose. The following lemmas demonstrates that
national manufacturing wages are uniquely determined by the pattern of trade captured by the matrix
of trade shares.
Lemma 3. The matrix I   ~Z> = I   M

ni
1+tni
>
  D
PN
i 6=n
tnini
1+tni

is non-singular for all
possible trade share matricesM(ni) and import tariff ratesM(tni).
Proof. Since tnn = 0 for each country n, sum of the elements of nth row of the matrix ~Z can be written
as
nn +
NX
i6=n
ni

(1  ni) + 

ni

= nn +
NX
i6=n
ni

1 

1  


ni

where ni := tni1+tni < 1 is the proportion of country n’s total expenditure on imports from country i
collected as import tariffs.
Since   1 and ni < 1, we have 1 

1  


ni < 1 for each n; i 2 N and
nn +
NX
i6=n
ni

1 

1  


ni

<
NX
i=1
ni = 1;
23This ensures that the results of Lemma 3 also applies to Z.
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such that every row of the matrix ~Z sums to less than one. Since it is also the case that every element
in ~Z is positive, there must always exist some right stochastic matrix  such that   ~Z, and that
lim
m!1
~Zm  lim
m!1
()m :
Since  is a stochastic matrix, the Perron-Frobenius theorem ensures that limm!1 ()m exists and
is also a stochastic matrix with each element bounded between 0 and 1. Then since  2 (0; 1) such
that limm!1 m = 0, we have
lim
m!1
m~Zm  lim
m!1
m lim
m!1
()m = 0NN ;
where 0NN refers to an N N matrix with every element equaling 0.
Then I+
P1
m=1 
m~Zm =

I  ~Z 1, since for anyM 2 N,"
I+
M 1X
m=1
m~Zm
#
[I  ~Z] = I+ M ~ZM ;
and
h
I+ limM!1
PM 1
m=1 
m~Zm
i 
I  ~Z = I. We have thus shown that I  ~Z 1 exists, in which
case, the inverse of

I  ~Z> exists as well and equalsP1m=0 m  ~Z>m.
Lemma 4. g() is a continuous function from SNN to RN++.
Proof. Since [I  Z] 1 is non-singular andD(LMn ) 1 is also obviously non-singular and the vector of
non-manufacturing incomeL(Y On ) is exogeneously given, then the vector of wages derived from trade
shares g()must be uniquely determined by the matrix of trade shares, and hence is a function (and
not just a correspondence) of the matrix of trade shares. Since g is a composition of linear functions,
each of which is continuous in , g() must also be a continuous function of .
For any given wage vector w 2 RN++; let f : RN+ ! SNN denote the function mapping from the wage
vector into a matrix of trade shares, such that
f(w) = M

ni(w)

= D
 
pn(w)

M(d ni )D
 
Tnw
 
n pn(w)

;
where pn(w) is defined by equation 11. It should be obvious that f is a continuous function of w.
Noting that the element of f(w) on the nth row and ith column is simply ni(w) as defined in Propo-
sition 2, a quick visual comparison between the functions g and equation 42 would confirm that the
right hand side of equation 42 is the composite function g  f. We can now proceed with the proof of
the existence of the equilibrium vector of wages w as fixed point of equation 42.
Proposition 7. There exists at least one fixed point  2 SNN of the function f  g such that
 = f  g():
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There then must exist at least a vector of manufacturing wages w = g() satisfying
w = g  f(w):
There must therefore exist at least one equilibrium vector of wages w satisfying Condition 4 of Defi-
nition 2. It follows immediately that there exists at least one equilibrium in the immobile scenario of
the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model.
Proof. Since the functions g : SNN ! RN+ and f : RN+ ! SNN are continuous, and SNN  RNN
is convex and compact, it follows that the composite function f  g : SNN ! SNN is a continuous
self-map. Hence by the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem,24 there must exist some  2 SNN such that
 = f  g(), and some w 2 RN+ such that w = g(): Then w must be a fixed point of g  f
since w = g() = g (f  g()) = g  f (g()) = g  f(w).
Since gf is the function on the right-hand-side of equation 42, Proposition 7 demonstrates that a fixed
point of equation 42 exists, and consequently, there must always exist an equilibrium of the immobile
labor equilibrium.
At first glance, it might appear to be more intuitive to directly show that the function g  f has a fixed
point of manufacturing wages, i.e. to directly show that there exists a fixed point of manufacturing
wages satisfying equation 42. The problem with that approach is that the space of ‘valid’ manufactur-
ing wages is difficult to define and shown to be convex, whereas the space of matrices of expenditure
shares as probability matrices, is well defined. This hopefully explains the slightly convoluted ap-
proach in this proof of the existence of the immobile labor equilibrium.
In order to analyze the general equilibrium in the immobile labor scenario, it would be important to
establish the conditions under which the equilibrium is unique such that comparative statics analy-
sis would be meaningful. The next section examines the sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the
immobile labor equilibrium.
6 Uniqueness of the Immobile Labor Equilibrium
In this section, we show that the immobile labor equilibrium, as characterized by the equilibrium
vector of wages, must be unique so long as certain conditions on the maximum trade costs and import
tariffs rates are met. The method by which we do so is to first characterize the global economy in
the immobile labor scenario as a pure exchange economy with national manufacturing labor and
the non-manufacturing goods as the traded goods. We shall next examine how patterns of trade are
influenced by changes in the prices of these ‘goods’, before obtaining proof of uniqueness of the
equilibrium by showing that the set of traded goods are gross substitutes for one another.
24Strictly speaking, SNN  RNN is not a compact and convex subset of a Euclidean space, but is instead a compact and
convex subset of a vector space. In that sense, it might be more appropriate to employ the Schauder fixed point theorem
for the proof, but that simply adds an additional layer of mathematical notation that is not essential to the basic proof. We
might simply consider rewriting SNN as a subset of RN
2 where kth collection of N elements represents the simplex in
which the kth row of theM(ni) exists.
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We begin by stating the sufficient conditions for a unique immobile labor equilibrium, in the following
assumption.
Assumption 1. The following 2 conditions hold jointly:
(a) It is the case that d ni d ij > (1  )d nj for all n; i; j 2 N .
(b) Each country n 2 N imposes a uniform tariff rate on imports, regardless of source, such that
tni = tn for each i 6= n, and tn is sufficiently small.
In the immobile labor scenario, since each country is endowed with an exogeneously determined
manufacturing labor supply LMn and non-manufacturing output Y On , it is appropriate to think about the
immobile labor Eaton-Kortum trade model as a pure exchange economy, in which each country trades
the services of its manufacturing labor force and stocks of non-manufacturing goods in exchange for
those of every other country.
The only prices that matters from this perspective are national manufacturing wages fwngn2N , and
the price of non-manufacturing goods pO. The heterogeneity of national production efficiency across
the set of manufacturing goods implies that different countries’ manufacturing labor forces are not
perfect substitutes. Furthermore, costly international trade in goods implies transaction costs for the
‘trade’ in labor services. Both are factors explaining why manufacturing wages might differ between
countries. While the non-manufacturing good was previously designated as the numeraire good, for
the purpose of this section we shall allow the common price of non-manufacturing goods across all
countries to freely vary in R++.25
Taking the vector of national wages w = fwngn2N and non-manufacturing price pO as given, the na-
tionalmanufacturing income for each countryn iswnLMn , and the value of the national non-manufacturing
endowment (or equivalently the national non-manufacturing revenue or national non-manufacturing
labor income) is pOY On . Total national nominal income is the sum of national labor incomes and tariff
income TRn(w; pO) + pOY On + wnLMn .
Since  is the proportion of national manufacturing revenues paid to labor, national manufacturing
revenues would be QRn (w) =
wnLMn

, and with the remainder (1  )QRn (w) being spent on manufac-
turing intermediate inputs.
WithXn(w; pO) being total national expenditure on manufacturing goods, TRn(w; pO) being national
tariff revenues collected on imports of manufacturing goods, net payments to suppliers excluding
25Recall that costs of trading non-manufacturing goods between countries was assumed to be costless, in which case
the law of one price must apply. The price of non-manufacturing goods must be the same in each country.
The purpose of allowing pO to freely vary is to ensure that aggregate demand functions for each country’s manufacturing
labor, and non-manufacturing goods is homogeneous of degree zero in the set of prices fw1; :::; wN ; pOg.
More intuitively, we allow pO to vary freely to simplify the proof showing the set of goods under discussion are gross
substitutes. For example, if we set pO to be the numeraire good with value always equalling 1, then in order to demonstrate
that the non-manufacturing good is a gross substitute for each of the other countries’ manufacturing labor, we need to
decrease all manufacturing labor wages by the same proportion simultaneously, and demonstrate that excess demand for
non-manufacturing goods decreases while excess demand for labor increases everywhere.
On the other hand, treating pO as an ‘ordinary’ variable price allows a textbook proof of gross substitution. In short,
allowing pO to freely vary in this section is simply a mathematical convenience.
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tariffs is Xn(w; pO)   TRn(w; pO). The national manufacturing trade deficit would simply be the
difference betweenmanufacturing net payments and revenues,Xn(w; pO) TRn(w; pO) QRn (w; pO).
Since (1  ) is the proportion of national income spent on non-manufacturing goods, the trade sur-
plus in non-manufacturing trade is simply non-manufacturing revenues less domestic consumption
of non-manufacturing goods, pOY On   (1  )

TRn(w) + pOY On + wnLMn

. The national budget
constraint implies that any trade surpluses in the manufacturing sector must be counter-balanced by
trade deficits in non-manufacturing sector. The equality of national manufacturing trade deficits and
non-manufacturing trade surpluses can be solved to yield
Xn(w; pO) = QRn (w) + 
 
TRn(w; pO) + pOY On

;
where  := 1   (1  ).
By Theorem 1, given a vector of manufacturing wages w, there must exist a unique corresponding
matrix of trade shares (w) = M

ni(w)

. If Assumption 1 holds, tariff revenues could be written
as
TRn(w) = Xn(w)n (1  nn(w)) ; (44)
where n := tn1+tn is the fraction of expenditures on imports collected as tariffs.
National expenditures on manufacturing goods given the vector of wages w would be written as
Xn(w; pO) =
QRn (w) + pOY On
1  n (1  nn(w)) :
Given the vector of national expendituresL

Xn(w; pO)

andmatrix of trade shares(w), the nominal
demand for manufacturing goods produced in country n net of tariffs is
QDn (w; pO) =
X
i2N
in(w)
1 + ti
Xi(w; pO)
=
X
i2N
in(w)
1 + ti

QRi (w) + pOY Oi
1  i (1  ii(w))

: (45)
Given a national wage vectorw and corresponding demand for country n’s manufacturing outputQDn ,
the implied demand for country n’s labor is LDn (w; pO) = 
QDn
wn
. Substituting this, and the manufactur-
ing revenues identity QRn (w) =
wnLMn

into equation 45, we obtain the aggregate demand for country
n0s labor as
LDn (w; pO) =
X
i2N
in(w)
1 + ti
0@

wi
wn

LMi + 

pO
wn

Y Oi
1  i (1  ii(w))
1A : (46)
Define Fn(w; pO) := LDn (w; pO)   LMn as the aggregate excess demand function for each country’s
manufacturing labor. The competitive equilibrium in the pure exchange economy requires that the
equilibriumwage vectorw and non-manufacturing price pO satisfyFn(w; pO) = 0 for all countries
n 2 N . Demand for each country’s manufacturing labor equals its endowment, and all national labor
markets clear.
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We next consider the excess demand function for non-manufacturing goods. Given a manufacturing
wage vector w, total global nominal demand for non-manufacturing goods isX
n2N
COn (w; pO) = (1  )
X
n
 
TRn(w) + wnLMn + pOY On

:
By equations 44 and 45, re-express the above equation as
X
n2N
COn
 
w; pO

= (1  )
X
n2N

n (1  nn(w))
1  n (1  nn(w))



wnL
M
n + p
OY On

+ wnL
M
n + p
OY On

:
The aggregate excess demand function for real quantities of non-manufacturing goods is simply global
real demand less real output of non-manufacturing goods,
FO(w; pO) =
X
n2N
COn (w)
pO
 
X
n2N
Y On ; (47)
and in the competitive equilibrium, FO(w; pO) = 0.
We shall now demonstrate that if Assumption 1 holds, then the aggregate excess demand functions in
this pure exchange economy exhibit the gross substitute property, in which case there any equilibrium
must be unique.
A set of goods are gross substitutes if whenever the price of one good is increased, aggregate demand
for that good decreases, and the aggregate demands for all other goods are increased.
In the setting of the Eaton-Kortum immobile labor trade model, the set of ‘goods’ consists of the na-
tional manufacturing labor forces, and the set of prices are national manufacturing wages. To demon-
strate that the gross substitute property holds, it simply has to be shown that for any arbitrary vector of
national wages w = fw1; :::; wNg, and any country k 2 N , the aggregate excess demand for country
k’s labor is strictly decreasing with country k’s wages wk, while aggregate excess demand for every
other country’s labor is strictly increasing, and that in response to an increase in non-manufacturing
price pO, demand for every country’s manufacturing labor increases, while aggregate demand for the
non-manufacturing good decreases.
We shall rely on the two results presented below.
Proposition 8. In the immobile labor scenario, given any vector of manufacturing wages w, the fol-
lowing statements hold:
1. The derivative of trade shares with respect to country k’s wages is given as
@ lnni
@ lnwk
=
8<:

@ ln pn
@ lnwk
  (1  ) @ ln pi
@ lnwk

8i 6= k


@ ln pn
@ lnwk
  (1  ) @ ln pi
@ lnwk
  

otherwise;
(48)
2. The Jacobian of the manufacturing price vector p(w) with respect to the manufacturing wage
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vector w is given as:
M
@ ln pn(w)
@ lnwi

=  [I  (1  )(w)] 1(w): (49)
3. For all n; i 2 N ,
min
i
ik <
@ ln pn(w)
@ lnwk
< kk: (50)
4. For any k 2 N ;
(a) @ lnnk
@ lnwk
< 0 for every country n 2 N , and
(b) @ lnnn
@ lnwk > 0 for every country n 6= k.
Furthermore, if Assumption 1(a) holds, it will be the case that
5. @ lnni
@ lnwk
> 0;for each country i 6= k, and every country n 2 N .
Proof. (Item 1) For each n; j 2 N , the natural logarithm of country n’s share of expenditure spent
on imports from country j could be written as a function of manufacturing wages as lnnj(w) =
lnTjd nj +  [ln pn(w)  (1  ) ln pj(w)   lnwj]. Noting that technology level Tj and trade costs
dnj are exogeneously given constants, the derivative of lnnj with respect to lnwi for any i 2 N is
@ lnnj(w)
@ lnwi
= 

@ ln pn(w)
@ lnwi
  (1  ) @ ln pj(w)
@ lnwi
  @ lnwj
@ lnwi

: (51)
Since @ lnwj
@ lnwi = 0 if j 6= k, and 1 otherwise, we obtain Item 1 of the proposition.
(Item 2) Since
PN
j=1 nj (w) = 1 for any n 2 N , taking derivatives with respect to lnwi on both sides
gives
0 =
NX
n=1
nj
@ ln nj(w)
@ lnwi
= 
NX
n=1
nj

@ ln pn(w)
@ lnwi
  (1  ) @ ln pj(w)
@ lnwi
  @ lnwj
@ lnwi

= 
"
@ ln pn(w)
@ lnwi
  (1  )
NX
j=1
nj
@ ln pj(w)
@ lnwi
  ni
#
: ()
Multiplying both sides of () by 1

and collecting into matrix form, we obtain
[I  (1  )(w)]M
@ ln pn
@ lnwi

= (w):
By a similar argument as Lemma 3, since limm!1(w) is bounded and limm!1 (1  )m = 0,
it must be the case that limm!1 [(1  )]m = 0NN and the inverse matrix [I  (1  )] 1 =
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P1
m=0 [(1  )]m exists and we can write
M
@ ln pn
@ lnwi

=  [I  (1  )(w)] 1(w):
This completes the proof for Item 2.
(Item 3) We now demonstrate the bounds of @ ln pn
@ lnwi .
Since the kth column of any N  N matrix can be extracted by post-multiplying it with an N di-
mensional kth unit vector (notated as k),26 post-multiplying both sides of equation 49 by k yields
L( @ ln pn
@ lnwk
) =  [I  (1  )] 1k, where k = L(nk) is the kth column of the matrix of trade
shares.
The matrix [I  (1  )] 1 = P1m=0 (1  )mm is positive since  as a stochastic matrix has
positive elements, in which case since minj2N ik1N  k  maxi2N ik1N , we have
min
i2N
ik [I  (1  )] 1 1N  L
 @ ln pn
@ lnwk

 max
i2N
ik [I  (1  )] 1 1N :
As a right stochastic matrix 1N = 1N hence [I  (1  )] 1N = 1N . Pre-multiplying the
relationship with [I  (1  )] 1 shows that that [I  (1  )] 1 1N = 11N , and we obtain
mini2N ik1N  L

@ ln pn
@ lnwk

 maxi2N ik1N ; or equivalently, @ ln pn@ lnwk 2 [mini2N ik;maxi2N ik].
Finally, from Proposition 6 we obtain kk = maxi2N ik as required in establishing the upper bound
of @ ln pn
@ lnwk
. This completes the proof for Item 3 of the proposition.
(Item 4a) From equation (), we have for each country n; k 2 N ,
@ ln pn
@ lnwk
= nk + (1  )
X
j2N
nj
@ ln pj
@ lnwk
= nk

 + (1  ) @ ln pk
@ lnwk

+
X
j 6=k
nj
@ ln pj
@ lnwk
: ()
Pick n 2 N such that @ ln pn
@ lnwk
= maxj 6=k @ ln pj@ lnwk , in which case we haveX
j 6=k
nj
@ ln pj
@ lnwk
<
X
j 6=k
nj
@ ln pn
@ lnwk
= (1  nk) @ ln pn
@ lnwk
:
Substituting the inequality back into the equation (), and bringing all terms with ln pnlnwk to the left
hand side and dividing throughout by nk yields
@ ln pn
@ lnwk
<  + (1  ) @ ln pk
@ lnwk
:
Since @ ln pn
@ lnwk = maxj 6=k
@ ln pj
@ lnwk by assumption, it must be the case that
@ ln pn
@ lnwk <  + (1  )
@ ln pk
@ lnwk for
all countries n 6= k, and by equation 48, @ lnnk
@ lnwk
< 0 for all n 6= k.
26AnN dimensional vector with the kth element being 1, and 0 everywhere else. An example would be the kth column
of an N dimensional identity matrix.
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From Item 3 of the proposition, we have @ ln pk
@ lnwk
< kk < 1, hence @ lnkk@ lnwk =  (ln pk   1) < 0.
We have thus shown that @ lnnk
@ lnwk < 0 for all n 2 N . Item 4(a) of the proposition has thus been
demonstrated.
(Item 4b) For n 6= k, @ lnnn
@ lnwk
=  @ ln pn
@ lnwk
> 0 since by Item 3 of the proposition @ ln pn
@ lnwk
> 0 and the
prices are always increasing in wages. This gives Item 4(b) of the proposition.
(Item 5) Pick country l such that lk := mini2N ik . By Item 3 of the proposition, @ ln pn@ lnwk > lk and
@ ln pi
@ lnwk
< kk for all n; i 2 N . Hence
@ ln pn
@ lnwk
  (1  ) @ ln pi
@ lnwk
> kk

lk
kk
  (1  )

= kk

d lk p
 
k
p l
  (1  )

()
With d lk p k =
P
i2N Ti(w

i p
1 
i )
 d lk d
 
ki and p l =
P
i2N Ti(w

i p
1 
i )
 d li , if Assumption 1(a)
holds such that d lk d ki > (1  ) d li for all i 2 N , then we must have d lk p k > (1  ) p l and
d lk p
 
k
p l
> (1  ) :
Substituting this back into equation () shows that @ ln pn
@ lnwk
  (1  ) @ ln pi
@ lnwk
> 0 for all n; i, and that
@ lnni
@ lnwk
= 

@ ln pn
@ lnwk
  (1  ) @ ln pi
@ lnwk

> 0
for all i 6= k. This concludes the proof of Item 5 and of the proposition.
The key items of interest in Proposition 8 are Items 2, 4 and 5. Whenever some country k0s wages
increases, Item 4(a) tells us that the country’s output always becomes less competitive in both do-
mestic and foreign markets. Every country including country k itself would choose to spend a lower
proportion of their expenditures on manufacturing goods from k. Item 4(b) says that whenever some
other country’s manufacturing wages increases, manufacturers in every other country would become
more competitive in their domestic markets.
Finally Item 5 shows that Assumption 1(a) ensures that an increase in country k’s wages would impose
no negative externalities on other countries’ competitiveness in trade of manufacturing goods. The
economic intuition behind Item 5 is that Assumption 1(a), which could alternatively be specified as
dnidij 2 [dnj; (1  ) 
1
 dnj), places an upper bound on the possible heterogeneity of trade costs,
which in turn limits how greatly expenditure shares on imports from one specific country might differ.
An interesting though tangential implication of Item 2 of Proposition 8 is that changes in national
manufacturing price of country n - in reaction to the increase in manufacturing wages in country k -
is driven by changes in the costs of imported and domestically produced intermediate goods fcigi2N ,
in proportion to the share of the country’s expenditures on imports from each source fnigi2N , as
evidenced by @ ln pn
@ lnwk
=
P
i2N ni
@ ln ci
@ lnwk
. Another implication, is that the country increasing wages
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would experience the greatest increase in manufacturing costs, such that (1  ) @ ln ck
@ lnwk
> @ ln cn
@ lnwk
for
all n 6= k.27
Finally, to the focus of this section, the uniqueness of the immobile labor equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the countries’ manufacturing labor forces and the
non-manufacturing good are gross substitutes such that
1. @Fk(w)
@wk
< 0 for all k 2 N .
2. @Fn(w)
@wk
> 0 for all n 6= k.
3. @Fn(w)
@pO
> 0 for all n 2 N .
4. @FO(w)
@pO
< 0.
Hence the immobile labor scenario of the Eaton-Kortum trade model has an unique equilibrium vector
of manufacturing wages in which non-manufacturing goods serve as the numeraire.
Proof. We shall first establish that that gross substitutability property holds by showing that Items
1 to 4 are true if Assumption 1 holds. The proof that gross substitutability implies uniqueness of
27To see that these two claims hold, first let Z := [I  (1  )] 1. Then Item 2 of Proposition 8 could be stated as
M
@ ln pn
@ lnwi

= Z = Z; ()
with the second equality since Z =
P1
m=1 (1  )m(m+1) = Z.
Since [I  (1  )]Z = I, we have Z  I = (1  )Z, in which case we can rewrite the above as
M
@ ln pn
@ lnwi

=

1   [Z  I] : ()
Cost of producing manufacturing goods in each country n 2 N is given as cn = wnp1 n , hence @ ln cn@ lnwi =  @ lnwn@ lnwi +
(1  ) @ ln pn@ lnwi , which in matrix form givesM
 
@ ln cn
@ lnwi

= I+ (1  )M @ ln pn@ lnwi . Comparison with equation () above
makes it obvious that
M
 @ ln cn
@ lnwi

= Z; (  )
which in turn yields
1. M

@ ln pn
@ lnwi

= Z = M(

@ ln cn
@ lnwi

from () and (  ). This gives for each n; k 2 N , @ ln pn@ lnwk =P
j2N nj
@ ln cj
@ lnwk .
2. (1  ) @ ln ck@ lnwk  @ ln cn@ lnwk . To see this, post-multiply both side of equation (  ) with k, the kth unit vector, to
obtainL
 
@ ln cn
@ lnwk

= L
 
znk

where znk refers to the (n; k)thelement ofZ andL(znk) is the kth column ofZ. Since
[I  (1  )]Z = I by the definition ofZ as the inverse of [I  (1  )], we have [I  (1  )]L(znk) = k
or equivalently,
znk   (1  )
X
j2N
njzjk =
(
0 8n 6= k
1 otherwise:
Suppose that znk = maxj2N zjk for some n 6= k. Then 0 = znk   (1  )
P
j2N njzjk  znk, with the
inequality since
P
j2N njzjk  maxj2N zjk. But Z =
P1
m=0 (1  )m(m) > 0NN since   0NN
implies that znk > 0. and we obtain a contradiction. So it must be the case that zkk = maxj2N zjk, and it
follows immediately that for all n 6= k, znk = (1  )
P
j2N njzjk  (1  ) zkk. The rest follows from
@ ln cn
@ lnwk = znk.
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the equilibrium is subsequently presented for completeness. For the sake of brevity in notation, let
Zi(w; i) := 1  i (1  ii(w)).
Since the excess demand function for each country’s labor force is Fn(w; pO) = LDn (w; pO)   LMn
where LMn is an exogeneously given manufacturing labor endowment, the excess demand function
varies only with demand for manufacturing labor, such that @Fn(w;p
O)
@wk
= @L
D
n (w;pO)
@wk
for n 2 N .
(Item 1)We first examine the effect on ‘own’ manufacturing demand. From equation 46, we can write
LDk =
1
wk
NX
i6=k
ik(w)
1 + ti
 
wiL
M
i + p
OY Oi

Zi(w; i)
+
kk(w)
Zk(w; k)

LMk + 

pO
wk

Y Ok

: ()
From Proposition 8, we have @ik(w)
@wk
< 0 for all i 2 N hence the first term on the right hand side
of equation () is strictly decreasing in wk. Economically speaking, when country k’s manufac-
turing wages increase while every other country’s remains constant, the fact that @ii
@wk
> 0 implies
that every other country i 6= k reduces imports as a share of manufacturing expenditures, which in
turn reduces national tariff revenues. Since manufacturing and non-manufacturing income, wiLMi
and Y Oi respectively, for these countries remains unchanged, the net effect is that for every country
other than k, nominal expenditures on manufacturing goods decrease. This decrease in manufac-
turing expenditures, combined with the decrease in country k’s competitiveness (as evidenced by
@ik
@wk
< 0) results in a decrease in country k’s nominal exports, which taken together with an increase
in manufacturing wages wk means that aggregate foreign demand for country k’s labor, written as
1
wk
PN
i6=k
ik(w)
1+ti
(wiLMi +Y Oi )
1 i(1 ii(w)) , must decrease.
What about domestic demand for country k’s labor? Since @kk
@wk
< 0 and kkk
Zk(w;k)
< 1 implies that
@
@wk
kk(w)
Zk(w; k)
=
@kk
@wk
Zk(w; k)

1  kkk
Zk(w; k)

< 0;
and the term Y
O
k
wk
is obviously decreasing in wk, the second term in equation () interpreted as do-
mestic demand for country k’s labor must also be decreasing. The economic interpretation is slightly
more complicated than is for the case of the other countries. While it is true that @kk
@wk
< 0 implies that
country k producers lose domestic market share, reducing demand for local labor, the decrease in the
share of domestic production in manufacturing expenditures also implies an increase in imports and
consequently an increase in tariff revenues, which along with an increase in manufacturing income
wkL
M
k , exerts an upwards force on nominal expenditures. However, the increase in tariff revenue is
proportionately smaller than the loss of domestic market share (as seen from kkk
1 k(1 kk) < 1) hence
the net effect on domestic demand for local manufacturing labor is negative. Then since an increase in
country k’s wages decreases both foreign and domestic demand for country k’s manufacturing labor,
we have
@LDk
@wk
< 0;
which gives us Item 1 of the theorem.
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(Item 2)We now consider the effect of an increase ofwk on demand for other countries’ labor. Demand
for manufacturing labor of country n 6= k, is written as
LDk =
1
wn

nn(w)
wnL
M
n + Y
O
n
Zn(w; n)
+
kn(w)
1 + tk
wkL
M
k + Y
O
k
Zk(w; k)
+
NX
i6=k;n
in(w)
1 + ti
wiL
M
i + Y
O
i
Zi(w; i)

; ()
where the first term on the right hand side represents domestic demand for country n’s manufacturing
labor, the second term demand from country k, and the final term aggregate demand from all other
countries.
Since countryn labor income, manufacturing and non-manufacturing alike are unchanged, and @
@wk
nn(w)
Zn(w;n) =
@nn(w)
@wk
1
Zn(w;n)

1  n
Zn(w;n)

> 0 as @nn(w)
@wk
> 0, it is clear that domestic demand for country n’s
manufacturing labor is increasing with wk.
For all other countries i 6= n, consider the term in(w)
1 i(1 ii(w)) . It would now be argued that if tariff
rates are sufficiently small, i.e. if i is sufficiently small, then @@wk
in(w)
1 i(1 ii(w)) > 0. Expanding the
partial derivative, we have
@
@wk
in(w)
1  i (1  ii(w)) =
1
Zi(w; i)

@in(w)
@wk
  iin
Zi(w; i)
@ii(w)
@wk

;
where Zi(w; i) := 1  i (1  ii(w)).
For each arbitraryw 2 RN++; since 1 ii (w) is bounded below 1, we have limi!0 Zi(w; i) = 1, so it
must be the case that limi!0 iinZi(w;i) = 0. Since trade shares are dependent not only on manufacturing
wages, but also on import tariffs (through trade costs), we can write trade shares as a function of
both wages and country i’s import tariff, in(w; i). It is easily shown that in(w; i) is a continuous
function of i; in which case iin(w;i)Zi(w;i) would also be a continuous function of i.
Since @in(w;i)
@wk
> 0, limi!0
iin(w;i)
Zi(w;i) = 0, and
@in(w;i)
@wk
and iin(w;i)
Zi(w;i) are both continuous in i,
we must have @in(w;i)
@wk
  iin(w;i)
Zi(w;i)
@ii(w;i)
@wk
> 0 for all i > 0 sufficiently small.28For each vector
of manufacturing wages w 2 RN++, let i(w) := sup
n
i 2 R++ : @in(w)@wk  
iin
Zi(w;i)
@ii(w)
@wk
> 0
o
; and
let  i := minw2RN++ fi(w)g. It must then be the case that for all w 2 RN++; @@wk
in(w)
Zi(w;i) > 0 for all
28First note that since @ii(w;i)@wk is bounded, it must be that
iin
Zi(w;i)
@ii(w;i)
@wk
= 0 for i = 0. Furthermore, it is the case
that iinZi(w;i)
@ii(w;i)
@wk
is a continuous function of i, since @ii(w;i)@wk is ultimately a linear and hence continuous function
of expenditure shares, and expenditure shares are continuous functions of tariff rates. By the same reasoning, @in(w;i)@wk
is also a continuous function of i, and so would Ai(w; i) := @in(w;i)@wk  
iin(w;i)
Zi(w;i)
@ii(w;i)
@wk
. (The notation Ai is
applicable only to this footnote.)
Suppose there exists some i such that
iin(w;i)
Zi(w;i)
@ii(w;i)
@wk
is non-increasing for all i 2 [0; i ). Then since
@in(w;i)
@wk
> 0 and iin(w;i)Zi(w;i)
@ii(w;i)
@wk
 0 for all i 2 [0; i ), it must be the case Ai(w; i) > 0 for all i 2 [0; i ) and
we obtain the desired result.
Suppose on the other hand that iin(w;i)Zi(w;i)
@ii(w;i)
@wk
is increasing for all i 2 [0; i ), and that Ai(w; i ) < 0. Then
since Ai(w; 0) = 0, the continuity of Ai in i implies that there must exist some i 2 (0; i ) such that Ai(w; i) > 0 for
all i 2 (0; i ). Once again, we obtain the required result that Ai(w; i) > 0 for all i sufficiently small.
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i 2 [0;  i ):
Since in
Zi(w;i)
 
wnLn + Y
O
n

could be interpreted as country n’s nominal expenditure on country
i’s manufacturing labor, and wnLn + Y On is country n’s nominal expenditure on manufactur-
ing labor (regardless of source) driven solely by national labor income, the term 1
wi
in
Zi(w;i) could be
interpreted as the multiplier that maps from country n’s total national labor income to demand for
country i’s manufacturing labor. For every country i 2 N , we have shown that the multiplier for
country n’s manufacturing labor 1
wn
in
Zi(w;i) is strictly increasing in wk for tariff rates i sufficiently
small. This combined with the fact that national labor incomes in all countries is non-decreasing (i.e.
@
@wk
 
wiLi + Y
O
i
  0 for all countries i 2 N ) yields @
@wk
in(w)
wn
wiL
M
i +Y
O
i
Zi(w;i) > 0, which in turn
immediately gives the desired result that demand for every country other than k’s manufacturing labor
increases with country k’s wage rate, or equivalently @L
D
n
@wk
> 0, for all countries n 6= k.
(Item 3) Bearing inmind that own trade sharesii (w) andZi (w; i) does not depend on non-manufacturing
price pO, a visual examination of equation 46 immediately gives Item 3 of the theorem. All else being
constant, an increase in the non-manufacturing price directly increases nominal national income for
all countries while leaving patterns of trade unchanged, resulting in greater nominal demand for every
country’s manufacturing labor. Since manufacturing wages are constant, this results in greater real
demand for every country’s manufacturing labor as well.
(Item 4) From equation 47, it is immediately clear that aggregate excess demand for non-manufacturing
goods depends only on each country’s real non-manufacturing consumption. Real non-manufacturing
consumption for each country n is given as
COn
pO
= (1  )

n (1  nn(w))
Zn(w; n)




wn
pO

LMn + Y
O
n

+

wn
pO

LMn + Y
O
n

(  ):
Once again, an increase in the non-manufacturing price by itself does not change patterns of trade
and the term n(1 nn(w))
Zn(w;n) remains unaffected by an increase in p
O. The purchasing power of non-
manufacturing endowment over non-manufacturing goods is obviously unchanged by an increase in
pO. However, an increase in the non-manufacturing price reduces the purchasing power of manufac-
turing labor income over non-manufacturing goods as evidenced by an decrease in the term

wn
pO

,
resulting in a decrease real demand for non-manufacturing goods for every country n 2 N . This
gives us item 4 of the theorem.
We have demonstrated the relevant goods, each country’s manufacturing labor and non-manufacturing
goods, are gross substitutes. We shall now demonstrate that there is a unique equilibrium vector of
manufacturing wages normalized by setting the non-manufacturing price to unity.
For ease of notation, let v := (w; pO) denote the vector of all manufacturing wages joined with the
non-manufacturing price. For expository convenience, refer to v as the ‘vector of prices’. Let F(v) :=
(F1(v); :::; FN(v); FO(v)) be the vector of aggregate excess demand functions. Noticing that each
aggregate demand function is homogeneous of degree zero in
 
w; pO

, it must also be the case that
F(v) is homogeneous of degree zero in v.
It shall now be shown that if 2 distinct equilibrium price vectors exist, they must be collinear.
Suppose to the contrary there exists 2 distinct, non-collinear equilibrium price vectors, v =
 
v1; :::; v

N+1

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and v =
 
v1; :::; v

N+1

; such that v 6= v, F(v) = F(v) = 0N+1, and there does not exist any real
number " such that v = "v. Multiply v by the scalar v

l
vl
:= minj
n
vj
vj
o
j=1;:::;N+1
to obtain v,
and it would be easy to verify that v  v with vl = vl . Since F is homogeneous of degree
zero, F(v) = F(v) = 0N+1, and v must also be an equilibrium vector of prices. Since the non-
collinearity of v and v implies the non-collinearity of v and v, there must exist at least one ‘good’
j for which vj < vj .
Then since the gross substitute property gives @Fl(v)
@vj
> 0 for all j 6= l and v 2 RN+1++ , vj < vj
for at least one good j, and vl = vl , it must be that case that Fl(v) < Fl(v). This implies that
F(v) 6= F(v), and either v or v are not equilibrium vectors of prices. A contradiction is obtained
as both v and v are equilibrium vectors of prices by assumption.
It has thus been shown that two distinct vectors are equilibrium vectors only if they are collinear, in
which case given any set of exogenous parameters satisfying Assumption 1 and with sufficiently low
import tariff rates, the space of equilibrium price vectors is a single dimensional ray in RN+1++ . Con-
sequently, there can only be one unique equilibrium vector normalized by setting non-manufacturing
good price pO = vN+1 to 1.
We conclude this section on the uniqueness of the the immobile labor equilibrium by re-emphasizing
that the requirement that Assumption 1 holds is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for unique-
ness. Numerous numerical simulations employing randomized parameters have not appeared to yield
any evidence of multiple equilibria in any set of parameters, even ones that grossly contradicts As-
sumption 1, admitting speculation that less restrictive sufficient conditions for uniqueness might exist.
Furthermore, while Item 2 of Theorem 2 requires some country specific uniform tariff rate tn to be
sufficiently low in order for the equilibrium manufacturing wages (normalized by non-manufacturing
good price) to be unique, the continuity of the tariff revenue multiplier 1   Pi tni1+tnini in each
tariff rate tni suggests the complementary result that the uniqueness of the equilibrium might also be
obtained if tni is sufficiently low for each n; i 2 N , even if country n imposes different import tariffs
on imports from different countries. This would be assumed to be true for comparative statics analysis
in later sections, in order to accommodate preferential trade agreements in which countries lower (or
increase) tariff rates on imports from specific trading partners.
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Part IV
Sectoral Trade Balance
In the Eaton and Kortum (2002) 2-sector general equilibrium trade model, it is possible for countries
to run sectoral trade deficits or surpluses. The national budget constraint only requires that any trade
surplus in themanufacturing sector bematchedwith an identical trade deficit in the non-manufacturing
sector such that trade balances across sectors in each country. As would be later demonstrated, sectoral
trade imbalances have significant influence on the national welfare consequences of tariff changes,
particularly when countries enter into sector specific preferential trade arrangements.
As non-manufacturing production relies only on labor as inputs, national non-manufacturing labor in-
comeY On equals nominal national non-manufacturing revenue. National trade surplus in non-manufacturing
trade SOn is simply nominal national non-manufacturing revenue Y On less national non-manufacturing
consumption COn = (1  )
 
Y Mn + Y
O
n + TRn

, such that
SOn = Y
O
n   (1  )
 
TRn + Y
M
n

:
National trade surplus SMn in the manufacturing sector is receipts from foreigners less payments to
foreigners. Trade surplus could also be calculated as national manufacturing revenues less national
manufacturing expenditures net of import tariffs
SMn = Qn   (Xn   TRn) ;
since domestically sourced manufacturing goods net out in the process.
By rearranging equation 22, we have Qn   (Xn   TRn) = (1  )
 
TRn + Y
M
n
  Y On ; or equiv-
alently SMn =  SOn . The only requirement of the balanced national budget constraint is that trade
aggregated across both sectors is balanced in each country, such that national trade surpluses in man-
ufacturing must be balanced by an equal deficit in non-manufacturing.
To see that trade in each sector need not balance, consider the following example in the mobile labor
scenario of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade model. Suppose the global economy is composed of
two countries in N = f1; 2g, and that international trade is costless and no tariff barriers exists, with
dni = 1 for all n; i 2 f1; 2g. Further suppose the 2 countries are identical in every possible way,
except for differing levels of manufacturing technology. More specifically, assume thatw1 = w2 = 1,
L1 = L2 = 1 but T1 = 1 and T2 = 3. For simplicity, set the remaining parameters as  = 2 and
 =  = 1/2.
Since there are no frictions associated with international trade of manufacturing goods, the Law of
One Price applies in the manufacturing sector and manufacturing prices must be the same between
the 2 countries, with p1 = p2. Solving for expenditure shares ni = Ti(dniwipi)
 P
j2N Tj(dnjwjpj)
  , we obtain
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11 = 21 =
1
4
and 12 = 22 = 34 ,
 =
 
1
4
3
4
1
4
3
4
!
:
Define Z =

I  (1  )>. It is easily verified that the inverse of Z is
Z 1 =
 
5
4
1
4
3
4
7
4
!
:
From equation 31, we have national manufacturing expenditures as L(Xn) = Z 1L(wn Ln). Cal-
culation gives X1 = 34 and X2 =
5
4
. From equation 30, manufacturing revenues are given by
L(Qn) = >L(Xn), solving which yields Q1 = 12 and Q2 =
3
2
.
Finally, since tariff revenues are 0 for each country, the vector of national manufacturing trade surplus
is  
SM1
SM2
!
=
 
Q1  X1
Q2  X2
!
=
 
 1
4
1
4
!
:
Country 2 runs a manufacturing trade surplus while country 1 suffers a correspondence manufacturing
trade deficit. It is not necessarily the case that trade in each sector balances.
In this particular scenario, since country 2 has a higher level of productive technology inmanufacturing
sector relative to country 1, we might intepret this as country 2 having a comparative advantage in the
production of manufacturing goods relative to country 1. The flipside of the coin is that country 1 has
a comparative advantage in the production of non-manufacturing goods. So it should be unsurprising
that country 2 should be a net exporter of manufacturing goods while country 1 is a net exporter in the
non-manufacturing sector.
One implication of sectoral trade imbalance is that changes in manufacturing prices would have dif-
ferent welfare implications for countries running manufacturing trade surpluses versus those running
deficits. Since the non-manufacturing good serves as the numeraire, an increase in nominal manu-
facturing prices implies an increase in the price of manufacturing goods relative to the price of non-
manufacturing goods. For countries running manufacturing trade surpluses, an increase in price of
manufacturing goods represents an increase in the price of exports relative to the price of imports,
resulting in welfare gains from improving terms of trade. The converse is true for countries with
manufacturing trade deficits.
Since sectoral trade balance has welfare implications in the Eaton and Kortum trade model, it would
be useful if manufacturing trade surpluses and deficits could be characterized in some way. One com-
plication is that there are many factors influencing a country’s manufacturing trade surplus. Higher
levels of manufacturing technology, lower wages (in the mobile labor scenario), greater manufactur-
ing labor supply and smaller non-manufacturing sectors (in the immobile labor scenario) would all be
associated greater potential for trade manufacturing surplus. Would a country with low technology
but a large labor supply enjoy manufacturing trade surpluses? Heterogeneous costs of transportation
further obscure the issue.
The remainder of this section demonstrates an interesting and non-obvious result for manufacturing
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trade balance: if some costs of international trade is symmetrical is some way, it is always possible to
rank countries n 2 N in terms of relative competitiveness, defined as the number of countries against
which a country runs a manufacturing trade surplus.
Sni, country n’s manufacturing trade surplus with country i, is the excess of revenues received by
country n on exports to country i, Qni = Xin1+tin , over the expenditures less tariffs paid by country n on
manufacturing imports from country i , Qin = Xni1+tni , such that
Sni = Qni  Qin = Xiin
1 + tin
  Xnni
1 + tni
:
We shall termM(Sni) = M(Qni) M(Qni)> the matrix of (manufacturing) trade surpluses and note
thatM(Sni) is skew-symmetric, i.e. Sni =  Sin:
Definition 3. We say that country n runs a trade surpluswith country i or equivalently, country i runs
a trade deficit with country n if
Sni > 0 > Sin:
We say that a country n’s manufacturing trade with country i is balanced if Sni = 0 = Sin.
The two assumptions below each independently provide the sufficient conditions for our final results
to hold.
Assumption 2. It is the case that the geographical distance matrix M( dni) and the matrix of tariff
ratesM(tni) is symmetrical, such the matrix of economic distancesM(dni) is symmetrical. I.e.
dni = din
tni = tin
dni = dni (1 + tni) = din (1 + tin) = din:
Assumption 2 is simply the assertion that the costs of trading from n to i is exactly the same as for
from i to n, that trade distance is symmetrical.
Assumption 3. It is the case that for all countries n; i; j 2 N , we have
dnidijdjn = dnjdjidin:
Assumption 3 asserts another form of symmetry in trade costs. Here, we might use Caliendo and
Parro’s (2015) model of iceberg trade costs and theMost-favored-nation (MFN) clause ofWorld Trade
Organization (WTO) rules to provide a justification for Assumption 3.
Economic trade distance dni could be decomposed into two factors, tariff barriers to trade (1 + tni)
and iceberg trade costs dni. Caliendo and Parro (2015) further modeled iceberg trade costs dni as
ln dni = ni + n + i + "ni:
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The parameter ni = in reflects symmetric bilateral trade costs like distances, cultural affinity and
common borders. n and i respectively refer to importer and exporter fixed effects such as non-tariff
barriers to trade, quality of shipping terminals etc. "ni is an uncorrelated random disturbance term. It
is easily verified that
ln
 dni dij djn
dnj dji din

= "ni + "ij + "jn   "nj   "ji   "nj:
Since the sum of error terms would also have an expected value of 0, consequently the expected value
of ln

dni dij djn
dnj dji din

equals 0. It then follows that the expected value of the ratio of economic distances
would be
E

ln dnidijdjn
dnjdjidin

=   ln (1 + tni) (1 + tij) (1 + tjn)
(1 + tnj) (1 + tin) (1 + tji)
:
Under WTO rules, all WTO member countries (which constitutes the bulk of all countries in the
world) extend to one another MFN status. If country n imposes tariffs on imports of tni on imports
from country i with MFN status, it must impose the same import tariffs on goods from MFN country
j, such that tnj = tni.
If we suppose all countries mutually confer MFN status to each other (a scenario approximating real-
ity), then it follows that every country imposes the same tariff rate on all imports, such that tn = tni
for all countries i 6= n. If this supposition holds, then Assumption 3 follows immediately as then
E

ln dnidijdjn
dnjdjidin

=   ln (1 + tn) (1 + ti) (1 + tj)
(1 + tn) (1 + ti) (1 + tj)
= 0;
and the ratio dnidijdjn
dnjdjidin
is expected to take on a value of 1.
The consequence of the two assumptions is found in the next lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose Assumption 2 or Assumption 3 holds. Then for all n; j; i 2 N ,
njji
ijjn
=
ni
in
:
Proof. For ease of notation, let ni = d ni and recall that ni =
Tic
 
i ni
p n
. Then
njji
ijjn
=
 
Tjc
 
j nj/p n
  
Tic
 
i ji/p i
 
Tjc
 
j ij/p i
  
Tnc
 
n jn/p j

=
njji/ni
ijjn/in

Tic
 
i ni/p n
Tnc
 
n in/p i
=
njji/ni
ijjn/in
ni
in
:
If Assumptions 2 or 3, then njji/niijjn/in = 1 as required.
Lemma 5 could be interpreted as meaning that symmetry in trade costs results in symmetry in expen-
diture shares. This results in transitivity in the relations of which countries runs trade surpluses with
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whom, the subject of the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Suppose Assumption 2 or 3 holds. Then,
Sjn  0&Sni  0 =) Sji  0:
Proof. Suppose Sjn  0 and Sni  0.
Sjn  0 implies that nj1+tnjXn 
jn
1+tjn
Xj or equivalently XnXj 
jn
nj
1+tnj
1+tjn
: Similarly, Sni  0 implies
that Xi
Xn
 ni
in
1+tin
1+tni
.
We then have
Xi
Xj
=
Xi
Xn
Xn
Xj
 ni
in
jn
nj
1 + tin
1 + tni
1 + tnj
1 + tjn
:
By Assumption 2, we have 1+tin
1+tni
1+tnj
1+tjn
= 1 and 1+tij
1+tji
= 1. By Lemma 5, we have jnni
innj
=
ji
ij
: Hence
we have
Xi
Xj
 ji
1 + tji
1 + tij
ij
;
or equivalently, Sji  0:
Proposition 9 asserts that if country j experiences a trade surplus with country n, and country n does
the same with country i, then country j must also enjoy a trade surplus with country i.
The results of Proposition 9 could be applied to the global economy in characterizing the structure of
manufacturing trade surpluses that occurs in equilibrium.
Definition 4. Define by “” the ‘relative competitiveness’ relation on N N .
For some pair of countries (n; i) 2 N N , we say the country n is ‘at least as competitive as’ country
i, denoted by n < i, whenever Sni  0  Sin, i.e. whenever country n does not run a trade deficit
with country i.
We say that country n is ‘strictly more competitive than’ country i’, denoted n  i, whenever Sni >
0 > Sin such that country n runs a trade surplus with country i.
Finally, we say that country n is ‘just as competitive’ as country i, denoted n  i whenever country
n and i have balanced trade with one another, such that Sni = 0 = Sin.
Theorem 3. If Assumption 2 or 3 holds, the set of countries N is totally ordered under the ‘relative
competitiveness’ relation, , such that for all n; i; j 2 N , we have
1. n  n (property of reflexivity)
2. n  i or i  n (property of completeness)
3. n  i and i  n then n  i (property of antisymmetry)
4. j  n and n  i then j  i (property of transitivity)
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Then since (;N ) is a totally ordered set, and the set of countries N has finite elements, we can
reindex countries, ni, for i = 1; 2; :::; N , such that
n1  n2  :::  nN :
Hence for each number i=1; 2; :::; N , we can find a country ni that does not have trade deficits with
at least N   i countries, and does not have trade surpluses with i  1 countries.
Proof. The ‘relative competitiveness’ relation, , on N inherits the totally ordered property from
(;R), via the definition of  in terms of trade surpluses.
To demonstrate this, we shall show that each item 1 through 4 of the Theorem holds.
(Item 1: Reflexivity) Each country runs 0 trade surplus with itself, such that Snn = 0, hence n  n
and the property of reflexivity holds.
(Item 2: Completeness) For each n; i 2 N , trade surplus Sni 2 R is defined, with Sni  0 or Sin  0.
Hence we have n  i or i  n and the property of completeness holds.
(Item 3: Antisymmetry) Suppose for some n; i 2 N , n  i and i  n, such that Sni  Sin and
Sin  Sni. Since the order relation  is antisymmetric in real numbers, it must be that Sni = Sin and
n  i.
(Item 4: Transitivity) Suppose for some countries n; i; j 2 N , it were the case that j  n and n  i,
such that Sjn  0 and Sni  0. Then by Proposition 9, it must be the case that Sji  0 and j  i .
If Assumptions 2 or 3 hold, Theorem 3 tells us that we can rank countries by the number of other
countries they run trade surpluses with. One important implication is that there must exist at least one
country that runs no manufacturing trade deficits with any other country, and at least one country that
runs no manufacturing trade surpluses. This is a useful result when considering the terms-of-trade
effects associated with changes in equilibrium manufacturing prices, one of the topics of the next
section.
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Part V
Equilibrium Analysis of Trade Liberalization
Policies
This part of the thesis seeks to answer a simple question: what predictions would the Eaton andKortum
(2002) trade model make on the welfare consequences of preferential trade agreements? How would
member and non-member countries be affected?
While trade agreements often include non-tariff related components, here we model preferential trade
agreements solely as countries mutually agreeing to lower tariffs on imports from one another.
This part of the thesis consists of two sections. In the first section, we study the simplest possible
case of trade liberalization, where one country unilaterally reduces tariffs on imports from another
country in the mobile labor scenario. The bilateral or multilateral tariff reductions associated with
trade agreements can be thought of as combinations of the unilateral cases, hence the focus on the
simplest elemental case.
We show that when a country unilaterally decreases import tariffs, the model predicts that prices
would decrease in all countries, and every country would substitute towards imports resulting in trade
creation everywhere.
We also show that starting in a scenario in which there are no import tariffs and manufacturing trade
is balanced for each country, changes in welfare depends only on domestic trade shares nn, and
parameters,  and . This result is analogous to themain result inArkolakis, Costinot andRodríguez-
Clare (2012). Our results however also shows that other factors such as manufacturing trade balance
SMn and import shares ni; n 6= i do matter when the restrictive assumption of balanced trade are
removed. In that sense, our results extends Arkolakis et al.’s findings to more general scenarios of
interest.
In the second section, we consider whether global free trade constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
7 Comparative Stactics in the Mobile Labor Scenario
In this section, we study how the mobile labor equilibrium changes in the simplest possible case of
trade liberalization - a unilateral tariff reduction by a country k on imports from another country l,
reducing the rate of tariffs tkl on imports from country l, holding all else constant.
7.1 Changes in Manufacturing Prices and Expenditure Shares
We start by considering how manufacturing prices changes with respect to the tariff rate tkl and it is
efficient to do so by first examining how expenditure shares ni are affected by changes to tkl:
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Recall that by equations 18, 19 and 20, for all n; i 2 N , we have
ni = Ti
 d ni c
 
i
p n
and pn = 
 X
i
Tid
 
ni c
 
i
! 1/
; (52)
where ci = wi p
1 
i refers to the costs of inputs into manufacturing production.
For notational convenience we shall use x0 := dxdtkl to denote the derivative of some equilibrium vari-
able x with respect to tkl.
Proposition 10. The matrix of derivatives of expenditure shares with respect to tkl is
M


0
kl

:= 

D

ln p0n

  D

ln c0n

  kl
1 + tkl
k
T
l

Moreover,
M

ln0ni

= 

L

ln p0n

1TN   1NL

ln c0n
T
  1
1 + tkl
k
T
l

Proof. SinceM
 

0
ni

= M  ln0ni,29 and since ln ni = ln  Ti  d ni + (ln pn   ln ci   ln (1 + tni)),
where Ti;  and dni are exogeneously given parameters, we have
d ln ni
d tkl
= 
h
ln p0n   ln c
0
i   ln (1 + tni)
0i
Noting that ln (1 + tni)
0
= 1
1+tkl
only if (n; i) = (k; l) ; and 0 otherwise, we have
M

ln0ni

= 

L

ln p0n

1TN   1NL

ln c0n
T
  1
1 + tkl
k
T
l

Let [A]ij denote the element ofmatrixA on the ith row and jth column, and note that

   L  ln p0n 1TNij =
ij ln p
0
i =

D
 
ln p0n



ij
for all (i; j) 2 N N . This implies that
 

L

ln p0n

1TN

= D

ln p0n


By similar reasoning, we have
 

1NL

ln c0n
T
= D

ln c0n

29The symbol  refers to the Hadamard product, i.e. for anym n matrices A = M (ani) and B = M (bni), we have
A  B = M (anibni).
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It follows then that
M


0
ni

=  M

ln 0ni

= 

 

L

ln p0n

1TN

   

1NL

ln c0n
T
    kTl

= 

D

ln p0n

  D

ln c0n

  kl
1 + tkl
k
T
l

Since the sum of expenditure shares of each country n is unity, i.e.
P
i2N ni = 1, the sum of changes
to expenditure shares of each country must be zero. This immediately gives us the derivatives of
manufacturing prices with respect to tkl via the next proposition.
Proposition 11. The vector of derivatives of the logarithm each country’s manufacturing goods prices
with respect to the tariff rate tkl is:
L

ln p0n

= L

ln c0n

+
kl
1 + tkl
k
Proof. Since  = M(ni) is a row-stochastic matrix such that
P
i2N ni = 1 for each n 2 N , it must
be that d
d tkl
P
i ni =
P
i
d ni
d tkl
= 0. It follows directly that
M


0
ni

1N = L
 X
i
d ni
d tkl
!
= 0N
From Proposition (10), we haveM
 

0
ni

= 
h
D
 
ln p0n

  D  ln c0n  kl1+tkl kTl i, therefore


D

ln p0n

  D

ln c0n

  kl
1 + tkl
k
T
l

1N = 0N
=) D

ln p0n

1N = D

ln c0n

1N +
kl
1 + tkl
k
T
l 1N
=) L

ln p0n

= L

ln c0n

+
kl
1 + tkl
k
In the mobile labor scenario, manufacturing wages are exogeneously given parameters hence lnw0n =
0 for all n 2 N , and ln c0n = (1  ) ln p0n. Hence a collorary to Proposition 11 is that in the mobile
labor scenario, it must be the case that
L(ln p0n) = (1  )  L(ln p
0
n) +
kl
1 + tkl
k (53)
= [I  (1  )] 1 kl
1 + tkl
k:
From footnote 27, the inversematrix [I  (1  )] 1 exists and equalsP1m=0 (1  )m(m). Hence
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we can rewrite equation 53 as
L(ln p0n) =
 
I+
1X
m=1
(1  )m(m)
!
kl
1 + tkl
k: (54)
This means that for all countries n 6= k,
d ln p0n
d tkl
= (1  ) kl
1 + tkl
 
nk + (1  )
X
i
niik + (1  )2
X
i
X
j
niijjk + :::
!
; (55)
and
d ln p0k
d tkl
= (1  ) kl
1 + tkl
 
kk + (1  )
X
i
niik + (1  )2
X
i
X
j
niijjk + :::
!
(56)
+
kl
1 + tkl
:
Equations 55 and 56 provide a nice economic interpretation for how manufacturing prices evolve in
response to a change to some import tariff rate tkl. Consider the following very informal discussion.
We can think of kl
1+tkl
as the ‘immediate’ impact of the tariff change on prices in country k, the coun-
try implementing the change in the tariff rate on imports from country l. From Proposition (3), the
distribution of prices of goods sold in country k does not depend on the source of the goods, hence
the conditional distribution of prices of goods imported from l is identical to the general distribution
of prices in k, such that the average price goods conditioned on them being sourced from l is also the
unconditional mean country k manufacturing good price pk.30Let p0k be the price of goods in general
in country k before the change in tkl, then we can write pk as
p0k = klp
0
k + (1  kl) p0k
where klp0k is the contribution to country k’s price made by imports from country l. After an infini-
tisimal change in tariffs d tkl, holding all other factors constant, the new average price of imports from
l to k would be 1+t
1
kl
1+t0kl
p0k, where t1kl = t0kl + d tkl is the new tariff rate and t0kl is the original tariff rate.
Holding all other factors constant, p1k := kl
1+t1kl
1+t0kl
p0k + (1  kl) p0k is the new country k price. Hence
the immediate impact on country k price due solely to the change in tkl is
0 ln pk  p
1
k   p0k
p0k
=
kl [(1 + t
1
kl) p
0
k   (1 + t0kl) p0k]
p0k (1 + t
0
kl)
=
kl
(1 + t0kl)
dtkl
30Recall that the measure of the set of all manufacturing goods j
j = 1 and the measure of the set of goods k sources
from any country i 2 N is j
kij = ki. The average expenditure on each good in 
ki = Xkij
kij = kiXkki = Xk, identical
to the average expenditure across all goods Xkj
j = Xk. Since the distribution of country k’s quantity demanded across
goods in 
ki is the same as that in 
, this immediately implies that pki, the country k average price of goods sourced from
country i must be the same as the unconditional manufacturing price in k, pki = pk, at market equilibrium.
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0 ln pk = kl1+tkldtkl could therefore be thought of as the ‘zeroth’ order effect, the immediate impact
of the change in tariff rate tkl on country k’s manufacturing price index, holding all other factors such
as trade shares and other countries’ prices and production costs constant.
Given the use of manufacturing goods as intermediate inputs, the increase in manufacturing product
prices in country k pushes up the cost of manufacturing production in the country by 0 ln ck =
(1  )0 ln pk = (1  ) kl1+tkldtkl.
Examining equations 55 and 56, it should be easily seen that these immediate impacts on country
k are propogated across countries through trade in manufacturing goods. For each country n 2 N
(including k), national manufacturing prices can be expressed as
pn = nkpnk + (1  nk) pn;
where pnk is the average price of goods sourced from k, and pnk = pn in the initial equilibrium.
When the cost of production in country k changes, the price of goods that n sources from k changes
as well. Recall that the price of a good ! 2 
nk, sourced from country k delivered to country n is
pnk(!) =
ckdnk
zk(!)
, hence the change in the country n price of all goods ! 2 
nk as a result of the increase
in country k’s production costs would be 1 ln pnk(!) = 0 ln ck. Since pnk is the average price of
all goods in 
nk, it follows immediately that the change in pnk would be 1 ln pnk = 0 ln ck. The
change in country n’s manufacturing price would be
1pn = nkpnk = pnknk
0 ln pnk:
Since pn = pnk at the initial equilibrium and 1 ln pnk = 1 ln ck, the proportional change in pn
would be
1 ln pn =
1pn
pn
= nk
0 ln ck:
The zeroth order change in production costs in country k changes manufacturing prices in every coun-
try, which in turn changes the cost of manufacturing everywhere, triggering off a cascade of higher
order changes in manufacturing prices and production costs, distributed through trade in manufactur-
ing goods, cumulatively increasing manufacturing prices.
However, since limm!1 (1  )mm is a zero-matrix, higher order effects eventually converge in
magnitude to 0 and the total change in prices in each country is bounded below infinity.
As country k was the source of the initial disruption to equilibrium prices, and the only one to expe-
rience the zeroth effect on prices, intuitively we might expect the change in country k manufacturing
prices to be the greatest among all the countries in N . The next theorem shows this to be true, and
that in fact, the proportional change to manufacturing costs in country k is greater than of prices in
any other country.
Theorem 4. In the mobile labor case,
1. d ln pn
dtkl
> 0 for each n 2 N .
2. d ln pk
dtkl
= maxi2N
n
d ln pi
dtkl
o
and d ln ck
dtkl
= (1  ) d ln pk
dtkl
 d ln pn
dtkl
for each n 2 N .
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3. For each country n 2 N , we have d lnnn
dtkl
> 0 and d lnnk
dtkl
< 0.
4. For country i 6= l, d lnki
dtkl
> 0, and d lnkl
dtkl
< 0.
Proof. (Statement 1) From equation 54 we have
L(ln p0n) =
 
I+
1X
m=1
(1  )m(m)
!
kl
1 + tkl
k:
Since expenditure shares are strictly positive,  > 0 is a matrix with strictly positive elements and
kl > 0. It follows immediately that for each n 2 N , the derivative ln p0n must be strictly positive as
products and sums of strictly positive numbers.
(Statement 2) Expanding equation 53 gives each ln p0n as
d ln pn
dtkl
=
8<:(1  )
PN
i=1 ni
d ln pi
dtkl
; 8n 6= k
(1  )PNi=1 ki d ln pidtkl + kl; if n = k:
Since
PN
i=1 ni = 1, the term
PN
i=1 ni
d ln pi
dtkl
is the trade-weighted average of all derivatives of national
log-prices. As the value of an average must be less than value of the largest constituent element, for
all n 6= k, we have
d ln pn
dtkl
 (1  )max
i2N
fln pig : ()
Wewish to show that d ln pk
dtkl
= maxi2N
n
d ln pi
dtkl
o
. Suppose to the contrary that d ln pk
dtkl
6= maxi2N
n
d ln pi
dtkl
o
,
and some country n 6= k satisfies d ln pn
dtkl
= maxi2N
n
d ln pi
dtkl
o
. But it would be the case that d ln pn
dtkl

(1  ) d ln pn
dtkl
, which is clearly impossible, since (1  ) < 1, and d ln pn
dtkl
> 0. Hence it must be the
case that
d ln pk
dtkl
= max
i2N

d ln pi
dtkl

: ()
It follows immediately from () and () that
d ln pn
dtkl
 (1  )max
i2N
fln pig = (1  ) d ln pk
dtkl
;
for all n 6= k as required.
(Statements 3 & 4) Follows immediately from the above results on changes in national prices and the
fact that for n; i 2 N , the derivative of log-tradeshares of country n0s imports from country i is given
as
d lnni
dtkl
= 

d ln pn
dtkl
  (1  ) d ln pi
dtkl
  d ln (1 + tni)
dtkl

:
First note that Statement 3 implies that for n 6= k,
d ln pk
dtkl
> (1  ) d ln pk
dtkl
>
d ln pn
dtkl
> (1  ) d ln pn
dtkl
:
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Also note that d ln(1+tni)
dtkl
= 0 for all n 6= k and i 6= l and 1
1+tkl
otherwise. Then, we have:
• For all n 2 N ,  d ln pn
dtkl
> 0 results in d lnnn
dtkl
> 0.
• For all n 6= k, d ln pn
dtkl
< (1  ) d ln pk
dtkl
results in d lnnk
dtkl
< 0.
• For all i 6= l, d ln pk
dtkl
> (1  ) d ln pi
dtkl
results in d lnki
dtkl
> 0:
• Finally, since ki is increasing in tkl for all i 6= l, and kl = 1  
PN
i6=l ki, it must be that kl
must be decreasing in tkl. That is, since d lnkldtkl =  
PN
i 6=l
kl
ki
d lnki
dtkl
and d lnki
dtkl
> 0 for all i 6= l,
it must be that d lnkl
dtkl
< 0:
The implication of Theorem 4 is that whenever a country k unilaterally increases the tariff rate on
imports from some country l, the effects are not limited to country k alone. Every country experiences
an increase in the prices of manufacturing goods, although country k would experience the greatest
increase. The increase in country k0smanufacturing price is so much greater than the rest, that even the
increase in country k’s manufacturing costs outweighs the increase in prices everywhere else. This is
unsurprising in light of the fact that it is the increase in country k’s manufacturing costs which triggers
the increase in manufacturing prices elsewhere.
Since increases in manufacturing costs ck directly affects the price of country k’s exports pnk(!) =
ckdnk
zk(!)
for any importing country n 2 N , the increase in ck relative to all other countries’ manufacturing
costs leads to loss of country k’s competitiveness in every foreign manufacturing product market. This
is seen from the loss of market share as evidenced by ln0nk < 0 for every country n 6= k. The fact that
ln0nk < 0when ln p
0
k = max

ln p0n
	
n2N suggests that in the Eaton and Kortummodel, the countries’
manufacturing output are gross substitutes. This result mirrors the discussion in Section III where we
used the gross substitution property of national manufacturing labor forces to prove that the immobile
labor equilibrium is unique.
The increase in prices everywhere also lowers the incentives for beneficial trade. The increase in
national manufacturing prices lowers real manufacturing wages, depressing the production cost of
domestically produced goods relative to prices of manufacturing goods in aggregate. This expands
the set of locally produced goods that are price competitive in domestic markets, and every country
substitutes towards domestically produced manufacturing goods, as seen from ln0nn > 0. In this
sense, tariff barriers results in trade destruction (as the converse of trade creation) everywhere.
Country l, the target of country k’s change in tariff policy bears the brunt of the economic damage. Not
only does country l suffer from the general price increases, from ln0kl < 0 we see it also experiences
a loss of market share in country k due directly to the imposition of higher tariffs on its exports.
There are some compensations for other third party countries n 6= l. ln 0ki > 0 shows that every
country besides country l - the target of the higher tariff barrier, enjoys greater market share in country
k, as buyers in country k diverts purchases away from suppliers in l.
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Given the loss of foreign market share and the increases in national manufacturing prices, one might
question if any country k would ever wish to unilaterally increase tariffs on imports. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, the answer is yes, especially if the global economy were initially in a state of global free
trade. The analysis of the welfare implications of unilateral tariff changes is the topic of the next few
sections.
7.2 Welfare Analysis in the Mobile Labor Scenario
In this section, we consider how national welfare of each country is affected by unilateral changes in
import tariff rates.
In the mobile labor scenario, the only variable component of nominal national income is tariff revenue,
hence lnY 0n =
Y
0
n
Yn
= TR
0
n
Yn
. With this in mind, taking the derivative of equation 21 for every country
n 2 N yields the derivative of national welfare with respect to some tariff rate tkl as
lnW 0n = lnY 0n    ln p0n
= 1
Yn
 
TR
0
n   Yn ln p0n

= 1
Yn
 
TR0n + (1  )Qn ln p0n  Xn ln p0n

;
(57)
with the third equality since Yn = Xn   (1  )Qn, by equation 22.
Since ln0nn =  ln p
0
n, we can modify equation 57 as:
lnW 0n =
TRn
Yn

lnTR0n   ln p
0
n

  Qn
Yn

1

ln0nn

+
SMn
Yn
ln p0n; (58)
where SMn = Qn   (Xn   TRn) is national manufacturing trade surplus.31
The first term in the right-hand-side of equation 58 refers to the welfare effect due to the change in
the real value of tariff revenues.
The second term refers to the trade creation effect of tariff changes. More specifically, a decrease in
the domestic share of expenditure as the result of a tariff change can be interpreted as buyers in country
n shifting purchases to more efficient overseas producers, with consequently positive welfare effects.
The final term refers to direct terms-of-trade effects. It is often thought that an increase in tariff
barriers on imports would negatively impact national welfare through increased prices. But when a
country enjoys a manufacturing sector trade surplus, an increase in manufacturing import tariffs might
actually increase national welfare because of increased prices. This slightly surprising result is due to
the terms-of-trade effect.
Recall that when a country runs a manufacturing trade surplus such that SMn > 0, it must run a non-
manufacturing trade deficit of the same size, SOn =  SMn < 0. Hence a country with a positive
manufacturing trade surplus is a net exporter of manufacturing goods and a net importer of the non-
manufacturing good. Since the non-manufacturing good is the numeraire good, increases in national
manufacturing prices pn also imply that national price of manufacturing goods increases relative to
31Lemma 10 in the Appendix show the same relationship for welfare changes hold in the immobile labor scenario.
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that of the non-manufacturing good, and the country with a manufacturing surplus experiences an
increase in real national income as the price of its exports increases against the price of its imports.
Since trade liberalization is associated with lower tariff rates and consequently lower manufactur-
ing prices (from Theorem 4), countries with manufacturing trade deficits benefit from reductions in
manufacturing import tariff rates, even if these reductions are implemented by some other country.
Conversely, countries with manufacturing trade surpluses stand to lose through terms-of-trade effects
when tariff barrier reduction measures are implemented.
Caliendo and Parro (2015) provided an extension of the Eaton and Kortum trade framework to acco-
modate an arbitrary J number of sectors of production, as opposed to two in the Eaton and Kortum
(2002) trade model. It might be instructive to consider the connections between welfare changes in
the original Eaton and Kortum (2002) model and the newer Caliendo and Parro (2015) variant.
In the Caliendo and Parro model, each of the J individual sectors use products from every other sec-
tor as intermediate inputs, and the various sectors and countries are linked together by international
trade of intermediate goods. As in the mobile labor scenario, labor freely moves between sectors
within each country, but like the immobile labor scenario, national wage levels are determined en-
dogenously. Interestingly, in Caliendo and Parro, national trade deficit (aggregated across sectors)
Dn is exogeneously fixed. In Caliendo and Parro, national income includes trade deficits, such that
Yn = TRn + wnLn +Dn:
The exogeneously determined national trade deficits Dn in Caliendo and Parro is analogous to the
exogeneously determined non-manufacturing income Y On in the Eaton and Kortum immobile labor
scenario, in the sense that Dn in Caliendo and Parro and Y On in the Eaton and Kortum immobile
scenario could be seem as exogeneous endowments from which demand for output from all sectors
is recursively generated. In the Eaton and Kortum immobile labor scenario, this could be seen from
equation 37. It is possible to derive a tensor-algebra equivalent for the Caliendo and Parro model with
respect to the vector of national trade deficits L(Dn), and this is in fact an avenue of research we are
currently pursuing for future work.
Given the discussion above, it is possible see strong parallels between a single sector version of the
Caliendo and Parro model and the immobile labor Eaton and Kortum trade model. Hence it is unsur-
prising that tariff changes would have the same effects on national welfare in both models.
In fact, the derivative of welfare changes in the Eaton and Kortum model can be written in exactly the
same form as that given in equation 16 of Caliendo and Parro (2015). For a single sector Caliendo and
Parro model, equation 16 in Caliendo and Parro (2015) giving the change in national welfare following
in a change in tariffs is stated as
lnW 0n =
1
Yn
X
i2N

Eni ln c
0
n  Mni ln c
0
i

+
1
Yn
X
i2N
tniMni

lnM 0ni   ln c
0
i

where Eni := Qni is before-tariffs exports from country n to i, and Mni := Qin is before-tariffs
imports from i to n. Caliendo and Parro termed
P
i2N
 
Eni ln c
0
n  Mni ln c0i

the terms of trade effect
as ln c0n represents changes in the world price (prices before tariffs and transportation costs) of country
n’s output.
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The latter term
P
i2N tniMni
 
lnM 0ni   ln c0i

was represented as a volume of trade effect. However,
since tniMni = TRni, nominal country n tariff revenues earned on imports from i, and lnM
0
ni =
lnTR0ni for n 6= k, it would be equally valid to rewrite Caliendo and Parro’s ’volume of trade effect’
as
P
i2N TRni ln

TRni
ci
0
, the ‘change in real tariff revenues’ effect.
To derive the Eaton and Kortum equivalent, substitute ln c0n = (1  ) ln p0n, ln p0n =
P
i2N ni ln c
0
i
and Xni = Qin + TRni into equation 57 (while equation 57 applies to the mobile labor scenario, the
same result below holds in the immobile labor scenario as well) to obtain
lnW 0n =
1
Yn
 
TR
0
n +Qn ln c
0
n  
X
i2N
(TRni +Qin) ln c
0
i
!
=
X
i2N

Qni ln c
0
n  Qin ln c
0
i

+
1
Yn
X
i2N
TRni(lnTR
0
ni   ln c
0
i);
with the latter equality since TRn =
P
i2N TRni and Qn =
P
i2N Qni. The equivalence between
welfare changes across both models should be obvious, hence Caliendo and Parro’s formulation pro-
vides another interesting way of intepreting welfare effects in the Eaton and Kortum trade model. In
particular, in the next section concerning a global free trade scenario, we would consider in detail
the terms-of-manufacturing-trade effect (as oppose to the ‘direct’ terms-of-trade effect between the
manufacturing and non-manufacturing trade referred to in the discussion of equation 58).
It is also worth relating the ‘trade creation’ welfare term to Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare’s
2012 paper, “New trade models: Same old gains?”. (Here after referred to as ACR.) The key result in
ACR is that across a wide range of trade models, including Eaton and Kortum (2002), changes in own
expenditure shares nn and trade elasticity
d ln( ninn )
d ln( pipn )
=   are sufficient statistics in determining na-
tional welfare consequences of external shocks, such as changes to other countries costs of production
or costs of trade. This result is given as
ln

W 1n
W 0n

=   1

ln
1nn
0nn

(59)
where 1   refers to the cost share of intermediate goods,W 0n and 0nn refer to inital national welfare
and own expenditure share, andW 1n and 1nn being the same variables after some exogenous shock.
Holding initial variablesW 0n and 0nn constant and taking derivatives of equation 59, their results can
be reframed as
lnW 0n =  
1

ln0nn: (60)
Given the single-sector framing of the models discussed in ACR, and the assumed absence of tariff
barriers, ‘manufacturing’ labor income Qn equals national income Yn, and TRn = 0. In addition, the
single-sector assumption in ACR and the static nature of the equilibrium models they analyse requires
that national budgets balance and no trade surplus is possible, such that SMn = 0.
Imposing the same conditions into the Eaton and Kortumwelfare derivative function given in equation
58, we obtain the identical result that changes in national welfare in response to an external change
in import tariffs (here interpreted as a change in costs of trade for some other country) is given by
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equation 60.
What equation 58 then implies is that our analysis generalizes ACR’s result to scenarios involving
sectoral trade imbalance and the existence of import tariffs. It shows that when these additional factors
are taken into consideration, own expenditures shares and trade elasticities alone are insufficient in
determining national welfare consequences of external shocks, and other issues like changes in tariff
revenues and terms of trade effects remain relevant.
How then are manufacturing tariff revenues, sales revenues and expenditures influenced by changes
in tariffs?
Proposition 12. The vectors of derivatives of national manufacturing tariff revenues, product sales
revenues and expenditures are given by
L(TR0n) = D(
TRn
Xn
)L(X 0n) + 
h
(1  )M(Qni)>D(ln p0n)  D(ln p
0
n)M(Qni)>
i
1N (61)
+(1 + )
Xkl
(1 + tkl)
2 k
L(Q0n) = t>L(X
0
n)  
h
(1  )D(ln p0n)M(Qni) M(Qni)D(ln p
0
n)
i
1N (62)
  (1 + ) Xkl
(1 + tkl)
2 l
L(X 0n) = (1  )L(Q
0
n) + L(TR
0
n); (63)
where Qni = in1+tinXi is the manufacturing sales revenues earned by country n on sales to country i.
Proof. The result for L(TR0n) and L(Q
0
n) comes from Lemma 7 in the Appendix, and noting that
D(ln c0n) = (1  )D(ln p0n). The result for L(X 0n) comes from the fact that in the mobile labor
scenario, L(Xn) = (1  )L(Qn)+L(TRn)+L(wn Ln) and that national labor income L(wn Ln)
is exogeneously fixed.
The first terms on the RHS of the equations for L(TR0n) and L(Q
0
n) both reflect increases in tariff
revenues and manufacturing revenues due to increases in national expenditures.
The second terms on the RHS of the equations reflect changes due to shifting patterns of trade or
equivalently changes in expenditure shares, caused by relative changes of national manufacturing
prices.
The third term in both equations refer to the direct impact32 of the change in the tariff rate tkl on
manufacturing and tariff revenues.
We note in passing that the direct effect of an increase in tkl on tariff revenues of k, the country
implementing the tariff rate increase, is (1 + ) Xkl
(1+tkl)
2 . This increase in country k’s tariff revenues
is exactly of the same size as the decrease in the manufacturing revenues of l, the targeted country,
  (1 + ) Xkl
(1+tkl)
2 . As dd tkl
tkl
1+tkl
= 1
(1+tkl)
2 =   dd tkl 11+tkl , we can interpret the direct impact of the tariff
32Direct effect here, as in the discussion surrounding changes in manufacturing prices, means the effect experienced as a
direct result of the change in tariff rate tkl, and not mediated through secondary channels such as changes in manufacturing
costs, prices, national aggregate expenditures or expenditure shares.
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increase as a transfer of country l’s sales revenue to country k’s tariff revenues of size (1 + ) Xkl
(1+tkl)
2 .
This is due solely to the fact that 1
1+tkl
, which is the proportion ofXkl - country k’s total expenditures
on imports from l earned by country l as manufacturing revenues - has decreased to the benefit of
tkl
1+tkl
, which is the proportion of Xkl earned by country k as tariff revenues.
In general, solving for changes to tariff revenues and hence changes to national welfare involves
simultaneously solving three systems of linear functions, namely equations 61, 62 and 63. While
obtaining the numerical solutions is a trivial task, it is challenging to analyze these equations to obtain
meaningful insights in the general case.
However in a scenario of global free trade, a scenario in which no country imposes import tariffs, and
TRn = 0 for all countries n 2 N , the task of characterizing changes in tariff revenues and hence
changes to national welfare becomes much simpler. This is the topic of the next section.
7.3 Global Free Trade
Definition 5. A scenario of global free trade is a scenario in which tni = 0 for all n; i 2 N , such that
no tariff barriers to trade exists.
In this section, we consider whether countries have incentives to deviate from a global free trade
arrangement. That is, we consider whether any country k can increase national welfare by marginally
increasing tariff rate tkl on imports from l, away from zero.
In the global free trade scenario, no country earns tariff revenue and L(TRn) = 0N . In the absence of
tariff wedges, national expenditures on goods equals revenues earned by suppliers, andXni = Qin. In
matrix form, we have M(Qni)> = M(Xni) = D(Xn). This greatly simplifies analysis of changes
in tariff revenues in response to changes to some tkl. In the mobile labor, global free trade scenario,
equation 61 simplifies to33
TR
0
k = Xkkl
TR
0
n = 0; 8n 6= k: (64)
Since all countries other than k do not impose import tariffs, their tariff revenues remain unchanged
at 0. The change in national welfare for these countries n 6= k is given as
lnW 0n =   ln p
0
n < 0;
with the inequality since by Theorem 4, ln p0n > 0 for every country n 2 N as manufacturing prices
33In the global free trade scenario, since tkl = 0, D(TRn) = 0NN and M(Qni)> = D(Xn), we rewrite equation
61 as
L(TR
0
n) =  D(Xn) [I  (1  )]L(ln p
0
n) + (1 + )Xklk:
Since L(ln p0n) = kl [I  (1  )] 1 k, and D(Xn)k = Xkk we have
L(TR
0
n) =  klD(Xn)k + (1 + )Xklk
= Xklk:
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everywhere increase in response to an increase in tkl. The interpretation is that an increase in tkl
does not change nominal national income for any country other than k, but it does increase national
manufacturing prices for these countries. Real income necessarily decreases and national welfare
deteriorates as a result.
In contrast, for country k, the country deviating from the global free trade agreement, national nominal
income increases due to the increase in tariff revenue, so it is not immediately apparent whether country
k benefits by introducing an import tariff tkl > 0.
By substituting equation 64 into 57, the change in national welfare for country k is given34 by
lnW 0k =
P
i2N
 
Qki ln c
0
k  Xki ln c0i

Yk
: (65)
In equation 58, we referred to the term S
M
n
Yn
ln p0n as the terms-of-trade effect on national welfare. More
precisely, S
M
n
Yn
ln p0n refers to the terms-of-trade effect specific to relative changes between prices of
manufacturing and non-manufacturing goods. In equation 65, the term
P
i2N
 
Qki ln c
0
k  Xki ln c0i

refers to a terms-of-trade effect for trade within the manufacturing sector. That is, ‘terms-of-trade’
here refers to changes in the prices of the types of manufacturing goods imported by the country k
relative to its manufacturing exports.
To see this, recall that Qki refers to country k’s revenues earned on manufacturing sales to country
i, and Xki in the global free trade scenario refers to country k’s payments to suppliers in country i.
From equation 4, the ‘world price’ net of tariffs that country k pays to suppliers in country i for a good
! 2 
ki , is pki(!) = ci dkizi(!) , where dki is exogeneously given ‘geographical trade’ costs and zi(!) is
the exogeneously given level of efficiency with which country i produces good !.
For all countries i 2 N , ln pki(!)0 = ln c0i. The price country k pays to foreigners for imports is
influenced by solely by changes in costs of manufacturing production at the source of the imports, and
ln c0i is the proportionate change in prices of country k’s imports from country i. For exactly the same
reason, ln c0k reflects the change in prices of country k0s exports.
Let pki =
hR
!2
ki pki (!)
1  d!
i 1
1  refer to the CES aggregate price of country k’s imports from
country i, such that Xki
pki
is the measure of real imports, and notice that ln p0ki = ln c
0
i. Then since
Xki ln c
0
i =
Xki
pki
p
0
ki, it is clear thatXki ln c
0
i is the change in country k payments to foreigners in country
i and similarly, Qki ln c
0
k is the change in payments received from foreigners in country i.
34Substituting equation 64 into 57, and recalling (1  ) ln p0n = ln c
0
n for all n 2 N gives
lnW
0
k =
Xkkl +Qk ln c
0
k  Xk ln p
0
k
Yk
: ()
From equation 53, we have ln p0k =
P
i2N ki ln c
0
i + klk in the global free trade scenario as tkl = 0. Substituting this
back into (), and letting Qk =
P
i2N Qki, we have
lnW
0
k =
X
i2N

Qki ln c
0
k  Xki ln c
0
i

Yk
: ()
This relationship in fact holds for all countries n 2 N in the global free trade scenario.
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The term
P
i2N
 
Qki ln c
0
k  Xki ln c0i

is consequently the change in net income earned on trade by
country k due to relative changes in prices of country k’s manufacturing imports and exports, and
hence termed the manufacturing terms-of-trade effect.
Given the discussion so far, is there any country that might benefit by deviating from global free
trade? The results of Theorems 3 and 4 assert that there must always exist one country that benefits
by introducing import tariffs.
Theorem 3 asserts that that must always exist some country k 2 N that does not run a manufacturing
trade deficit against any other country such that Qki   Xki  0 for all i 2 N . Suppose country k
marginally increases tariff rate tkl away from 0.
By Theorem 4, it must be that ln c0k > ln c
0
i for all countries i 6= k, and we must have Qki ln c0k >
Xki ln c
0
i for all countries i 6= k, and hence lnW 0k > 0. A country that runs no manufacturing trade
deficits would always benefit by deviating from a global free trade agreement.
But there exists an even more general result: every country could benefit by unilaterally increasing
tariff rates away from 0.
Theorem 5. For all countries k 2 N , in the mobile labor global free trade scenario,
d lnWk
d tkl
=  
X
n 6=k
Yn
Yk
d lnWn
d tkl
> 0: (66)
Every country can increase national welfare by unilaterally deviating from the global free trade agree-
ment.
Proof. Transposing equation 53 in the global free trade scenario gives
L(ln p0n)> = kl>k

I  (1  )> 1 : ()
In the free trade scenario, Yn the national income is simply wn Ln, the national labor income, such that
L(Yn) = L(wn LN). It is also the case that since tni = 0 for all n; i 2 N , we have Dt = 0NN . Hence
equation 31 can be rewritten as
L(Yn) =

I  (1  )>L(Xn): ()
Combining the pre-multiplying the LHS () with the LHS of (), and the same of RHS of the equa-
tions, we get
L(ln p0n)>L(Yn) = kl>k L(Xn);
giving X
n2N
Yn ln p
0
n = Xkl = TR
0
k: (  )
Since Yn is nominal expenditure on consumption of manufacturing goods, we can interpret equation
(  ) as the change in global consumption expenditure on manufacturing goods, and this increase in
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global manufacturing consumption is due entirely to the increase in country k’s tariff income.35
Since
Yn lnW
0
n =
8<: Yn ln p
0
n 8n 6= k
TR
0
k   Yn ln p0k otherwise;
therefore equation (  ) can be rewritten asX
n2N
Yn lnW
0
n = 0:
As an increase in tkl decreases welfare in every country other than k, we have
P
n 6=k Yn lnW
0
n < 0,
which immediately gives us
Yk
d lnWk
d tkl
=  
X
n6=k
Yn
d lnWn
d tkl
> 0;
as required.
The basic intuition behind Theorem 5 is that deviation from the global free trade arrangement is a
constant sum game. Equation 66 can be rewritten as
X
n2N
YnP
i2N Yi
lnW 0n = 0: (67)
The income-weighted average of national welfare changes equals 0. Country k gains by deviating
from global free trade at the expense of the other countries.
Recall that (1  )Yn is the real non-manufacturing consumption by any country n given national
nominal income Yn and Yn is the country’s corresponding nominal consumption of manufacturing
goods. Since i) nominal incomes are unchanged for any country n 6= k, ii) non-manufacturing prices
remain unchanged at 1 (as the non-manufacturing good is the numeraire) and iii) manufacturing prices
increase in every country when country k increases import tariffs, it follows that real manufactur-
ing consumption decreases and non-manufacturing consumption remains constant for these countries.
35An alternative interpretation is this:
Since Ynpn is real national manufacturing consumption for country n 2 N , the change in real manufacturing consump-
tion for each country is
Yn
pn
0
=

pn

Y
0
n   Yn ln p
0
n

=
(  pnYn ln p0n ; 8n 6= k
  pk

Yn ln p
0
k   TR
0
k

otherwise:
The sum of price weighted changes to real national manufacturing consumption is hence
X
n2N
pn

Yn
pn
0
= TR
0
k  
X
n2N
Yn ln p
0
n
=   (1  )TR0k:
(1  )TR0k is the increase in real non-manufacturing consumption in country k. The interpretation here is that
global real manufacturing consumption falls, as labor resources are directed away from manufacturing towards non-
manufacturing production in order to accommodate greater demand for non-manufacturing goods from country k.
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National welfare is strictly deteriorates for these countries because of diminished real manufacturing
consumption, and lnW 0n < 0 for all countries n 6= k. Then by equation 66, country k’s welfare must
increase.
The creation of a tariff barrier tkl distorts the global allocation of manufacturing production, and in-
creases the prices of manufacturing goods everywhere. The increase in the price of manufacturing
goods results in substitution towards consumption of non-manufacturing goods. This, combined with
the distortion of production allocations towards less efficient manufacturing producers, means that
global real value-added (output net of intermediate goods) of manufacturing goods decreases.
To see that global real manufacturing output decreases whentkl > 0 in the global free trade scenario,
start by summing up changes in manufacturing revenues and expenditures in equations 62 and 63.
Recalling that
P
i2N TR
0
i = TR
0
k = Xkl, we obtain the changes in global manufacturing output and
expenditure as X
n2N
Q
0
n =
X
n2N
X
0
n  XklX
n2N
X
0
n = (1  )
X
i2N
Q
0
n + Xkl:
Solving for global nominal manufacturing value-added 
P
i2N Q
0
n gives

X
i2N
Q
0
n =   (1  )Xkl < 0: (68)
The increase in country k’s national income via the increase in national tariff revenue Y 0k = Xkl is
spent on increased nominal manufacturing consumption Xkl and increased real non-manufacturing
consumption (1  )Xkl.36Equation 68 shows that the total decrease in global manufacturing value-
added equals the increase in country k’s non-manufacturing consumption.
Manufacturing value-added Qn in each country for each country n 2 N is manufacturing labor
income wnLMn . Total national labor force Ln = LMn + LOn is split between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors. Recall that in themobile labor case, the national labor force Ln is exogeneously
fixed as is the national wage rate wn: Fixed national wages means that decreases in national manufac-
turing value-added is met by a proportional decrease in national labor employed in the manufacturing
sector, such that Q0n = wn
 
LMn
0
. Inelastic national labor supply implies that the decrease in man-
ufacturing employment equals the increase in non-manufacturing employments -
 
LMn
0
=
 
LOn
0
.
Labor is the sole input to constant-returns-to-scale non-manufacturing production hence the increase
in non-manufacturing production is proportional to the increase in non-manufacturing employment,
with
 
Y On
0
= wn
 
LOn
0
. We then rewrite equation 68 asX
n2N
 
Y On
0
= (1  )Xkl:
36(1  )Xkl is the increase in real country k non-manufacturing consumption since the non-manufacturing good is
the numeraire good with price of 1.
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Since non-manufacturing consumption remains unchanged in every country other than k, any increase
in global non-manufacturing output
P
n2N
 
Y On
0
is completely captured by country k as increased
non-manufacturing consumption. The increase in country k’s non-manufacturing consumption diverts
labor in the global economy towards the production of non-manufacturing goods, with a consequen-
tial decrease in the global manufacturing workforce. Given the constant returns to scale technology
employed in the manufacturing sector, the reduced manufacturing labor force results in decreased
global real manufacturing output. This is consistent with the alternative interpretation that the de-
crease in global nominal manufacturing value-added combined with increased manufacturing prices
everywhere mathematically necessitates lower global real manufacturing output.
Real manufacturing consumption in country k may decrease due to the higher national price of man-
ufacturing goods, though this is mitigated in part by increased nominal manufacturing consumption
expenditure Xkl. But any loss in k’s national welfare through lower real manufacturing consumption
is more than compensated for by increased real non-manufacturing consumption (1  )Xkl, which
in turn comes at the expense of real manufacturing consumption everywhere else. By deviating from
global free trade, country k gains by a transfer of real resources from every other country to itself.
Since any country k 2 N can increase national welfare by increasing tariffs on imports from every
other country l 2 N , such that d
d tkl
lnWk > 0, equation 65 tells us that starting from a world free trade
scenario, any country can improve manufacturing sector terms-of-trade by erecting tariff barriers , asX
i2N

Qki ln c
0
k  Xki ln c
0
i

> 0:
The interpretation of this result is the ability of national governments to exercise market power by
manipulating the production costs and hence prices of their countries’ exports through tariff policy.
The stochastic distribution of manufacturing efficiencies ensures that for every country, there must
always exist some set of manufacturing goods for which the country is most efficient producer in the
world. Even in the presence of costs of international trade, there would always be some goods for
which a country is the monopoly supplier. However, perfectly competitive markets for manufacturing
goods prevents individual firms in any country from exercising market power, as competitive markets
prevents coordination of prices or output with other firms in the same country.
Governments have the ability to compensate for this lack of coordination. By increasing import tariffs,
the government in country k increases the cost of manufacturing and hence the pushing up the factory
gate price of manufacturing goods produced in the country. Theorem 4 ensures that the prices of
the country’s imported manufacturing intermediate goods do not increase as quickly as the country’s
exports as ln c0k > ln c
0
i for all i 6= k. Thus higher import tariffs increase average manufacturing value
added. Furthermore, part of the increase in prices of imported goods is recovered as tariff revenues,
partially off-setting any increase in expenditures on imported goods. In other words, tariff policy
could serve as a means of controlling the prices of a country’s exports, allowing a country to exercise
market power even in the presence of perfectly competitive markets. 37
37It is interesting to note that in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Figure 5 in page 1753 demonstrates that a country can gain by
raising tariff rates away from zero, with the same explanation of countries exercising market power through tariff policy.
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The discussion up to this point suggests that taking other countries’ tariff choices as given, there should
exist some positive country k import tariff vector (tk1; :::; tkN) 0N that maximizes national welfare.
Given the complexity of analysing changes in national welfare when countries impose positive import
tariffs rates, the analysis of countries’ optimal vectors of import tariffs lies beyond the scope of this
thesis, though potentially fertile ground for future research.
However, one could easily show that starting from a global free trade scenario, holding all other tariffs
constant at zero, there exists an tariff rate tkl > 0 that maximizes country k’s national welfare. We
have already established by Theorem 5 that when tkl = 0, we have lnW
0
k > 0 and country k can
improve national welfare by increasing tariffs rate on imports from country l.
On the other hand, if tkl is sufficiently high, national welfare could be increased by decreasing tkl. As
tkl approaches1, imports from country l would be priced out of country k’s markets, and kl = 0.
Since expenditure on imports from l is non-existent, so would country k’s tariff revenues. As tariff
tkl is lowered, imports from l increases, as would country k tariff revenues and hence national income
would increase. Gaining greater access to efficient country l producers lowers manufacturing prices
in country k and national manufacturing prices pk decreases. The increase in national income and
lowered manufacturing prices triggered by a decrease in tkl results in greater real national income -
welfare.
Then since lnW 0k is obviously continuous in tkl, limtkl!0 lnW
0
k > 0 and limtkl!1 lnW
0
k < 0 there
must exist some optimal tariff tkl 2 (0;1) that maximizes country k welfare. An analytical charac-
terization of the optimal tariff rate tkl here would be difficult, given the role played by terms-of-trade
effects in changes to national welfare. More precisely, the terms-of-trade effect resulting from changes
to manufacturing prices either positively or negatively impacts national welfare depending on the di-
rection of a country’s trade balance. However, the response of national trade balance to changes in
tariff policies is complex, complicating the analysis.
That aside, with Theorem 5 we could construct each country’s decision whether or not to deviate from
the global free trade arrangement as the classic prisoner’s dilemma game, in which every country
could gain by deviating from the jointly optimal outcome of global free trade, and every country loses
by others’ decision to do so.
From this game-theoretic perspective, it is clear that a global free trade agreement is not a Nash equi-
librium and hence would quickly unravel, at least in the context of the Eaton and Kortum trade model.
The typical means by which to resolve the coordination problem inherent in prisoner’s dilemma type
games is to establish punishment mechanisms for deviations from the desired outcome. Would it be
possible to establish the global free trade arrangement as a Nash equilibrium if countries are allowed to
respond to unilateral impositions of import tariffs by introducing tariffs on imports from the offending
country?
But their analytical result is based on the assumption that the manufacturing labor force in this country is arbitrarily small
compared to that of other countries. This assumption is required in their analysis to ensure that changes in this country
has no effect on any other countries, as the arbitrarily small workforce would imply that this country’s contributions to
international trade flows would be inconsequential.
Theorem 5 shows that even without the assumption of a vanishingly small labor force, a country can benefit from raising
tariffs away from global free trade.
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To simplify the analysis, we consider this issue in the context of a symmetrical world.
Definition 6. A symmetrical world is one in which every country is identical, as are the trade costs
between each pair of countries. For each country n 2 N , national technology level Tn = T , national
labor force Ln = L and national wage rate wn = w for some constants T , L and w. For each pair
countries n; i 2 N , we have trade costs dni = d for some constant d  1 if n 6= i and dnn = 1.
In the global free trade scenario in a symmetrical world, national labor incomes, manufacturing prices,
revenues and expenditures are identical and no country runs a manufacturing trade surplus or deficit,
such that for all countries n 2 N , we have Yn = Y , pn = p and Xn = X = Qn. Since manufactur-
ing wages and prices are identical between countries, national manufacturing expenditure shares on
domestically sourced goods must be identical as well, such that nn = , and by the same reasoning
expenditure shares on imports from other countries must be also identical, such that ni = 1 N 1 for all
n 6= i.
Lemma 6. Under a global free trade scenario with symmetrical countries, the following holds:
• for any n; i 2 N , d ln ci
d tin
= c;
• for any n; i; j 2 N with i 6= j, d ln ci
d tjn
= c,
for some c > c > 0.
Proof. Because d ln ck
d tkl
> d ln cn
d ln tkl
> 0 for all n 6= k by Theorem 4 and because all the countries and
trade costs are identical the result is direct.
Proposition 13. Under a global free trade scenario with symmetrical countries, suppose country k
deviates from the global free trade agreement by introducing import tariff tkl = t > 0 for on
imports from some country l 2 Nnfkg.
Let A  Nnfkg denote the set of countries that punishes this unilateral deviation by introducing
tariffs on imports from k, such that for all n 2 A; we have tnk = t.
Denote the total change in the logarithm of national welfare in country i 2 N by
 lnWi :=
 
d lnWi
dtkl
+
X
n2A
d lnWi
dtnk
!
t:
Then,
 lnWi =
8<:

1  jAj
N 1

Bt if i 2 A [ fkg
  jAj+1
N 1 Bt otherwise
;
where B = XY (1  ) (c  c) > 0.
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Proof. Suppose country k introduces tariffs on imports from country l such that tkl = t that is
sufficiently small. In the mobile labor scenario, equation 57 could be written in matrix form as
L(lnW 0n) = D(Yn) 1D(Xn)
h
klk + L(ln c
0
n)  L(ln p
0
n)
i
:
Since L(ln p0n) = L(ln c
0
n) + klk, and given the symmetrical countries assumption, nn =  and
ni =
1 
N 1 for all n 6= i, Yn = Y and Qn = Xn = X for all n 2 N , we have
L(lnW 0n) = D
 X
Y

[I  ]L(ln c0n);
and for each country n 2 N , the change in welfare in response to some marginal increase in tkl is
d
d tkl
lnWn =
X
Y
(1  )
 
ln c0n  
NX
i 6=n
ln c0i
N   1
!
=
8<: 
X
Y
(1  )   c c
N 1
 8n 6= k
X
Y
(1  ) (c  c) n = k;
with the second equality by Lemma 6.
Suppose each country h 2 A retaliates by introducing thk = t = tkl: By symmetry of the
countries,
d lnWh
d thk
=
d lnWk
d tkl
= B;
where B = XY (1  ) (c  c) > 0 and
d lnWi
d thk
=
d lnWn
d tkl
=   B
N   1 :
for all i 6= h and n 6= k.
A country increasing tariff rates enjoys an increase in national welfare of B as a direct consequence
of its actions, while all other countries suffer decreases of national welfare   B
N 1 .
Suppose country n 2 NnA [ fkg, such that n is a bystander country maintaining no tariff barriers.
Then the cumulative negative welfare effects of the jAj+ 1 tariff increases by countries h 2 A[ fkg
is
 lnW 0n =
0@ X
h2A[fkg
d lnWi
dtnk
1At
=  
 jAj+ 1
N   1 B

t:
Countries i 2 A [ k suffer jAj negative effects from the jAj other countries’ decisions to increase
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tariff rates, when enjoying a positive effect from its own imposition of tariffs. Hence for all i 2 A[k,
 lnW 0i =
0@d lnWi
d tik
+
d lnWi
d tkl
+
X
h2Ani
d lnWi
dtnk
1At
=

1  jAj
N   1

B:
Proposition 13 implies that deviating from global free trade is a weakly dominant strategy even if the
punishment mechanism is implemented. Every country enjoys increases in welfare from unilaterally
deviating from a global free trade agreement whenever retaliation is not universal,38 i.e. if A 
Nnfkg. If retaliation is universal, i.e. ifA = Nnfkg, deviating from the global free trade arrangement
does not make the deviating country worse off.
When a set A is a singleton, we immediately obtain the following result as a corollary to Proposition
13. It simply states that when country k and country l increase tariffs on imports from each other,
these two countries gain, while the remaining countries loses.
Corollary 1. Under a global free trade scenario with symmetrical countries, when tkl = tlk =
t > 0 fort sufficiently small, then lnWk > 0, lnWl > 0, and lnWn < 0 for n 2 Nnfk; lg.
Corollary 1 states that there is always a pair of countries who are better off not joining a global free
trade network.
Within a partial equilibrium framework under the assumption of symmetrical countries, Furusawa
and Konishi (2007) demonstrated that global free trade is a stable network in the sense of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996). In their definition, a pairwise stable network is a network in which no country has
an incentive to cut a link with another and for any unlinked pair of countries, at least one of them has
no incentive to form a link with the other.
A bilateral free trade agreement between countryn and i can be thought as a link, which is an unordered
pair of two countries. A global free trade agreement, as conceptualized as the collection of bilateral
free trade agreements between all possible pairs of countries, would therefore be represented from the
network perspective as a network in which every country is linked with every other country.
Since Corollary 1 indicates at least 2 countries would find it welfare enhancing to abandon their bi-
lateral free trade agreement, i.e. to extinguish the link between their respective nodes, in contrast to
38Proposition 13 also implies that the design of the punishment mechanism for unilateral deviation from global free
trade is important in determining the effectiveness of the punishment mechanism in maintaining global free trade as a
stable outcome. Once again, suppose country k imposes tariffs on imports from some country l. If the rules of the free
trade agreement only allows the country transgressed upon to retaliate, then lnWk > 0 (as in Corollary 1) and country k
is still better off by deviating. However, if collective punishment is allowed, that is, if every country is allowed to impose
tariffs on imports from the transgressing country k, then lnWk = 0 and country k does not have an incentive to deviate.
But the effectiveness of the punishment mechanism is fragile. Even if collective punishment is permitted, it could be
easily shown that country k might find it best to simply impose tariffs on imports from every country i.e. tki > 0 for
all i 2 Nnk, since the eventual punishment would be the same, that every country imposing tariffs on imports from k. It
is in fact the case that punishment, no matter whether individual or collective, would not be effective in maintaining the
global free trade arrangement.
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Furusawa and Konishi, we find that a global free trade scenario does not represent a pairwise stable
network, at least within the context of the Eaton and Kortum trade model.
Analytical results for the immobile labor scenario, under similar assumptions of global free trade and
symmetrical countries are presented in the Appendix.
8 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we perform numerical simulations to examine how the fundamental variables of the
model such as tariff rates, the presence of intermediate goods, the relative level of technology and
labor forces, affect the welfare consequences of preferential trade agreements.
The numerical simulations in this section are aimed to develop a better understanding of direction of
changes to welfare, prices and trade patterns, brought on by the implementation of preferential trade
agreements, particularly as an avenue to apply and discuss our theoretical results obtained previously
in the thesis.
It must be noted that the results here are not intended as a guide to the consequences of real world
examples of trade agreements, as the baseline scenario implemented in the numerical simulations here
is strictly hypothetical, with many parameters chosen for computational convenience.
8.1 Simulation Method
The conventional method to conduct comparative statics used in Eaton and Kortum (2002) requires
the full set of model parameters: the values of , , , the matrix of geographical distancesM
 
dni

,
the vector of manufacturing technology levels L (Tn), the vector of total labor forces in each nation
L(Ln), and the vector of wages in each nation L(wn).
In this section we use a different method that can be conducted with less information on parameters
and does not require computing a fixed point as a solution to the system of equations. This method
only takes bilateral trade and tariff data as exogenous information in addition to the values of , ,
and . In this method, we first obtain the trade share matrix M(ni). By equation 53, we obtain the
changes in the prices for all the countries and then the changes in the trade shares with Proposition
10. Simultaneously solving equations 61, 62, and 63, we obtain the changes in tariffs, manufacturing
revenues, and expenditures, which together with the changes in prices give us the changes in national
welfare by equation 57. We find the new equilibrium by numerically integrating the changes over the
tariff changes.
We consider a model with three countries. The baseline scenario for our counterfactural exercise
in one in which 39 each country imposes the same tariff rate t, on the manufacturing imports from
all other countries. We define a bilateral PTA as being formed when two countries agree to mutually
remove tariffs on the imports from each other, and examine how national welfare and other equilibrium
variables change for both member and non-member countries following the formation of PTAs.
39Our program is not confined to three countries, but can be applied to many countries, such that n > 3. However, it is
desirable to keep the analysis as simple as possible.
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In the benchmark scenario, all the countries are identical and trade costs are symmetrical. In other
scenarios, we make changes to initial tariff rates, the cost share of intermediate goods, the relative
technological levels and labor forces to see how welfare consequences for members and nonmembers
are influenced by each country’s characteristics.
8.2 The Benchmark Case
Table 1 provides the baseline levels of the parameters we use for the simulations. Dekle, Eaton and
Kortum (2007) suggest that  usually ranges from 0:25 to 0:5. We use 0:25. Following Dekle et al.
(2007) and Cheong and Takayama (2013), we use  = 0:28. Given that  only influences the absolute
value of manufacturing prices, but not the relative manufacturing prices or any other endogenously
determined variables, we simply set  = 1.40 We use  = 8:21 based on the estimations in Cheong and
Takayama (2013), for which Eaton and Kortum (2002) obtain a similar value.41 The two parameters,
wn = 2:35 and Ln = 247:14, are chosen for our convenience so that wages, prices, and hence trade
shares in equilibrium are the same for the mobile and immobile labor cases in the baseline setting.42
N = 3 dni = 1:2 8i 6= n  = 0:25  = 0:28  = 1
tni = 0:05 8i 6= n  = 8:21 Tn = 1 wn = 2:35 Ln = 247:14
Table 1: List of Parameters
Table 2 shows the changes in the equilibrium values in the benchmark case. We present the changes
in manufacturing trade deficits for country n, denoted by Dn, and the domestic trade share, nn in
absolute terms, and other results in % terms. In a symmetrical case, Dn is initially zero, and so the
40Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), we chose  = 1 for computational simplicity since the value of  is incon-
sequential when considering relative changes in prices, trade shares and national welfare. Quoting from footnote 18 of
Eaton and Kortum (2002): “While our framework allows for the possibility of inelastic demand (  1), we must restrict
 < 1 +  in order to have a well defined price index. As long as this restriction is satisfied, the parameter  can be
ignored, since it appears only in the constant term (common across countries) of the price index.”(emphasis added)
41Simonovska and Waugh (2014) suggest that a value for  of approximately 4 might be more appropriate. Numerical
simulation of the benchmark case were performed with  = 4. It was found that while the direction of changes in
equilibrium variables remains consistent with our chosen baseline scenario, the magnitude of the changes were different.
In particular, compared with our baseline settings, when using  = 4we found that the magnitude of welfare changes were
increased, while the magnitude of changes in trade flows (e.g. changes in own trade shares nn) were reduced.
These observations could be explained by recognizing that is a measure of elasticity of trade, the responsiveness of
trade flows to changes in trade costs. In the context of changes to tariff rates,  indicates the ease with which countries can
shift to lower cost suppliers when the imports from a particular country are made more expensive due to heightened tariff
barriers. It is hence no surprise that the size of change in trade flows was decreased when  was reduced from 8.21 (as in
our baseline settings) to 4, with changes in own trade sharesnn for member countries dropping from -0.04 to -0.02.
When buyers find it difficult to substitute towards lower cost suppliers in response to higher import tariffs, the welfare
effects of tariff changes would be amplified. Correspondingly, we naturally would associate lower values of  with greater
absolute sizes of changes in welfare associated with changes in tariff regimes. When  was decreased from 8:21 to 4, it
was found that the welfare decrease suffered by PTA member countries jumped from -0.41 basis points to -10.36 basis
points.
As this exercise shows, accurate estimates of  would be critical in the empirical application of the Eaton and Kortum
model.
42In this section, we only consider the case of mobile labor, because the purpose of the numerical simulations in this
section was to illustrate and discuss the theoretical results we have obtained for the mobile labor scenario. Numerical
simulation results and commentary for the immobile labor scenario are included in the appendix.
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ratio of changes is not well defined. In addition, nn is the proportion of expenditure on domestic
goods, and so absolute changes in nn are more appropriate.
As Yn = wn Ln + TRn, and labor income wn Ln is fixed, the change in tariff revenues affects na-
tional welfare. As tariffs are eliminated with a PTA, members lose tariff revenues, and so welfare
decreases when tariff rates are sufficiently high, as shown in Table 2. The reduction of tariff revenues
for members is around 50%, which may appear large. With the 3-country setting, initially, each coun-
try collects tariffs on imports from two countries. After the formation of a PTA, member counties
now obtain tariff revenues from only one country (the nonmember country), and tariff revenues fall
by approximately 50%.
As asserted in Theorem 4, the change in price is larger for member countries and thus own trade shares
decrease more. In this specific benchmark case, the nonmember country gains. As Theorem 4 also
states, own trade share in the nonmember country decreases and import expenditure increases, which
in turn increases tariff revenues. Combined with the lower prices, increased tariff revenues improve
nonmember country’s welfare.
Country n %Wn %TRn %Ln %pn Dn nn
Member -0.4 10 2 -54.22 5.17 -2.04 -5.02 -0.04
Non-Member 0.20 0.54 -7.14 -0.78 10.05 -0.01
Table 2: The Benchmark Case (unit: % except for Dn and nn)
8.3 Tariffs
In this subsection, we examine how the welfare consequences of a PTA are affected by a higher pre-
PTA tariff. We set the initial tariff rates before the PTA as 50%, instead of 5%. In this scenario, as
shown in 3, member countries are better off compared to the benchmark case. The decrease in price
is larger and so does the own trade share. Even though the tariff revenues decrease more, member
countries gain due to the substantial decrease in prices. From equation 58, the gains from sourcing ef-
ficiencies, which represent the second term, dominate the losses from tariff revenues, which represent
the first term.
In this scenario, the nonmember also gains. It is worth noting that the proportional increase of tariff
revenues of the nonmember country is much larger compared to the one in the benchmark case. This
is because countries’ initial import shares from others are very small due to the high initial tariff rates,
which generate very low initial tariff revenues, and consequently a very high proportional change for
a small absolute change of tariff revenues.
8.4 Intermediate Goods
By Proposition 11, particularly as described in equations (55) and (56), the indirect effects on prices
of a PTA are transmitted through trade in intermediate goods. Here, we study how the presence of
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Country n %Wn %TRn %Ln %pn Dn nn
Member 1.74 -73.52 2.93 -7.94 -2.71 -0.17
Non-Member 0.35 52.75 -4.52 -0.40 5.43 -0.01
Table 3: Changes for a Tariff Rate of 50% (unit: % except for Dn and nn)
intermediate goods affects welfare consequences of a PTA. In order to do so, we set the cost share of
intermediate goods 1    = :01 so that intermediate goods play a negligible role in production. 4
demonstrate that prices in nonmember countries are largely unaffected by the formation of a PTA as
the indirect effects on prices vanish and nonmember country’s welfare gains become negligible. The
only remaining effects are the direct effects of tariff changes on member countries.
Country n %Wn %TRn %Ln %pn Dn nn
Member 0.02 -52.78 1.07 -0.68 -0.91 -0.04
Non-Member 0.0510 2 0.03 -1.25 -0.02 10 1 1.82 -0.99 10 4
Table 4: Changes for Intermediate Goods,  = :99 (unit: % except for Dn and nn)
8.5 Technology
In this subsection, we consider how a country’s relative technological level affects the welfare con-
sequences of a PTA. A country’s technological level determines the competitiveness of its products
in markets and a country i with a higher technology level has a greater market share ni everywhere.
Here, we assume that one of the three countries has a higher technological level. Then, we consider the
following two scenarios. First, one country forms a PTA with the higher technological level country.
Second, the country forms a PTA with a country with the same technological level as itself.
Table 5 and Table 6 present the results of the first scenario and second scenario, respectively. Here, we
assume T1 = 1:5 and T2 = T3 = 1. Country 2 gains by forming a PTA with the similarly developed
country, while conversely loses if the other member country has a higher level of technology. The
primary factor driving this result is the change in tariff revenues. Country 2 imports substantially
more from the higher technological level country, country 1 than country 3. If it forms a PTA with
country 1, it loses the larger part of its tariff revenues. On the other hand, forming a PTA with the less
competitive country has only a smaller effect on tariff revenues.
Our finding does not support the “natural trading partners hypothesis” (see Krugman (1991), Summers
(1991) and Wonnacott and Lutz (1989)). As pointed out in Bhagwati (1993), the point of the natural
trading partners hypothesis is that a trading partner with which a country trades more would also be
a natural candidate as PTA partner, as such a PTA is less likely to be trade diverting. On the other
hand, Krishna (2003) uses U.S. trade data to empirically study this hypothesis, and find no evidence
to support it. In our analysis, from country 2’s point of view, higher technology country 1 which
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naturally trades more with country 2 (compared to country 3 with a lower level of technology), is less
desirable as a PTA partner.
Country n %Wn %TRn %Ln %pn Dn nn
1 0.0710 1 -53.85 4.08 -1.91 -4.60 -0.03
2 -0.02 -59.71 5.72 -2.28 -4.82 -0.04
3 0.21 0.28 -7.32 -0.83 9.42 -0.01
Table 5: Changes in the Technological Level when T1 = 1:5 (unit: % except for Dn and nn)
Country n %Wn %TRn %Ln %pn Dn nn
1 0.17 1.04 -6.58 -0.65 10.87 -0.01
2 and 3 -0.0410 1 -48.94 5.84 -1.91 -5.44 -0.03
Table 6: Changes in the Technological Level when N = 3 and T1 = 1:5 (unit: % except for Dn and
nn)
8.6 Trade Deficits
From equation 58, the initial level of trade deficits, Dn = Xn   Qn   TRn is an important determi-
nant of welfare effects upon a PTA. In this subsection, we consider how each country’s trade deficits
affect welfare consequences of a PTA. AsDn is endogenous in the model, we assume that one country
(country 1) has a greater national labor force and thus this country has a higher demand in manufac-
turing products than others. This country consequently runs trade deficits, while the other countries
run trade surplus before a PTA.
Table 7 presents the results. Unlike in other tables, in this table, we present Dn instead of Dn. A
positive Dn means that country n is running trade deficits before a PTA. The changes in prices and
own trade shares for the two member countries are the same. However, country 1 with trade deficits
gains after a PTA, while the other member country (country 2) loses.
Country n %Wn %TRn %Ln %pn Dn nn
1 0.06 -55.33 1.76 -2.04 6109.32 -0.04
2 -0.07 -52.76 9.30 -2.04 -3054.66 -0.04
3 0.19 -0.26 -7.80 -0.78 -3054.66 -0.01
Table 7: Changes for National Labor Forces when N = 3 and L1 = 2L2 (unit: % except for Dn and
nn)
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Part VI
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis we have provided an overview of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of international
trade including some recent literature underpinning the stochastic specification of production technol-
ogy used in the model.
We have provided proofs of existence of the general equilibria in the Eaton and Kortum trade model,
and the sufficient conditions for these equilibria to be unique.
The endogenously determined trade balance was also considered and a ‘nice’ analytical result was
obtained for the pattern of trade surpluses and deficits that would occur in the equilibrium of the
Eaton and Kortum trade framework.
Using the Eaton and Kortum (2002) general equilibrium model, we then proceeded to consider how
PTAs (through the prism of elemental cases of unilateral trade liberalization) affects both nonmem-
ber and member countries’ trade flows and welfare. Our main findings are summarized as follows.
First, when one country decreases tariffs on imports from another country, the price level decreases
in every country. Second, such trade liberalization by any number of countries leads to trade creation
everywhere as the domestic expenditure shares for all countries decrease. Third, some nonmember
countries may gain from a PTA. Finally, global free trade is not stable.
Various extensions are possible from here. Several recent extensions and applications of the Eaton-
Kortum model of international trade assume perfect substitutability of labor between different indus-
trial sectors (for example, Caliendo and Parro, 2015). In this thesis, we have focused on the case where
labor is mobile between sectors within a nation, although as our results on the immobile labor scenario
in the appendix also show that different assumptions of labor mobility result in some differences of
the outcomes. It might be interesting to extend our analysis to models with multiple manufacturing
sectors between which labor mobility is neither completely mobile nor immobile. Modelling sectoral
labor forces imperfect substitutes would allow for endogenously determined differentials in wages
between sectors with each country. This would be useful in analyzing changes in national income
inequality arising from trade liberalization policies.
Also, as the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model excludes capital flows, another interest avenue of future
research might involve modeling the non-manufacturing good as financial assets, the trade of which
generates international capital flows. However, since demand for financial assets are determined at
least in part by expectations of future consumption, an extension of the Eaton and Kortum trade frame-
work to accommodate multiple time periods might be required. The flipside of future consumption
is of course current investment. It would also be interesting to see it might be possible to incorporate
investment into technology augmenting capital goods.
Another extension would be to study the process of coalition formation. In this thesis, we simply
considered the case of global free trade, in a sense, a grand coalition of all trading nations. Our analysis
of national welfare consequences of individual trade agreements, viewed as stepping stones towards
a global free trade agreement, could useful in analyzing complicated sequential trade negotiations.
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Finally, as alluded to in the discussion after Proposition 6, the triangular inequality assumption for
trade costs in the context of the Eaton and Kortum trade framework, precludes the possibility of en-
trepots. In empirical studies employing the Eaton and Kortum trade framework, this often results in
entrepots such as Singapore being omitted from the data set used, or being amalgamated into arguably
unnatural economic units with other larger countries.43 It might be interesting to see if entrepots might
be admitted in the analysis by relaxing the triangular inequality assumption and allowing for the pos-
sibility of trans-shipment. For example, the realized price of some good ! in country n might then be
specified as pn(!) = min fmini2N fpii(!)dnig ;mini;j2N fpii(!)dnjdjigg, with the entrepot country
j potentially earning revenues pii(!)dji (dnj   1).
43For example, in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Singapore was combined withMalaysia and the Philippines into one single
economic ‘country’.
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Part VII
Appendix I: Immobile Labor Scenario
Numerical Simulation
9 Immobile Labor Scenario Simulation Method
Our procedure to compute an equilibrium is as follows. We denote each variable under mobile and
immobile labor cases by superscriptM and I, respectively. In order to ensure comparability across
mobile and immobile labor cases, we need to ensure that prices, expenditure shares, national income
and national welfare are equal across the mobile and immobile labor cases in the starting baseline
scenario. In this way, we can make sure that the starting economic situation is the same between the
two cases and compare how the labor mobility assumptions could affect welfare consequences of an
PTA.
We take as exogenously given parameters, the values of , , , the matrix of geographical dis-
tances M
 
dni

, the vector of manufacturing technology levels L (Tn) and the vector of total labor
forces in each nation L For the purposes of immobile labor scenario, we also take the vectors of
non-manufacturing income L
 
Y On

and manufacturing labor force L
 
LIn

as exogenously given.
The matrix of tariffs M (tni) is determined by the PTA combinations. For the baseline scenario in
which PTA’s do no exist, tni = t for all n 6= i, and 0 otherwise. For cases in which any country k
forms a bilateral PTA with another country l, tkl = tlk = 0, with all other tariff rates remaining the
same as in the baseline scenario.
To ensure comparability between the cases of mobile and immobile labor, we set wages in the mobile
labor case to equal equilibrium manufacturing wages in the baseline scenario of the immobile labor so
that wMn = wIn holds for every n. This ensures that equilibrium manufacturing prices and expenditure
shares are exactly the same between the mobile and immobile labor cases in the baseline scenario, and
pMn = p
I
n and Mni = Ini hold (denoted by pn and ni, respectively).
The welfare consequences of PTA differs between the mobile and immobile labor cases. The key
points that we stress here are:
• in the case of mobile labor, technological level is more relevant than other factors;
• in the case of immobile labor, manufacturing labor forces and nonmanufacturing income are
also important factors;
• in the case of immobile labor, there is a positive relationship between trade balance and welfare
consequences.
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9.1 Numerical Simulations
We numerically calculate the changes in the equilibrium variables, across the nations, and also com-
pare differences in outcomes under the immobile labor cases with the ones in the mobile labor case. By
using parameters in Table 1, we choose Ln = 60 and Y On = 440 so that wages, prices and hence trade
shares in equilibrium are the same between the mobile and immobile cases in the baseline scenario.
The last two sections are particularly for the case of immobile labor.
9.2 Simulation Results
9.2.1 Mobile and Immobile Labor Cases
Consider the welfare changes associated with the establishment of a PTA under the two different
assumptions in labor mobility. In the case of mobile labor, as 1 = wn Ln
Yn
+ TRn
Yn
, the change in welfare
is brought by the change in tariff revenues. In the case of immobile labor, it has more complicated
channels and because 1 = Y
O
n
Yn
+ Qn
Yn
+ TRn
Yn
, both tariff revenues and changes in production become
important in determining welfare consequences. Notice that if Y
O
n
Yn
is larger, Qn
Yn
+ TRn
Yn
is smaller.
In the mobile labor scenario, members lose tariff revenues and so welfare decreases when tariff rates
are moderate. When tariff rates are very high, even members gain, because efficiency dominates tariff
revenues. Nonmembers always gain due to the positive externality of lower prices. In the immobile
labor case, the effects are opposite in that members gain and nonmember lose through wage changes.
Wages increases for members and decreases for nonmembers. The following table summarizes these
points.
The following table is the outcome in the immobile labor case of the benchmark scenario in Table 2.
Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
Member 0.13 -51.04 2.12 -0.41 -0.10 -0.04
Non-Member -0.07 -1.76 -0.12 0.09 0.21 0.0410 1
Table 8: Immobile Labor Case when N = 3 (unit: 0:01%)
The following table is the outcome in the immobile labor case of the scenario in Table 3.
Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
Member 1.80 -63.26 2.16 -6.02 -1.04 -0.17
Non-Member 0.09 11.98 -2.16 -2.26 2.09 -0.0210 1
Table 9: When N = 3 (unit: 0:01%)
The following table is the outcome in the immobile labor case of the scenario in Table 4.
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Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
Member 0.04 -51.23 0.54 -0.19 0.04 -0.04
Non-Member -0.03 -2.59 0.11 0.20 -0.09 0.0610 1
Table 10: Immobile Labor Case when N = 3 and  = :99 (unit: 0:01%)
9.2.2 Technology
The following table is the outcome in the immobile labor case of the scenarios in Table 5 and Table 6,
respectively.
Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
1 0.16 -50.48 1.97 -0.27 -0.42 -0.04
2 0.10 -56.90 2.29 -0.59 0.22 -0.05
3 -0.07 -1.70 -0.14 0.09 0.21 0.0410 1
Table 11: Immobile Labor Case when N = 3 and T1 = 2 (unit: 0:01%)
Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
1 -0.07 -1.90 -0.09 0.10 0.19 0.0410 1
2 and 3 0.12 -45.70 2.13 -0.37 -0.11 -0.04
Table 12: Immobile Labor Case when N = 3 and T1 = 2 (unit: 0:01%)
9.2.3 Nonmanufacturing Income and Trade Imbalance
If a country has a relatively small nonmanufacturing sector, then in the immobile labor case the country
tends to gainmore by joining the PTA,while losingmore if excluded. In Table 17 and Table 13, country
1 has a smaller nonmanufacturing income Y O1 = 220. The intuition is that country 1 relies heavily on
manufacturing for a national income. Thus its manufacturing exports is more important and joining
the PTA increases its international market shares. However, if excluded, trade is diverted to the other
countries.
It is also understandable that country 2 gains more by forming a PTA with country 3, rather than with
country 1. Country 3 has a larger economy and the effects on prices and wages are of a larger scale
when country 2 and 3 form a PTA. Table 17 demonstrate the differences between the two scenarios.
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Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
1 0.33 -49.99 2.47 -0.19 -0.72 -0.05
2 0.02 -55.23 1.76 -0.61 0.57 -0.04
3 -0.07 -1.70 -0.11 0.11 0.16 0.0410 1
Table 13: Immobile Labor Case when PTA = f1; 2g and Y O1 = 220 (unit: 0:01%)
Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
1 -0.09 -2.09 -0.11 0.11 0.16 0.0410 1
2 and 3 0.11 -47.66 2.19 -0.34 -0.10 -0.04
Table 14: Immobile Labor Case when PTA = f2; 3g and Y O1 = 220 (unit: 0:01%)
n = 1 Dn =  34:23
n 6= 1 Dn = 17:12
Table 15: Baseline Manufacturing Trade Imbalance when N = 3 and Y O1 = 220
9.2.4 Manufacturing Labor Forces
If a country has a smaller manufacturing labor force (Ln), then in the immobile labor case the country
gains less by joining the PTA, while other members gain more. In Table 16, country 1 has a smaller
manufacturing labor force L1 = 30. Country 1 manufacturing wages tend to be higher because of the
relative scarcity in labor, and hence country 1 is less competitive in the international market. Lowering
trade barriers results in greater imports and lower exports.
Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
1 0.04 -52.42 2.52 -0.71 0.55 -0.05
2 0.17 -37.58 1.84 -0.02 -0.77 -0.03
3 -0.07 -2.00 -0.07 0.14 0.16 0.0410 1
Table 16: Immobile Labor Case when PTA = f1; 2g and L1 = 30 (unit: 0:01%)
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Country n %Wn %TRn %wn %pn Dn nn
1 -0.07 -1.42 -0.20 0.07 0.20 0.0410 1
2 and 3 0.14 -63.01 2.10 -0.49 -0.08 -0.05
Table 17: Immobile Labor Case when PTA = f2; 3g and L1 = 30 (unit: 0:01%)
n = 1 Dn = 35:92
n 6= 1 Dn =  17:93
Table 18: Baseline Manufacturing Trade Imbalance when N = 3 and L1 = 30
Part VIII
Appendix II: Immobile Labor Comparative
Statics
In this appendix, we provide some results on unilateral deviations from global free trade in the immo-
bile labor scenario, specifically, the welfare effects of an imposition of tariff rate tkl > 0. This result
is presented in Proposition 15.
Due to the complexity44 of equilibrium changes in the immobile labor scenario, we only provide results
for a scenario in which some country k unilaterally deviates from global free trade in a symmetrical
world, a world analogous to the one defined in Definition 6 of the main text. Due to the limited results
obtained in the immobile labor scenario, commentary would be kept to a minimum.
10 Derivatives in the General Case
The general case here refers to the Eaton and Kortum (2002) general equilibrium model in general, in
the sense that results in this section applies to both the mobile and immobile labor scenarios.
1. Let t := M( ni
1+tni
). Then
d
dtkl
 := M
 d
dtkl
ni

=  
h
D(ln c0n)  D(ln p
0
n)
i
   kl
1 + tkl
k
>
l
d
dtkl
t := M
 d
dtkl
ni
1 + tni

=  
h
tD(ln c0n)  D(ln p
0
n)t
i
  (1 + ) kl
(1 + tkl)
2 k
>
l
Proof. The basic concept is to take the log-derivatives. Notice that ni = Tic
 
i
d ni (1+tni)
 
p n
, and that
Ti and dni are fixed parameters, and d tnid tkl = 0 if (k; l) = (n; i) and 0 otherwise, hence
44As an illustration of the complexities involved, this entire Appendix, with at least 10 lemmas and propositions, is
constructed merely to present the relative welfare effects in Proposition 15.
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ddtkl
ni
1 + tni
=
ni
1 + tni

d
dtkl
lnni   d
tkl
ln (1 + tni)

=
ni
1 + tni
d
dtkl
 
ln
 
Ti d
 
ni
   (ln ci   ln pn)  (1 + ) ln (1 + tni)
=
8<: 
ni
1+tni
 
ln c0i   ln p0n

for (n; i) 6= (k; l)
  kl
1+tkl

ln c0l   ln pk   (1 + ) 11+tkl

otherwise:
Consolidated intomatrix form, we get the expression as presented in the statement of the lemma above.
The derivation for d
dtkl
 is found in Proposition 10.
SinceQn =
P
i2N
in
1+tin
Xi, it is always the case thatL(Qn) = t>L(Xn). SinceTRn = Xn
P
i2N
tni
1+tni
ni =
Xn
P
i2N

1  ni
1+tni

, collected into matrix form, we have L(TRn) = D(Xn) [I  t] 1N . This pro-
vides us with the next result on the derivatives of tariff revenues and manufacturing revenues.
Lemma 7. Since L(TRn) = D(Xn) [I  t] 1N , we have
L(TR0n) = D(
TRn
Xn
)L(X 0n) + 
h
M(Qrni)>D(ln c
0
n)  D(ln p
0
n)M(Qrni)>
i
1N + (1 + )
Xkl
(1 + tkl)
2 k:
(69)
Since L(Qrn) = t>L(Xn), we have
L(Qr0n ) = t>L(X
0
n)  
h
D(ln c0n)M(Qni) M(Qni)D(ln p
0
n)
i
1N   (1 + ) Xkl
(1 + tkl)
2 l: (70)
Notice that the country increasing the tariffs, k, enjoys an immediate increase to tariffs, (1 + ) Xkl
(1+tkl)
2
equivalent to the loss of revenue suffered by country l, whose exports on are being acted against.
Proof. Since L(TRn) = D(Xn) [I  t] 1N , taking derivatives w.r.t. to tkl, we have
L(TR0n) =

d
dtkl
D(Xn)

[I  t] 1N   D(Xn)

d
dtkl
t

1N
= D(lnX 0n)D (Xn) [I  t] 1N
+D(Xn)


h
tD(ln c0n)  D(ln p
0
n)t
i
+ (1 + )
kl
(1 + tkl)
2 k
>
l

1N
= L(TRn
Xn
)L(X 0) + 
h
M(Qrni)>D(ln c
0
n)  D(ln p
0
n)M(Qrni)>
i
1N
+(1 + )
Xkl
(1 + tkl)
2 k;
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with the second equality since
D(lnX 0n)D (Xn) [I  t] 1N = D(lnX
0
n)L(TRn)
= D(TRn)L(lnX
0
n)
= D(TRn
Xn
)L(X 0n):
The proof for the expression for L( d
dtkl
Qrn) is similar, noticing that
d
dtkl
t> =

d
dtkl
t
>
:
11 Derivatives in Immobile Labor Scenario
In the immobile labor scenario, we have L(Xn) = L(Qn) + L(TRn) + L(Y On ) where  :=
1   (1  ), and Y On is exogeneously determined non-manufacturing income.45 Taking derivatives
with respect to tkl, we have L(X
0
n) = L(TR
0
n) + L(Qr
0
n ).
Lemma 8. The vector of derivatives of national expenditure on manufacturing goods is given as:
I  D

TRn
Xn

  t>

L(X 0n) =



d
dtkl
t>

D (Xn)  D(Xn)

d
dtkl
t

1N
= 
h
M(Qni)>D(ln c
0
n)  D(ln p
0
n)M(Qni)>
i
1N
+
h
M(Qni)D(ln p
0
n)  D(ln c
0
n)M(Qni)
i
1N
+(1 + )
Xkl
(1 + tkl)
2 (k   l) :
Proof. The result follows immediately from substituting expressions for L(TR0n) and L(Q
0
n) from
Lemma 7 into L(X 0n) = L(TR
0
n) + L(Qr
0
n ).
Lemma 9. Since manufacturing wages is L(wn) = D(LMn ) 1L(Qn) where  is the labor share of
income in the manufacturing sector and LMn is the fixed national manufacturing labor force, we have
L(lnw0n) = L(lnQ
0
n):
And since L(lnw0n) + (1  )L(ln p0n) = L(ln c0n) and L(ln p0n) = L(ln c0n) + kl1+tkl k, it follows
immediately that
L(lnw0n) = [I  (1  )]L(ln c
0
n)  (1  )
kl
1 + tkl
k:
45An alternative interpretation of Y On would be that Y On represents country n’s before-trade stock of financial assets.
Since the non-manufacturing good is defined as the numeraire good, and trade in the non-manufacturing good is costless,
this characterization fits well.
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Lemma 10. LetWn := Y
O
n +wnLn+TRn
pn
denote country n’s aggregate national welfare. The derivatives
of log-welfare with respect to tariff rate tkl is given as
lnW 0n =
1
Yn
h
Qn

lnw0n   ln p
0
n

+ TRn

lnTR0n   ln p
0
n

+ SMn ln p
0
n
i
; (71)
where SMn := Qn   (Xn   TRn) is national manufacturing trade surplus.
Notice that national welfare is increasing in manufacturing real wages, wn/pn and increasing in real
tariff revenues TRn/pn.
Proof. lnWn = lnYn    ln pn where Yn = Y On + TRn + Qn is national income. Hence
lnW 0n =
1
Yn

Y
0
n + Yn ln p
0
n

:
Since  is the share of national income spent on consumption of manufacturing goods, total national
manufacturing expenditure less expenditure on manufacturing intermediate goods equals Yn, such
that Yn = Xn   (1  )Qn:
Since national non-manufacturing income Y On is fixed by assumption, we have Y
0
n = TR
0
n + Q
0
n:
Substituting the two expression, Yn = Xn   (1  )Qn and Y 0n = TR0n + Q0n into the expression
for lnW 0n and some arrangement of the terms gives the required equation.
Comparing Lemma 10 and equation 58, bearing in mind that 
 
lnw0n   ln p0n

=  1

ln0nn in the
immobile labor scenario, we see that in the Eaton and Kortum trade model in general, national welfare
is governed by the same three factors, changes in own trade shares as a measure of efficiency of
production allocation, changes in real value of tariff revenues, and terms of trade effects between
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
12 Global Free Trade in the Immobile Labor Scenario
In this section, we obtain results for the immobile labor scenario of the Eaton and Kortum trade model,
under the assumption of global free trade, as defined in Definition 5.
Lemma 11. In the immobile labor scenario, under the assumption of global free trade,
1. t =  such that,
2. M(Qni)> = D(Xn) andM(Qni) = >D(Xn);
3. L(TR0n) = Xklk;
4. L(Q0n) = >L(X
0
n)   D(Qn) [I 	]L(ln c0n) + D(Qn) [kl	k   (1 + ) lkl], where
	 = M( ni) = D(Qn) 1M(Qni) and  ni := QniQn is the share of country n’s manufacturing
output sold to country i. Term 	 the export share matrix.
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Proof. As tni = 0 and TRn = 0 for all n; i andM(Qni)> = D(Xn), we have
L(TR0n) = D(Xn)
h
D(ln c0n)  D(ln p
0
n)
i
1N + (1 + )Xklk
= D(Xn)
h
L(ln c0n)  L(ln p
0
n)
i
+ (1 + )Xklk
= D(Xn) [ klk] + (1 + )Xklk
= Xklk:
The remainder of the results comes from substitutingt =  and	 = D(Qn) 1M(Qni) into equation
70.
Lemma 12. In the immobile labor scenario, under the assumption of global free trade,
[I  B]L(ln c0n) =
kl
1 + 

(1  ) k + 	k    (1 + ) Xk
Ql
l

;
whereB = 1
1+
h
(1  ) + 	+ 	D

Qn
Xn

[I  (1  )]
i
; and  =  ( + )  (1  ) Qrk
Xk
.
Proof. Under the world free trade scenario, the following statements hold
L(Q0n) = >L(X
0
n)  D(Qrn) [I 	]L(ln c
0
n)
+D(Qn) [kl	k   (1 + ) lkl]
L(X 0n) = L(Q
0
n) + klD(Xn)k
L(lnQ0n) =
1


[I  (1  )]L(ln c0n)  (1  ) klk

Substituting the second statement into the first and some rearrangement yields

I  >D(Qrn)L(lnQ0n) = D(Qrn) [kl ( + )	k   (1 + ) lkl]
 D(Qrn) [I 	]L(ln c
0
n):
Substituting L(lnQ0n) = L(lnw
0
n) =
1

 
[I  (1  )]L(ln c0n)  (1  )klk

into the above and
rearranging yields the slightly unwieldy expression
AL(ln c0n) = D(Qrn) [kl ( + )	k    (1 + ) lkl]
+ (1  ) kl

I  >D(Qrn)k;
where A :=

I  >D(Qrn) [I  (1  )] + D(Qrn) [I 	].
Consider the term

I  >D(Qrn): Since >D(Xn) = M(Qni) = D(Qrn)	, implying that > =
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D(Qrn)	D(Xn) 1, it follows that

I  >D(Qrn) = D(Qn)  D(Qrn)	D(QrnXn )

= D(Qn)

I 	D

Qrn
Xn

;
and we can rewrite the matrix A as
A = D(Qn)

I 	D

Qrn
Xn

[I  (1  )] +  [I 	]

;
and the expression defining L(ln c0n) as
I 	D

Qrn
Xn

[I  (1  )] +  [I 	]

L(ln c0n) = [kl (+ )	k    (1 + ) lkl]
+ (1  ) kl

I 	D

Qrn
Xn

k;
as we pre-multiply both sides of the equation by D(Qrn) 1: Rearranging the coefficient of L(ln c
0
n) on
the left hand side of the equation above yields,
[I  B]L(ln c0n) =
kl
1 + 

(1  ) k + 	k    (1 + ) Xk
Ql
l

whereB = 1
1+
h
(1  ) + 	+ 	D

Qn
Xn

[I  (1  )]
i
; and  =  ( + )  (1  ) Qrk
Xk
.
Unlike in the mobile labor scenario, the changes in immobile labor equilibrium arising from a change
in tariff rate tkl remains complicated, even with the assumption of global free trade. We shall simplify
the analysis even further by assuming a world with symmetrical countries.
13 Welfare Implications of Trade Liberalization
The analysis in the immobile labor scenario is complex. We provide some intuitive results by first
considering the simplest possible scenario, one in no country imposes a tariff on imports from any other
country, and in which every country is identical in every regard and the distances between each pair
of countries is exactly the same. Call this the symmetrical global economy scenario under immobile
labor assumptions.
Definition 7. In the symmetrical global economy in the immobile labor scenario, it is assumed that
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• Every country is identical, such that for each country n 2 N ,
Tn = T
Y On = Y
O
LMn = L;
where T ; Y O and L are exogeneously given constants.
• Manufacturing trade costs between each pair of countries is identical. For each pair of countries
n; i 2 N with n 6= i,
dni = d  1
Combining the symmetrical world and global free trade assumptions, it must also be the case that
tni = 0 for all n; i 2 N .
Since every country is identical to every other country in every way, it must be the case that equilibrium
prices and wages are the same across all countries such that for all n; i 2 N ,
wn = wi = w
pn = pi = p;
where w and p are some endogenously determined numbers.
It must also be the case that each country’s manufacturing output and expenditure must be the same
as all others, such that for all n; i,
Xn = Xi = X
Qn = Qi = Q:
Under the symmetrical world assumption, no country can run a trade surplus such that Qn = Xn for
every country n. If any country runs a manufacturing trade surplus, then by the symmetry of each
country’s circumstances, every country must run a trade surplus, which is an impossibility, given that
global manufacturing trade must balance. Hence
X = Q
or equivalently in vector form,
L(Xn) = X1N = L(Qn):
Lemma 13. In the immobile labor scenario, under the assumptions of global free trade and symmet-
rical world, for every country n, we have
nn =  :=
1
1 + (N   1)  ;
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where  := d . For every pair of different countries n 6= i,
ni = :
Let 2ni :=
P
j2N njji refer to the element of the matrix 2 on the nth row and ith column.
It is the case that
2nn :=
NX
j=1
njjn = 
2

1 + (N   1) 2
2ni :=
NX
j=1
njji = 
2
nn   2 (1  )2 ;
noting that the diagonal elements of2 are identical to one another, and that the off-diagonal elements
of 2 are also identical to each other. Denote 2 := 2 [1 + (N   1) 2], such that for all n, we have
2nn = 2:
Finally, it is the case that the manufacturing expenditure shares matrix is symmetric and is identical
to the manufacturing export share matrix, such that
 = > = 	:
Proof. For each pair of countries n; i, by the definition of manufacturing expenditure shares we have
ni =
Ti

wi p
(1 )
i
 
d ni
p n
:
nn = Tn

wn
pn
 
:
Under the symmetrical global assumption, we have Ti = T , wn = wi = w and pn = pi = p, and
dni = d, hence
nn = T

w
p
 
ni = T
 
w p1 
 
p 
d 
= T

w
p
 
d 
= nn d
 :
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Since nn +
PN
i 6=n ni = 1, and there are N   1 countries which are not country n, we have
nn +
NX
i6=n
nn d
  = 1
=) nn
 
1 + (N   1) d  = 1
=) nn = 1
1 + (N   1) d  :
Define  := 1
1+(N 1) d  . Then as ni =  = in for any pair of different countries n; i, the trade
share matrix  must be symmetric such that  = >:
Next, consider the elements of the matrix product, 2; and let  := d .
2nn =
NX
j=1
njjn
= 2nn +
NX
j 6=n
njjn
= 2 + (N   1) 22
= 2

1 + (N   1) 2 :
For the off-diagonal elements of 2, we have
2ni =
NX
j=1
njji
= nnni + niii +
NX
j 6=n;i
njji
= 22 + (N   2) 22
= 2

1 + (N   1) 2    1  2 + 2
= 2nn   2 (1  )2 :
Finally, we consider the matrix of manufacturing export shares,	 = M(Q
r
ni
Qrn
). In general the definition
of manufacturing export shares gives 	 = D(Qn) 1t>D(Xn). Under the free-trade assumption,
we have t = M( ni
1+tni
) = M
 
ni
1+0

= , and under the symmetrical world assumption, we have
D(Qn) = D(Xn) = XI, where I is the identity matrix. We have also just shown that  = > under
the symmetrical world assumption, hence
	 = D(Qn) 1>D(Xn)
=

1
X
I



XI

= :
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Lemma 14. In the symmetrical world scenario, it is the case that for all n; i,
 := nn > 
2
nn > 
2
ni > ni = :
Proof. We first show that 2ni > ni for all n; i. Since nn =  and ni =  for all n; i, and
 + (N   1)  = 1, we have
2ni =
NX
j=1
njji
= 22 + (N   2) 22
=  [1 +  (1  )]
> ;
hence 2ni > ni for all n; i:
Then since  = [1  (N   1) ] and2nn =
h
1 PNi6=n2nii, it follows immediately from2ni > 
that  > 2nn for all n:
Lemma 15. Define L(zn) := [I  B] 1 k, where B is given in Lemma 12. Then it is the case that:
• zn = zm for all n;m 6= k, and
• zk = maxi2N zi:
• Finally, it is the case that for any n 6= k,
 (1  ) zn =
 
[(1  ) + ]nk + [    (1  )] 2nk

(zk   zn) :
Proof. As defined previously, B = 0 + 12, where 0 = (1 )+1+ and 1 =
 (1 )
1+
. By the
definition of L(zn); we have 
I  0  12

L(zn) = k:
For any n 6= k, we have
zn   0
X
i
nizi   1
X
i
2nizi = 0
implying that
zn   0
 
nnzn +
X
i6=n
nizi
!
  1
 
2nnzn +
X
i6=n
2nizi
!
= 0:
Take any other m 6= n; k, and notice that since for all m;n; i, we have nn = mm = ; 2nn =
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2mm = 2; ni = mi =  and 2mi = 2ni = 2   2 (1  )2, we have
zm   zn = 0
 
mmzm   nnzn +
X
i6=m
mizi  
X
i 6=n
nizi
!
+1
 
2mmzm   2nnzn +
X
i6=m
2mizi  
X
i6=n
2nizi
!
=
 
0 (1  ) + 12 (1  )2

(zm   zn)
which implies that
(1   (1  ) [0 + 1 (1  )]) (zm   zn) = 0:
Since (1   (1  ) [0 + 1 (1  )]) 6= 0 as  (1  ) 2 (0; 1), , we must have zm   zn = 0 or
equivalently, zm = zn:
Next, we show that zk > zn for all n 6= k. [I  B]L(zn) = k implies that
zk   0
 
kkzk +
X
i6=k
kizi
!
  1
 
2kkzk +
X
i6=k
2kizi
!
= 1:
Since for any i; n 6= k we have ki = kn and zn = zi, such that
P
i6=k kizi = (1  kk) zn for some
arbitrary n 6= k, we can write the above as
zk   0 (kkzk + (1  kk) zn)  1
 
2kkzk +
 
1  2kk

zn

= 1:
Then, given that we can write for any country n,
zn   0 (nkzk + (1  nk) zn)  1
 
2nkzk +
 
1  2nk

zn

= 0;
taking the difference of the two equations above gives us
(zk   zn)  0 (kk   nk) (zk   zn)  1
 
2kk   2nk

(zk   zn) = 1
or equivalently,  
1  0 (1  )  1 ( (1  ))2

(zk   zn) = 1;
noting that  (1  ) 2 (0; 1).
It remains to be shown that 1  0 (1  )  1 ( (1  ))2 > 0.
If 1 > 0, then it is immediately obvious that 1 ( (1  ))2 < 1 (1  ) which then implies that
1  0 (1  )  1 ( (1  ))2 > 1  (0 + 1)  (1  )
> 0
since (0 + 1) = 1  (1 )1+ 2 (0; 1).
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Consider the case when 1 < 0. By contradiction, suppose that there exists w 2 (0; 1), such that
w21 + w0   1  0
or equivalently,
 w2 j1j  1  w0:
Since w 2 (0; 1) implies that w2 < w, it follows that
 w j1j >  w2 j1j  1  w0
=) 0 > 1  w0 + w j1j
= 1  w (0 + 1)
= 1  w

1   (1  )
1 + 

= 1  w +  (1  )
1 + 
:
But this implies that
1  w <   (1  )
1 + 
< 0
which then implies that w > 1 which is a contradiction, since w 2 (0; 1) by hypothesis.
Hence it is always the case that 1  0 (1  )  1 ( (1  ))2 > 0.
Then since
 
1  0 (1  )  1 ( (1  ))2

> 0, we have zk   zn > 0 for any arbitrary n 6= k as
required, and we have shown that zk = maxn zn.
We now show that final result of the lemma. Since for any n; i 6= k, it is the case that zn = zi, thenPN
i 6=k nizi = zn
PN
i6=k ni = zn (1  nk) and similarly,
PN
i6=k 
2
nizi = (1  2nk) zn. Therefore for
any n 6= k, we can write the nth row of [I  B]L(zn) = k as
zn   0 (nkzk + (1  nk) zn)  1
 
2nkzk +
 
1  2nk

zn

= 0;
or equivalently,
(1  (0 + 1)) zn =
 
0nk + 1
2
nk

(zk   zn) :
Since 1  (0 + 1) = (1 )1+ , dividing both sides of the equation by 1+ above yields the required
result.
Lemma 16. Define for any l 2 N , L(z(l)n) := [I  B] 1 l: It is the case that the lth element of the
vector,
z(l)l = zk
and all other elements n 6= k of the vector
z(l)n = zn:
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Let L(gn) := [I  B] 1k: Then it is the case that
gk = zn +  (zk   zn)
gn = zn +  (zk   zn) ;
for all n 6= k.
Since  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1), it follows immediately that
zk > gk > gn > zn;
for all n 6= k.
Proof. Define L(z(i)n) := [I  B] 1 i. It is clear that L(zn) as defined in Lemma 15 is identical to
L(z(k)n):
Let Pij := I (i   j) (i   j)> refer to the permutation matrix that interchanges the ith and jth rows
of any conformable matrix that it pre-multiplies, and interchanges the ith and jth columns of matrices it
post-multiplies. Since [I  B] has diagonal elements sharing a single constant value and off-diagonal
elements that similarly are identical to one another, it is easily verified that Pij [I  B] = [I  B]Pij .
It is then the case that L(z(i)n) = PijL(z(j)n), as
[I  B]PijL(z(i)n) = Pij [I  B]L(z(i)n) = Piji = j:
Pre-multiplying both sides with [I  B] 1 immediately gives the result
PijL(z(i)n) = [I  B] 1 j = L(z(j)n):
This means that for any arbitrary country i, the vectors L(z(k)n) and L(z(i)n) are identical, except
with the ith and kth elements of each vector interchanged, such that z(k)k = z(i)i and z(k)i = z(i)k,
and for all other n 6= k; i, we have z(k)n = z(i)n for any n 6= j; i.
Since z(k)i = zi, z(k)n = zn and for all n; i 6= k; zi = zn, and z(k)k = zk, we have shown that the
first part of the lemma holds.
We now consider the second part of the lemma concerning L(gn) := [I  B] 1k: Sincek = k,
the kth column of the trade expenditure share matrix, we can write
k = kkk +
NX
i 6=k
iki
= k + 
NX
i6=k
i:
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Then
L(gn) = [I  B] 1k
=  [I  B] 1 k + 
NX
i6=k
[I  B] 1 i
= L(z(k)n) + 
NX
i 6=k
L(z(i)n):
This implies that for the kth element of L(gn),
gk = z(k)k + 
NX
i6=k
z(i)k
= z(k)k +  (N   1) zn
= zk + (1  ) zn;
with the second equality since for all i 6= k, z(i)k = z(k)i = zi, and zn = zi for any i; n 6= k, and the
third equality since kk +
PN
i6=k ki = 1, kk =  and ki =  for all i 6= k, together implies that
 + (N   1)  = 1 or equivalently, (N   1)  = (1  ) :
For any j 6= k, for similar reasons, we have
gj = z(k)j + z(j)j + 
NX
i6=n;k
z(i)j
= zn + zk + (N   2) zn + zn   zn
= (N   1) zn +  (1  ) zn + zk
= (1  ) zn + zn +  (zk   zn)
= zn +  (zk   zn) ;
as required.
Proposition 14. In the symmetrical world scenario with global free trade and immobile labor,
ln c0k > 0 > ln c
0
n > ln c
0
l:
Proof. In the symmetrical world scenario, since 	 =  = >; and  is a matrix with diagonal ele-
ments of  = 1
1+(N 1) and off-diagonal elements of , we can write the vector of log-cost derivatives
w.r.t to tkl as
L(ln c0n) =

1 + 
[I  B] 1 [(1  ) k + k    (1 + ) l] :
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This can be rewritten as
L(ln c0n) =

1 + 
[(1  ) [L(z(k)n   L(gn)] +  (+ ) [L(gn)  L(z(l)n)]   (1  )L(z(l)n)] ;
where L(z(i)n) := [I  B] 1 i for any i 2 N , and L(gn) := [I  B] 1k.
By Lemma 16, let z := z(k)k = z(l)l and z^ := z(i)n for any n 6= i, noting that z > gk > gn > z^ for
all n 6= k. The change in manufacturing cost for country k, the country imposing the tariff, is given
as
ln c0k =

1 + 
[(1  ) [z   gk] +  (+ ) [gk   z^]   (1  ) z^] :
The change in cost for country l, is written as
ln c0l =

1 + 
[(1  ) [z^   gn] +  (+ ) [gn   z^]   (1  ) z^] ;
and the change in cost for all other countries n 6= k; l is given as
lnc0n =

1 + 
[(1  ) [z^   gn] +  (+ ) [gn   z]   (1  ) z] :
Since it is the case that
z > gk = z^ +  (z   z^) > gn = z^ +  (z   z^) > z^;
we have
ln c0k > ln c
0
n > ln c
0
l:
And since
 (1  ) zn =

((1  ) + )nk + ( (+ )  )2nk

(z   z^)
z   gk = (1  ) (z   z^)
gk   z^ =  (z   z^) ;
we have
ln c0k =

1 + 

(1  ) (1     nk) +  (+ )
 
   2nk

+ 
 
2nk   nk

:
Since nk = ; and 1    = (N   1) , we have 1      nk = (N   2)   0 since the nature
of a international trade model implies more than one country and the number of countriesN  2. By
the results of Lemma 14, it must be the case that  > 2nk > nk: Hence it must be the case that
ln c0k > 0:
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Since nk =  and 2nk =  + 2 (1  ), we can write  (1  ) z^ as
 (1  ) z^ =  [(1  ) +  (+ )]  + [ (+ )  ] 2 (1  ) (z   z^) ;
which when substituted into the expression for ln c0n combined with the fact that gn  z^ =  (z   z^)
gives
ln c0n =

1 + 
  (1  )  (2   (1  ))  2 (1  ) (z   zn) :
Since  (1  ) 2 (0; 1) implies that 2   (1  ) > 0, it must be that
ln c0n < 0:
Hence
ln c0k > 0 > ln c
0
n > ln c
0
l
where k is the country imposing tariffs, tkl, on imports from country l, and n 6= k; l is any arbitrary
third party country.
13.1 Welfare in Symmetrical Scenario with Global Free Trade
Lemma 17. In a scenario with global free trade (and not necessarily symmetrical scenario),
L(lnW 0n) = D(Yn) 1
h
D(Qn)L(ln c
0
n)  D(Xn)L(ln c
0
n)
i
;
or equivalently, for all countries n 2 N ,
lnW 0n =
1
Yn
"
Qnlnc
0
n  Xn
X
i
ni ln c
0
i
#
:
Proof. In general, for any arbitrary country n 2 N , changes in national welfare can be expressed as
lnW 0n = 1Yn

Qrn
 
lnw0n   ln p0n

+ TR
0
n   (Xn  Qrn) ln p0n

: Since ln c0n =  lnw
0
n + (1  ) ln p0n
implies that ln c0n = 
 
lnw0n   ln p0n

, we have
lnW 0n =
1
Yn
h
Qrn ln c
0
n + TR
0
n  Xn ln p
0
n
i
:
In matrix form, we can write
L(lnW 0n) = D(Yn) 1
h
D(Qn)L(ln c
0
n) + L(TR
0
n)  D(Xn)L(ln p
0
n)
i
:
In the world free trade scenario, L(TR0n) = Xkklk and D(Xn)L(ln p
0
n) = D(Xn)L(ln c
0
n) +
Xkklk; in which case we can immediately write
L(lnW 0n) = D(Yn) 1
h
D(Qn)L(ln c
0
n)  D(Xn)L(ln c
0
n)
i
:
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Proposition 15. In the symmetrical scenario, under global free trade arrangements,
lnW 0k > 0 > lnW
0
n > lnW
0
l
for n 6= k; l.
Proof. Under the symmetrical world assumption, under world free trade arrangements, the vector of
log-welfare derivatives with respect to tkl reduces to the simple expression
L(lnW 0n) =
X
Y
[I  ]L(ln c0n);
where X and Y are the common national manufacturing expenditures and national incomes shared by
all countries.
For country k,
lnW 0k =
X
Y
 
ln c0k  
NX
i=1
ki ln c
0
i
!
=
X
Y
 
NX
i=1
ki

ln c0k   ln c
0
i
!
:
Since ln c0k > ln c
0
n for all n 6= k, we must have lnW 0k > 0.
For all countries n 6= k; l,
lnW 0n =
X
Y
 
NX
i=1
ni

ln c0n   ln c
0
i
!
:
Since ln c0n = ln c
0
i for all countries n; i 6= k; l, we have
PN
i6=k;l ni
 
ln c0n   ln c0i

= 0: Furthermore,
nk = nl =  so we can write
lnW 0n =
X
Y


ln c0l   ln c
0
k

< 0
since ln c0k = maxi ln c
0
i > mini ln c
0
i = ln c
0
l.
Finally, for country l,
lnW 0l =
X
Y
 X
i
li

ln c0l   ln c
0
i
!
=
X
Y


ln c0l   ln c
0
k

+
X
Y
X
i6=k;l

ln c0l   ln c
0
i

:
Since XY 
 
ln c0l   ln c0k

= lnW 0n for any arbitrary n 6= k; l and
P
i6=k;l
 
ln c0l   ln c0i

< 0 as ln c0l =
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mini ln c
0
i, it immediately follows that
lnW 0l < lnW
0
n
for all n 6= l.
There is a difference in welfare consequences between the mobile and immobile labor scenario. In the
mobile labor scenario, lnW 0n = lnW
0
l for all n 6= k. In the immobile labor case, changes in tkl affects
the target of tariff policy tkl, the country l more negatively than third-parties, n 6= k; l, due to the
effects of reduced demand on country l’s output and consequent decreases in national manufacturing
wages. Further analysis is merited to disentangle the mechanisms by which manufacturing wages are
determined in the immobile labor scenario.
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